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
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The Natal rebellion of 1906



Walter Bosman



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THE NATAL REBELLION OF 1906

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THE NATAL REBELLION OF 1906

BY

WALTER BOSMAN

CAPTAIN, ENGINEER OFFICER, NATAL MILITIA STAFF; AIDE-DE-CAMP TO COL.
DUNCAN MCKENZIE, C.B., C.M.G., V.D.; ASSOCIATE MEMBER OF INSTITUTE
OF CIVIL ENGINEERS

AND AN INTRODUCTION BY

COL. DUNCAN MCKENZIE, C.B., C.M.G., V.D.

COMMANDING THE COLONIAL FORCES

*WITH TWENTY-ONE PORTRAITS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS
SEVEN PLANS AND A MAP*

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1907

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MOY VAN
ALLEN
VAGEL

PREFACE.

IN placing this volume before the public, the writer craves indulgence for its many shortcomings, which, it is hoped, are rather to be found in its literary merits than in its reliability as a faithful record of events.

The Native Rebellion in Natal, which would seem to have been—in the opinion of those persons, peculiar to Great Britain, who discredit their countrymen in the Dominions beyond the Seas—a matter for argument in courts of law or for settlement in the calm atmosphere of a Liberal cabinet meeting in London, loomed as ominously in the minds of many South Africans and seemed fraught with as grave danger to the Colony as did the hostilities between Britain and Boer in the year 1899.

The little Colony of 97,000 white people appeared to have an almost impossible task before it. A population of nearly a million natives, without exception as far as was known to the contrary, were prepared to take up arms; to loot and destroy the scattered homesteads which had taken years of patient labour to establish; to perpetrate upon gentle

women and tender children nameless barbarities which the savage mind alone can conceive ; and to drive the white man into the sea.

How the white people of Natal responded to the call to arms for the protection of their homes and for the vindication of their title to rule in the land of their adoption, and how that call also reached and was responded to by the sister Colonies in South Africa is set forth, however inadequately, in the following pages.

The task which Natal faced with so bold a front was indeed a great one. How great may perhaps be better understood when it is stated that the cost of the six months' military operations is estimated to be £1,000,000. In proportion to total population this is as great an expenditure to the Colony as would be the sum of £38,000,000 (approximately) to the United Kingdom, and it must be remembered that nine-tenths of the population of the Colony are little if at all removed from savagery.

The writer was fortunate in being attached throughout the operations to Colonel McKenzie's Staff, and is thus enabled to write as an eye-witness of the events described.

He is indebted to Colonel McKenzie for permission to refer to official documents in the field ; to Mr. John W. Shepstone for his criticism on Sigamanda's narrative of the murder of Piet Retief and his party ; to Major Rodwell and Captain Tanner for their valuable assistance in supplying any information he required ; to Mr. Lawrence Dundas and others for

the snapshots taken in the field ; and to Mr. Hopkins of Kearsney for the account of the raid on the store at Thring's Post.

The volume pretends to nothing beyond the telling of a plain unvarnished tale, and if it convey to the mind an accurate impression of the events in the abortive struggle of the Natal native and the Zulu to overthrow the government of the white man, its object will have been achieved.

BLAGDON, ALEXANDRA ROAD,
MARITZBURG, *7th October*, 1906.

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INTRODUCTION

BY COL. MCKENZIE, C.B., C.M.G., V.D.

CAPTAIN BOSMAN has been good enough to submit the MS. of his work upon the recent Native Rebellion for my perusal and comments.

Whilst I find it somewhat difficult to criticise a work which contains so much reference to myself, and to operations conducted under my command, nevertheless I feel that, without laying myself open to the charge of egotism, I can conscientiously characterise his efforts as a true and faithful portrayal of the history of the campaign, and am of opinion that as a record this book will be invaluable.

The exceptional and unique opportunities which Captain Bosman had, whilst on my Staff, of taking notes and observations at the time, peculiarly fit him as one to present to the public, which he does in this volume, an unvarnished account as an eye-witness, of the operations during the Rebellion.

It may not be out of place here to take this opportunity of expressing my very emphatic denial of the alleged atrocities imputed to the Colonial troops under my command, the reports of which I need hardly add

were without foundation. As regards the decapitation of Bambata, it is sufficient to say that this was rendered imperative in the cause of humanity.

In concluding my remarks upon a work dealing with this Rebellion, it is fitting that I place on record my high regard for and sense of appreciation of the troops employed. All, including those from the sister Colonies, under my command, cheerfully and loyally carried out my orders under, as I am aware, arduous and trying conditions; they were ever actuated by the one motive, "Duty to their country," to perform which they are, and have been, ever ready.


I trust that every success may attend Captain Bosman's efforts.

D. McKENZIE, *Col.*,
O. C. Troops.

COTSWOLD, NOTTINGHAM,
NATAL, *October, 1906.*

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.

T.M.R.	Transvaal Mounted Rifles.
C.M.R.	Cape Mounted Rifles.
N.N.C.	Natal Naval Corps.
N.C.	Natal Carbineers.
B.M.R.	Border Mounted Rifles.
N.M.R.	Natal Mounted Rifles.
U.M.R.	Umvoti Mounted Rifles.
N.D.M.R.	Northern District Mounted Rifles.
Z.M.R.	Zululand Mounted Rifles.
N.F.A.	Natal Field Artillery.
N.P.	Natal Police.
D.L.I.	Durban Light Infantry.
N.R.R.	Natal Royal Rifles.
N.M.C.	Natal Medical Corps.
N.V.C.	Natal Veterinary Corps.
N.T.C.	Natal Telegraph Corps.
N.S.C.	Natal Service Corps.
R.H.	Royston's Horse.
N.R.	Natal Rangers.
Z.N.P.	Zululand Native Police (Nongqais).





COL. DUNCAN MCKENZIE, C.B., C.M.G.
(From Photograph by W. L. Atwell).

CHAPTER I.

BYRNETOWN TRAGEDY.

TOWARDS the end of December, 1905, rumours of unrest and disaffection amongst the native population were freely circulated in the Colony. The killing of pigs, white fowls, and the discarding of European utensils by natives were also reported. Dinuzulu's name was invariably connected with these reports as being the chief promoter of the discontent. It was also contended that the payment of the poll-tax which fell due on 1st January would be used as a pretext for a general rising.

The first act of open defiance manifested itself on 7th February, 1906, at Henley on the occasion of the collection of poll-tax by the Magistrate of the Umgeni division from the Chief Mveli, when a party of twenty-seven natives fully armed assumed a threatening attitude. The party was identified by the Chief's brothers and their names taken.

On the following day fourteen Natal Police (Europeans) under the charge of Sub-Inspector Hunt proceeded to Hosking's farm ("Trewirgie") in the Byrne district, near Richmond, to effect the arrest of these

natives. It was just before sundown when the police brought away with them two of the natives handcuffed. They were pursued by an armed party who demanded the instant release of the two prisoners. This insolence Sub-Inspector Hunt treated with contempt, whereupon a conflict ensued resulting in the murder of this gallant officer and Trooper Armstrong.

On 9th February, martial law was proclaimed by His Excellency the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum. On the same day the right and left wings of the Natal Carbineers, two squadrons of the Border Mounted Rifles, and one battery of Field Artillery received orders to mobilise for active service. This force, which was subsequently augmented by the Natal Police Field Force and twenty Native Police (Nongqais) under Colonel Mansel, C.M.G., was placed under the command of Colonel Duncan McKenzie, C.B., C.M.G., V.D.

On 10th February the right wing Natal Carbineers, with the exception of the Richmond squadron (who remained at their headquarters), and the Natal Police Field Force concentrated at Thornville Junction.

On 11th February the left wing Natal Carbineers and two squadrons B.M.R. concentrated at Elands Kop on the Cape-Natal line.

On 12th February a combined movement was made on the scene of the outbreak from Thornville Junction, Elands Kop, and Richmond; the three forces joining hands that afternoon at Hosking's farm. The country *en route* was searched as far as possible for rebels but with no result.

The detachment of police under Inspector Lyttle, sent out immediately after Hunt's murder, was found all well on the farm.

On 13th February the country was searched and the crops and kraals of rebels were destroyed.

On 14th February two natives who had been arrested were tried by court-martial and condemned to be shot. In the afternoon the order was carried out in the presence of Mveli's men to whom the circumstances were fully explained.

The force reached Richmond that evening after a long and trying day.

For the sake of the moral effect on the natives who viewed the withdrawal of Imperial troops from the Colony as a mark of His Majesty's displeasure, application was made to the G.O.C. in South Africa to send a regiment to Maritzburg from Pretoria. The request was promptly acceded to, and the regiment of the 2nd Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders took up their quarters at Fort Napier, Maritzburg, on 13th February. The disaffected natives, who were followers of the Ethiopian movement, took refuge in the Enon bush towards the Umkomanzi. The loyal Chief Mveli made an offer to Government, which was accepted, to search for these rebels with five hundred followers.

On 21st February the rebels made a sortie and attacked Mveli, but were driven back with the loss of three killed and eight captured, including their leader, Majongo. In the engagement five of Mveli's men were wounded. This loyal Chief was accorded the

honour of parading his men before the Duke of Connaught during his visit to Pietermaritzburg in February, 1906, and was publicly thanked for his services by His Royal Highness.

The capture of the remainder of the rebels in the bush was left to the Natal Royal Regiment and the Natal Police aided by Mveli's men. By 5th March the whole of the rebel band had been captured or had surrendered.

CHAPTER II.

McKENZIE'S FIELD FORCE—THE NATAL CRISIS.

ON 19th February Colonel McKenzie's force left Richmond for Ixopo and Highflats to restore order and confidence in that part of the Colony in accordance with the following instructions from the Commandant of Militia:—

*Commandant of Militia to Lieut.-Col. McKenzie,
C.B., C.M.G., V.D.*

“MILITIA HEADQUARTERS,
“February 17th, 1906.

“With reference to our conference to-day at Richmond as to your further movements, the following was agreed upon:—

“On Monday next, the 19th instant, you will march with all your mounted men and one or two sections Artillery from Richmond to Springvale, crossing the Umkomaas by the Josephine Bridge, thence to Highflats and thence to Ixopo. From Ixopo you will proceed to Mabedhlana, thence to Bulwer and to Elands Kop.

“Circumstances may cause you to change this route, and you are not to consider yourself bound by it.

You will send two men with a message to Msikofeni and other Chiefs on your route before your forces approach their neighbourhood, assuring them that they need fear nothing from the column under your command.

“You will take care that nothing is done by your force to provoke an outbreak on the part of the natives.

“If Msikofeni does not come and pay his respects to you as Officer Commanding the Force, you will take this as a sign of fear, or as indicating that he is not as loyal to the Government as he professes to be; you will, however, take no action until you have gone on and given some of the smaller Chiefs an opportunity of coming to see you. By their demeanour, if they come to pay their respects to you according to native custom, or by their remaining aloof, you will try to form an opinion of their attitude towards the Government. You will then warn the Government (assuming that Msikofeni remains aloof) and report fully on the situation.

“You will also warn the residents at Ixopo, High-flats, Donnybrook, Umzinto and Dronk Vlei, and other places if necessary, to get their families into laager and be prepared to defend themselves if attacked. (I would favour one or two large laagers in preference to many small ones.)

“You will then summon Msikofeni to come and see you, assuring him of his personal safety. If he comes and explains his previous non-appearance to your

satisfaction, and effects the arrest of the members of his tribe who armed, he will not be punished, but if his explanation is not considered satisfactory you may, if you so think fit, punish him by a fine of cattle.

"If the Chief refuses or delays to come to you on being again summoned and warned that if he neglects to appear before you he will be severely punished, you will burn his kraal and seize his cattle at your discretion, and if you see fit, disarm his tribe and put down any armed resistance.

"Under no circumstances will you arrest the Chief if he attends before you.

"Any fine that you may impose you will collect from the Chief, by force if necessary.

"After having dealt with this Chief you may deal with the smaller Chiefs, if you have reason to think that they are defying Government.

"I wish to impress on you the necessity for great discretion, with the object of avoiding a conflict if possible, and if you should have reason to think that other tribes will be in sympathy with, and possibly assist Chief Msikofeni to resist, you will delay extreme or decisive measures until you have advised me, in order that I may have time to prepare reinforcements by mobilizing remainder of the Active Militia and possibly the 1st Militia Reserve.

"(Sgd) H. T. BRU-DE-WOLD,

"Colonel,

"Commandant of Militia."

The manner in which Colonel McKenzie carried out the foregoing instructions was fully dealt with in his dispatch of 25th February as hereunder:—

*The Officer Commanding McKenzie's Field Force to
the Commandant of Militia.*

"CAMP, STUARTTOWN, IXOPO,

"February 25th, 1906.

"SIR,

"Having reach Ixopo after marching through the heart of Msikofeni's tribe, and having interviewed him and other Chiefs, I beg to submit my report as to the general condition of affairs.

"On Tuesday the 20th instant the column arrived at Garland's Store, Springvale, and there bivouacked for the night.

"It was not intended originally to stay there that night, but as it was the closest point to Msikofeni's Kraal, I decided to stay with a view to giving Msikofeni an opportunity of coming to pay his respects to me if he so wished.

"Mr. Garland informed me that he had great influence with Msikofeni, and would try to bring him up if he so wished.

"I informed Mr. Garland that if he wished to go to Msikofeni and advise him privately to come, I had no objection. This he did, and about 5 P.M. Msikofeni, accompanied by Mr. Garland and a few followers, came to pay his respects to me.

"Lieut.-Col. Royston interpreted for me, and Lieut.-Col. Lugg, my Intelligence Officer, was also present.

"I told Msikofeni that I was pleased that he had come to pay his respects to me and that I wished to have a talk with him about the state of the country, it having come to the ears of the Government, whom I represented, that there was some unrest in the land, but as it was late I would not go into the subject then, but that I would send for him in the course of three or four days' time when I should expect him to come at once, probably either to Highflats or Ixopo.

"I have reliable information that Msikofeni's mother (who is a daughter of the late Chief Langalibalele) has great influence over the tribe, which influence she is using for a good purpose in trying to induce the young men to pay the poll-tax.

"The general impression is that there was great unrest in Msikofeni's tribe. Evidence goes to prove that Msikofeni's men did arm. Mamba is Msikofeni's Induna in charge on the north side of the Umkomaas. His son informed me that the war cry was given in his section of the tribe by an unknown person from the hills on his side without the Chief's knowledge. This however shows that the tribe was organised and ready.

"Mr. Garland considered that the natives generally were alarmed at seeing my force marching through the country, as there appeared to be, for some reason which has not transpired, a feeling through Msikofeni's people that he had been or was going to be arrested.

"Msikofeni is a young man of about twenty-five years of age.

"The column arrived at Highflats on the afternoon of the 21st February.

"Mr. J. Gold met me here and informed me that a reliable native of his had informed him that Msikofeni, Gileni, Munyu and Ngangezwe were to join with other Chiefs and break out into open rebellion on Sunday the 18th instant. This was the original programme and one which was upset by hearing that this column was at Richmond ready to advance through the country.

"From Highflats I had a telephonic conversation with the Magistrate, Ixopo, and asked him to order Chiefs Msikofeni, Bhekameva, Faku, Munyu, Gileni and Bhekakupiwa to appear before me at Ixopo, on Friday, the 23rd.

"Faku is reported to have doctored his tribe for war, but when I taxed him on the subject he denied it. However, I had information that he himself had two small scars on his forehead which were hidden by his headdress, which on removal exposed two small marks. He then admitted having doctored himself, but explained that it was on account of the illness of his child.

"This Chief and Munyu I distrust very much, although they both stated that they had given orders for their men to pay. Munyu did not appear when ordered to do so some time ago by the Magistrate, Ixopo, making the excuse that he was ill and stated that he had ordered his Induna to come in his place but the Induna had failed to obey him. He excused himself by saying he was too old to rule the tribe. I

informed him that so long as he was Chief he must obey orders given him by the Government, and that the responsibility of ruling his tribe rested with him, and that if he wished to abdicate he should inform the Government accordingly.

"I informed these Chiefs that they must come again themselves if called upon by me.

"Speaking generally on the situation in this district, I think there is no questioning the fact that great unrest has existed amongst the natives which has been caused by what the natives consider to be excessive taxation.

"There is no doubt that Chiefs have been communicating with each other with a view to combination, as in the imposition of the poll-tax they consider they have a general cause for complaint.

"The mobilisation of this column, consequent on the attack by Majongo's party on Police (which appears to have been premature from the general plan of operations by the disaffected natives) has undoubtedly upset the scheme which was hatching. This has been enhanced by the shooting of Majongo's men before Mveli's people, a fact which was known abroad through the land by the next morning, also of the burning of Majongo's kraals and destruction of his crops.

"The effect of the presence of this column has undoubtedly been good, by restoring confidence in the inhabitants and showing the natives that the Government is determined to stamp out any signs of rebellion or resistance.

"Both the Magistrate and myself feel that if Msikofeni and his people pay the poll-tax the others will follow suit, and it is to this end that I am now working. What the ultimate result will be it is impossible to say definitely, but I have every hope that the disaffection is now simmering out.

"I have, etc.

"(Sgd) D. McKENZIE, *Lieut.-Col.*,
"Commanding, McKensie's Field Force."

After restoring order in the Ixopo district the field force marched down to the south coast as far as Umtwalumi where Colonel McKenzie dealt with the recalcitrant tribe under Chief Charlie Fynn who had threatened the Magistrate of Alexandra County (Mr. Knight) at Nelson's Store on the 21st February. This tribe and their Chief were punished by a heavy fine in cattle, and the principal offenders tried by court-martial.

The evidence collected from some of the members of this tribe was of a revolting character. One of them divulged the method of barbarity which was to be adopted towards the white women of the Colony.

On 31st March the field-force was demobilised after having nipped in the bud the rebellion in the southern part of the Colony. The stern measures taken had the effect of keeping those natives quiet who gave no sign of trouble during the subsequent outbreak in Zululand and Natal.

The prisoners concerned in the murders of Sub-Inspector Hunt and Trooper Armstrong of the Natal

Police, and in the assault upon Sergeant Stephens and other members of the force, were tried by a general court-martial which assembled at Richmond on 12th March, 1906.

The prisoners were further charged with public violence for being in arms against the Government.

The court sat continuously until 19th March, when twelve of the prisoners were found guilty and sentenced to suffer death by being shot.

The finding and sentence of the court in the capital cases were duly submitted to the Governor for confirmation, who, after consulting the Executive Council in accordance with the terms of the Royal Instructions, confirmed the sentence.

The execution was fixed for 30th March at noon, and representatives from the surrounding native tribes were warned to be present.

The Governor informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies, by telegraph, of the confirmation of the sentence, and, on the evening of 28th March, received a reply by cable to the effect that the Governor should suspend the execution for the further consideration of the Home Government.

The Governor accordingly requested the Prime Minister (the Hon. C. J. Smythe) to give instructions to suspend the execution of the sentence, but the Prime Minister found himself unable to take that course, whereupon the Governor, in the exercise of his powers, gave directions to postpone the execution pending further consideration.

In view of the importance of maintaining the authority of the Government at that critical juncture, and of the constitutional question involved by the interference of the Secretary of State with the decision of the Executive Council of the Colony enjoying responsible government, Ministers felt themselves compelled to immediately tender their resignation to the Governor, but, at his request, consented to remain in office pending a further communication from the Secretary of State.

On 30th March the Secretary of State telegraphed to say that he had received the Governor's telegram of the previous day giving full information as to the procedure and circumstances of the trial, the opinion of the Attorney-General thereupon, the Governor's own careful examination of the whole case and evidence against each individual prisoner, and the conclusive manner in which the individual guilt of each prisoner was established. The Governor was also informed that His Majesty's Government had, at no time, had the intention to interfere with the action of the Responsible Government of Natal, or to control the Governor in the exercise of his prerogative, but that His Majesty's Government felt entitled, in view of the existing circumstances, and of the presence of British troops in the Colony, to obtain full information in reference to Martial Law cases in regard to which an Act of Indemnity would have ultimately to be assented to by the Crown, but that, in the light of the information furnished, His Majesty's Government

recognised that the decision of this grave matter rested in the hands of the Natal Ministers and the Governor.

The Secretary of State's telegram of 30th March, was laid by the Governor before his Ministers with a request that they would reconsider the question of their resignation, and, on the assumption that the order suspending the execution would be withdrawn, Ministers expressed their willingness to continue in office.

The Governor thereupon rescinded his order for the suspension of the sentence, and Ministers resumed office.

The sentence was carried out on Monday, 2nd April.

CHAPTER III.

LEUCHARS' FIELD FORCE—MAPUMULO.

WHILST one force was dealing with the native tribes in the Ixopo Division, it was found necessary to settle matters with the Chief Gobizembe in the Mapumulo Location. On the occasion of the collection of poll-tax at Allen's Store, there assembled Gobizembe and 1,000 of his men who openly defied the magistrate and treated him with deliberate disrespect. Mapumulo, the seat of the Magistracy, lies between Greytown and Stanger on the watershed of the Tugela and Umvoti Rivers. On the 24th February, the Umvoti Mounted Rifles, Natal Mounted Rifles, 100 of the Natal Naval Corps, one Battery Field Artillery and two companies of the Durban Light Infantry were mobilised for active service. This force was placed under the command of Colonel Leuchars, C.M.G. A simultaneous movement was made upon Mapumulo, the U.M.R. marching from Greytown and the other units from Stanger. On arrival at Mapumulo, Gobizembe was summoned to appear before the officer commanding. He was ordered to bring in the offenders of his tribe. After the exercise of much patience, Colonel Leuchars

sent an ultimatum on the 2nd March to Gobizembe to produce the natives who had insulted the Magistrate at Allen's Store by 10 A.M. on the 5th March. Gobizembe still procrastinated, and on the expiration of the ultimatum Colonel Leuchars destroyed his kraal by shell fire after having removed all women and children to a place of safety. Gobizembe was captured, a large number of his followers surrendered, and it was reported that the operations had subdued the whole tribe. Gobizembe was tried and deposed and banished from his location into Zululand. Colonel Leuchars' force was demobilised on 16th March, 1906.

CHAPTER IV.

BAMBATA—IMPANZA FIGHT.

IN the thorn country towards the Tugela, there dwelt a Chief by the name of Bambata. His tribe—known as the “Amazondi” (meaning “the haters”), derived from the patriarch Zondi who very many generations ago was the head of these people—had their habitations in four Magisterial divisions, *viz.*: Umvoti, 884 huts; New Hanover, 116 huts; Lions River, 93 huts; and Umgeni, 30 huts.

Bambata's father was Macinza, who married the daughter of Pakati, the grandfather of the present Chief Silwane, head of the Amacunu the most powerful tribe in Natal. Bambata's boundaries abut on the area occupied by his cousin Silwane's people.

Macinza, son of Jangeni, died in 1883 when Bambata was still a boy. In 1884 Magwababa, a trustworthy Induna and brother of Macinza, was appointed Regent. Bambata's boyhood was spent in his father's kraal and early in life he cultivated an insatiable taste for kafir beer which grew with his years. He also had a violent temper which did not improve when he reached manhood. On 6th June, 1890, on arriving at majority,



DINUZULU
(From a Photograph taken 1906).

he was appointed to the Chieftainship of his tribe. Bambata's rule did not inculcate obedience to law and order amongst his people, inasmuch as he himself was committed for trial for cattle-stealing and was suspended on 10th January, 1895. An appeal to the Native High Court exonerated him from the charge and he was reinstated as Chief on 2nd May in the same year. He had, on entering into man's estate, acquired the habit of borrowing, and was always heavily in debt. Early in the year 1906 he was implicated in a faction fight in which he assaulted a member of his own tribe and was fined the sum of £20. During his trial a European resident gave evidence against him. This so infuriated Bambata that he threatened the European in question with reprisal. About this time Bambata paid a visit to Zululand. Though a section of the Zondi tribe under Nongamulana had emigrated and settled in the Nqutu and Nkandhla districts after the Zulu war of 1879, Bambata had little or no interests in Zululand. Nongamulana, who had 462 huts, remained loyal throughout the rebellion though some of his people joined the rebels. For all his past demeanours and general behaviour Bambata was deposed from his position and his younger brother Funizwe succeeded him, and old Magwababa was once more appointed Regent. Bambata returned from Zululand and became a menace to the white people in and about Greytown. His followers were reported to be armed and prowling about the country within ten miles of Greytown on the main road to Keat's Drift. A mes-

sage was sent by Government to Bambata to come to Maritzburg and his reply was that he would sooner be shot in his own country than undergo the penalty in Maritzburg.

To what extent Bambata's conduct was connected with the outbreak at Byrnetown, the defiant attitude of the people of Gobizembe at Mapumulo, of Msikofeni at Umkomanzi, of Tilonko at Mid-Illovo and of Charlie Fynn at Umtwalumi, time will show. There however could have been no doubt that he must have been encouraged in his defiance against order by the disquiet and unrest in the other parts of the Colony. Orders were issued for his arrest. He however evaded the authorities and once more fled to Zululand. The movements of Bambata, though closely followed, baffled the authorities. It was however known that he picked up one Zulu named Cakitshana, whose father lived in the Ndwandwe division under Dinuzulu. Cakitshana claimed to be an emissary of Dinuzulu. He was a hot-blooded youth, eager for war, and became Bambata's lieutenant. Cakitshana exercised a great influence over Bambata's adherents, and it was through him as the mouthpiece that Bambata made free use of Dinuzulu's name to the effect that Dinuzulu openly countenanced the rebellion. On 3rd April in the dead of night, Bambata made his sudden appearance at his Natal home and carried away Magwababa, his uncle, whose fate would have been certain death, had it not been for the intervention of Cakitshana, who informed Bambata in strong terms that it was the order of the

Child (Dinuzulu) that no man was to be killed without a trial. Magwababa was accordingly tried by a "court-martial" on the night of his capture, but due to the extraordinary persuasive power of Cakitshana, he was not condemned to death. Magwababa was kept a close prisoner, but during the retreat after the Impanza fight, he bribed his guards and made his escape to the Magistrate at Krantzkop.

On receipt of the news of the capture of Magwababa, the Magistrate of Greytown proceeded to the scene with a small police escort to investigate. They were however fired on by Bambata's followers and retreated in hot haste to Keat's Drift. A strong police force under Colonel Mansel, C.M.G., was at once despatched from Maritzburg. The reappearance of Bambata after his second visit to Zululand, the Byrnetown tragedy in February, the attitude of Gobizembe's and other tribes, did not fail to impress the authorities that the movement was a widespread one, and Government wisely determined to deal with the situation with promptitude and firmness.

Accordingly orders were at once issued to mobilise the U.M.R., "C" Battery N.F.A., and one Company D.L.I. under the command of Colonel Leuchars, C.M.G. The loyal Chief Sibindi, whose location partly adjoins that of Bambata, was ordered by the Supreme Chief to call out one thousand of his men. This order was promptly obeyed. On the receipt of intelligence from Keat's Drift to the effect that the small police detachment was not strong enough to escort the women and

children to Greytown, Colonel Mansel at once went with his force to their relief, and the following was the official report of the resistance he met on his return journey to Greytown on the night of the 4th April. It is worthy of note that both phases of the campaign commenced with the attack on the Natal Police:—

“O.C. Troops, Greytown, to Minister of Defence P.M. Burg. April 5th, 1906. Col. Mansel's report received 10.15 to-day with request I forward same to Minister Defence and for my information:—

“Begins:—Acting on attached wire, I thought it necessary to proceed to Keat's Drift to bring back the Europeans, male and female, who were detained at that place, and who were unable to get away owing to road being occupied by the enemy. For this purpose I took the greater part of the Natal Police that were with me, viz.: 5 Officers and 146 non-commissioned Officers and men. This force started about 2.45 P.M. and reached Keat's Drift about 4.30 P.M. without having been molested in any way, though the road goes through dense bush, and every precaution was taken. There was delay in getting the three ladies and European boy away, and it must have been fully 6.15 P.M. before we started, and we were considerably delayed on the road. Every possible precaution was taken to guard against surprise, but the nature of the country prevented flankers being thrown out. It was half moon. The advance guard was a short distance ahead when suddenly a dense body of Kafirs rushed out of the bush between the

advance and the main body. The advance guard was under the command of Inspector Dimmick, and the Kafirs went straight for the rear of the advance guard. The guard immediately turned and fought their way back to the main body of which I was riding at the head. I immediately dismounted the men and opened fire thus assisting the advance guard to get back. The Kafirs were checked on the road by this fire, but worked round the bush and got on both our flanks. There were a good many guns amongst the Kafirs, with such they opened a heavy fire. The Kafirs got within a few yards of the column, but the bush was so dense we seldom got a sight of them. It was a very hot corner for some time, probably about half an hour. Our fire gradually got their attack under, when we resumed our advance, they following us for some distance firing and shouting obscene epithets. After this we were not followed further. The following ladies were in a carriage: Mesdames Hunter, Marshall and Borham with her small son. These ladies all behaved with the greatest courage and gave up their carriage for the transport of the dead and wounded and walked fully eight miles on foot. I regret to say our loss was severe, being as follows:—

Killed :—Lance-Sergeant Harrison and Troopers Ashton and Greenwood.

Wounded :—Troopers Dove, Braull and Emanuel and Trumpeter Milton.

Missing :—Sergeant Brown.

“We brought all the dead and wounded away except

Sergeant Brown who is missing, and who I much fear is killed. I would bring to your favourable notice the excellent behaviour of the men, who were cool and quiet, and obeyed every order with the greatest alacrity, and also the behaviour of the advance guard in fighting their way back to help us. In doing this most of the casualties occurred. I would also bring to your notice the gallantry of Major Dimmick and Trooper Folker and others who brought in Trumpeter Milton, who was severely wounded, Trooper Folker carrying him in front of him on his saddle. The gallantry of Inspector Dimmick and Trooper Folker in bringing this man in under most desperate circumstances deserving of the V.C."

The wire referred to reads as follows :—

"From Inspector Rose to Chief Commissioner of Police. Bambata and armed force still at Impanza. European residents here cannot return. Ottley's men remain here; not enough to enter Impanza valley. Magistrate left for Greytown via Mudén."

CHAPTER V.

SIGANANDA REVOLTS.

ON the 8th April Colonel Leuchars' force surrounded the Impanza bush and shelled Bambata's kraal. Bambata and his followers had escaped into Zululand and crossed the Tugela below Krantzkop, where they were pursued by the Krantzkop Reserves. The body of Sergeant Brown, who was reported missing at the Impanza fight, was found on the Keat's Drift road terribly mutilated, parts of his body having been taken away by the rebels to be compounded into "medicine". Bambata was reported to have taken refuge in Cetshwayo's stronghold in the Nkandhla Mountains, which was considered to be inaccessible even by Zulus. The position in Zululand was reported to be critical, and Mr. C. R. Saunders, C.M.G., the Commissioner for Native Affairs in that Province, left Eshowe for Nkandhla, and the order was issued to the natives in that district to arm and capture Bambata. On the 14th April the Government offered a reward of £500 for the capture of Bambata, dead or alive. On the 17th April Sigananda's tribe broke out in open rebellion. Dinuzulu sent a message to the Government

asserting his loyalty and ordered his chief Induna Mankulumana to seek out Sigananda. The left wing of the Natal Carbineers, consisting of 400 mounted men, and a section of N.F.A. under the command of Lieut.-Col. Mackay proceeded with convoy from Dundee to Nkandhla. Two Companies of the D.L.I. left for Eshowe and one Company for Ginginhlovu. An irregular corps of 500 men was raised for special service. It was styled "Royston's Horse" and was placed under the command of Lieut.-Col. Royston, C.M.G., D.S.O. The situation had become critical and the gravest anxiety was entertained that the rebellion would spread in Zululand, and on the 20th April offers of assistance were received from the other South African Colonies. Although Dinuzulu offered his impi to Government to drive out "that dog" Bambata, it was not considered advisable at that juncture to accept his offer.

On the 23rd April the Transvaal offered a regiment of 500 mounted men completely equipped and maintained whilst in the field, which generous offer was accepted by Natal, and on the 26th April the first contingent left Johannesburg for Dundee. On that day also Lieut.-Col. Mackay's Column arrived at Nkandhla. The right wing Natal Carbineers also left Pietermaritzburg for Helpmakaar, where a powerful chief named Kula was suspected of sedition. The reward for the capture of Bambata was withdrawn. Bambata and Sigananda were reported to have collected three strong impis in the Nkandhla Forest

where Dinuzulu's Induna, Mankulumana, met with a hostile reception from the rebel Chiefs. At the same time there were disquieting reports about Mehlokazulu in the Nqutu district. On the 28th April Colonel McKenzie was given the command of the Zululand field-force which was composed of the following:—
Transvaal Mounted Rifles, under Lieut.-Col.

Barker	500
Royston's Horse, under Lieut.-Col. Royston .	550
Section of N.F.A. (2 15-pounders)	35
Section of N.F.A. (2 pom-poms)	25
Half company of D.L.I.	55
Detachments of Medical, Veterinary, Signalling and Service Corps.	

At Nkandhla.

Zululand Mounted Rifles, under Major Vander- plank	90
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At Babanango.

Northern District Mounted Rifles, under Major Abraham	150
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At Fort Yolland.

Natal Naval Corps, under Commander Hoare .	106
Section of N.F.A. (2 15-pounders)	35
Natal Police, under Colonel Mansel	200
Zululand Native Police	90

At Eshowe.

Two Companies, D.L.I. (25 mounted), under Major Nicol	210
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At Ginginhlovu.

Half Company, D.L.I. 55

On the 29th April Royston's Horse was inspected by His Excellency the Governor, and they left Pietermaritzburg for Dundee on the following day.

Colonel Sir Aubrey Wools-Sampson, K.C.B., whose name is so widely known for his services to the country during the Boer War, 1899-1902, was appointed chief staff officer to Colonel McKenzie.

The whole of the Zululand field-force with the exception of the troops stationed in Zululand were camped in Dundee preparatory to their march to Nkandhla.

CHAPTER VI.

THE BOBE FIGHT.

ON the 2nd May Colonel Mackay's force had a skirmish with the enemy at the Nkandhla, four of the latter being killed by Captain Park Grey's squadron, Natal Carbineers.

On the 3rd May whilst attention was riveted on the rebellion in the Nkandhla forest, the murder by someone unknown of Mr. H. M. Stainbank, Magistrate of Mahlabatini, on the bank of the White Umfolozi River, five miles south of Ulundi, came as a great shock to the Colonists and darkened the war cloud already hanging over the land. Mr. Stainbank was camped with his party which consisted of his wife, child and governess, two troopers of the Natal Police and three native constables, on the south bank of the White Umfolozi River, east of the main road from Melmoth to Mahlabatini. There were also a few natives of the Tshanibezwe tribe in attendance. He had been collecting taxes from the Chief Ngobozane during the day, whose people evinced reluctance in paying the tax. In order to avail himself of the telegraph line he crossed the White Umfolozi River which forms the

boundary of the Mahlabatini and Emtongjaneni districts, for the purpose of establishing telephonic communication with Mr. Saunders, the Commissioner for Native Affairs at Eshowe. After his evening meal, he proceeded to the wire escorted by the two Natal policemen. He connected his field telephone with the line and was in the act of putting the receiver to his ear when a shot rang out from the direction of the thorn bush close by. Mr. Stainbank fell back exclaiming that he was shot. Three other shots followed, two of which wounded one of the policemen in the arm and side, but not seriously. The bullet which struck Mr. Stainbank fractured the knee bone and unfortunately severed the main artery. He was at once placed in the trolley with the wounded policeman, and, accompanied by his family and party, taken with all speed back to Mahlabatini. He succumbed to his wound before reaching the seat of Magistracy. The hut tax collections and camp equipment were left behind and were found intact on the following morning. Fifteen paces from where Mr. Stainbank was hit there were four ·303 empty cartridge cases, and their discovery led to the belief that more than one rifle was fired on the night of the tragedy.

The loyal Chief Nqodi and his tribe were at once ordered out by Government to defend the Magistracy against attack and the officials went into laager, as it was feared that the perpetration of the crime might have possibly been the signal for a rising in the district. But there was no other act of violence committed and


nothing indicated that the tribes in the division were disposed to revolt. All the Chiefs of the division turned up at the Magistracy on the 4th May to express their regret and horror of the murder. By the death of Mr. Stainbank the service lost a conscientious and promising Magistrate who was barely thirty years of age. The sympathy for the bereaved young widow, who is a daughter of the Hon. H. D. Winter, Minister for Native Affairs, was widely felt throughout the Colony.

On the 3rd May the Zululand Field-Force left Dundee with twenty days' supplies. There were 150 wagons with the column. Ox-transport over indifferent roads and bad drifts was both tedious and slow. The column marched by day and laagered up by night. The form of laager adopted was that of a square with wagons drawn close up, horses and cattle and reserves in the enclosure, and sufficient men to line the four sides of the square outside the wagons. Strong piquets were posted fifty yards from the laager. The route taken was that *viâ* Laffnie's Drift, Buffalo River, Nqutu Magistracy, Nondweni and Fort Louis at the Babanango.

Before the arrival of the Field-Force at Nkandhla, news of Colonel Mansel's fight at the Bobe Ridge near Cetshwayo's grave reached Colonel McKenzie. Colonel Mansel's force had been camped at Fort Yolland. On hearing that the enemy, belonging chiefly to Siganda's tribe, was in force at Cetshwayo's grave, he marched *viâ* the Nkomo Hill, through a portion of the Nkandhla Forest, on the 5th May. Several shots were

fired by the rebels in the forest and one man was wounded. Leaving the main forest road to Nkandhla on the right, the force commenced to descend the Bohe Ridge. On entering more open country down a precipitous hill, the advance guard, consisting of a troop of the Natal Mounted Rifles under Lieutenant Blamey and the Nongqais, all in single file, were charged in the most determined manner by about two hundred Zulus. The enemy had posted themselves in the gullies on either side awaiting the advance. It was reported that at one time the Zulus would have charged right into the troops had not supports from the Durban Light Infantry (Mounted) under Major Campbell and the Natal Police been pushed up in time. The Zulus came within a few yards of the muzzles of the men's rifles. One of the Nongqai had a hand-to-hand fight and was wounded in the head, but not before he had bayoneted his antagonist.

Whilst the frontal attack was in progress, the enemy extended on both flanks with the object of carrying out a rear attack, which was checked by the Natal Naval Corps. Both attacks having failed and seeing they had lost over sixty killed and many wounded in the first charge, the impi scattered. Over 200 head of cattle and numbers of goats were captured during the day's operations. Bambata was supposed to have been in command of this impi and was mounted on a white horse. He was seen to flee in the direction of the Insuzi River westwards. The total force of the impi was estimated to be 1,000



(1) Nongqai in advance here were fired on, they cleared bush and troops came through.

(2) A few rebels on horses were here, one was shot, one horse captured.

(3) M.I. Coy. D.L.I. came up and went to (4) to burn kraal.

(5) Enemy known to be to west of this about (7), (8), (9); N.M.R. came up and went to (6); Nongqai at (8); N.M.R. retired behind Nongqai; M.I., D.L.I. came up as enemy were repulsed with some N.P.; remainder N.P. and Infantry; D.L.I. and N.N.C. were on ridge from (2) to (3) and (5) Infantry being in rear.

The fire became general when troops came up at (5), (6) and (7), as the enemy retired N.W. and S.: a N.N.C. maxim was in action at (7).

The Nongqai then advanced to (9), the N.P. to (8), at this time the rear was in action at (6).

Nongqai then crossed valley to (11) and remained until the rest of the troops had passed, here one private Nongqai was wounded.

From (11) to (10) a sniping fire was kept up by enemy.

(12) Troops watered about 5 P.M.

(13) All troops were drawn up and retired *via* (14).

The order of advance to (5) from (0) was 1. Nongqai; 2. M.I., D.L.I. and N.M.R.; 3. N.P., and 4. Infantry—from (9) to (11) the order was 1. Nongqai; 2. N.P.; 3. N.M.R. and D.L.I., M.I.; 4. Infantry—from (11) to (13) the order was 1. N.M.R. and D.L.I., M.I.; 2. N.P.; 3. Infantry; 4. Nongqai.

The Komo Hill lies to S.E. Line of retirement bending South under Komo to Fanafilies Store.

The author is indebted to Major Fairlie, of the Natal Police, for the above plan.

strong. Colonel Mansel's casualties were Corporal Errington, N.M.R., slightly wounded in head, one N.C.O. and one private Nongqai wounded. The force did not pursue the rebels but retired to camp by the Insuzi Valley road to Fort Yolland which they reached late at night. The effect of this fight must have dispelled the delusion of the rebels, who had relied on the medicines of their witch doctors which they believed would turn the white man's bullets into water.

CHAPTER VII.

EARLY OPERATIONS—NKANDHLA.

ON 8th May Colonel McKenzie's Column arrived at the Nkandhla Magistracy, where Colonel Mackay's force was already camped. On the following morning a survey of the country was made by Colonel McKenzie from the summit of the Empandhleni Hill, immediately above the seat of the Nkandhla Magistracy. The Empandhleni was of historical interest. It was the signalling station to Eshowe during the Zulu disturbances of 1887, and it was one of Major Chapman's outposts during the Boer War, 1899-1902. The day was beautifully clear, and looking to the south and eastwards an extensive and magnificent panorama presented itself. The rebel outposts were distinctly visible against the skyline on the rugged Nomanci Hills—the high peaks of the Nkandhla Range—behind which lay the extensive Nkandhla Forest, obscured from view. Beyond these hills the Entumeni Mission Station, thirty miles, and the township of Eshowe, forty miles distant, glistened in the sunlight, and beyond these again a long blue line marked the waters of the Indian Ocean fully fifty

miles distant. Westward lay the small camp of the Zululand Mounted Rifles on the Ntingwe, which in a direct line was barely ten miles distant, whilst the circuitous wagon road was, owing to the rugged nature of the country, no less than thirty-seven miles in length between these two points.

Between Empandhleni and Ntingwe lay the Insuzi Gorge. About ten to fifteen miles beyond the Ntingwe were the forest-clad slopes of the Qudeni Mountains. To the North-West the Qudeni plateau and the Madhlozi Peak formed the background on the southern slopes of which the wagon road could be clearly traced winding its way up to the Ensingabantu Store. Eight miles to the North the obelisk monument on the Itala, in memory of those who fell at the Itala fight against Botha's army, stood boldly against the skyline.

The strategical position of the Ntingwe was fully recognised, it being situated between the Nkandhla and the Qudeni Forests, both of which were formidable places of retreat and concealment for the rebels. In order to strengthen the Z.M.R. under Major Vanderplank, it was decided so send there the Transvaal Mounted Rifles under Colonel Barker. The searchlight section was left behind at the Nkandhla. As the country in the Nkandhla forest and in Zululand was unknown to Colonel McKenzie, he decided to carry out a reconnaissance. Accordingly on the morning of the 10th May the following force moved out of camp at 4 o'clock. Colonel Mackay with the left wing N.C.

was in the advance whilst Royston's Horse acted as rear-guard. The pom-pom section and one gun of the N.F.A. formed part of the force and there were also 100 Native Scouts, most of whom were mounted. By 6.30 A.M. the advance occupied Nomanci Ridge overlooking the bush, the Ridge being evacuated by the enemy's outposts on the approach of the forces. On one stony kopje a stone wall had been built by the rebels across the road apparently with the object of impeding or blocking the passage of the guns. The Carbineers took up the positions evacuated by the rebels who retreated into the forest. The Native Scouts under cover of our rifles proceeded down to the intervening valleys, where they burnt about twenty kraals and captured five horses, two oxen and 100 goats. A few rebels armed with rifles did a little sniping from behind the bush but with no result. The guns dropped a few shells on a kopje on the opposite ridge which had the effect of driving a number of rebels into the forest. Three squadrons of Carbineers were left behind to take up their positions in the natural stone fortresses and to lie in wait for the enemy, who, it was thought, on seeing the retirement of the main force, would again endeavour to take up their old positions in which the Carbineers were concealed. They, however, did not venture beyond the edge of the bush. After waiting till nightfall, Captain Park Grey, who was in command, reluctantly retired with his men on Nkandhla to join Colonel McKenzie's force which had returned to camp late in the afternoon. This

reconnaissance afforded a glimpse of a very small portion of the forest and of the difficult nature of the country in which the troops had to operate. On arrival in camp news was received that the powerful Chief Kula near Helpmakaar and six of his Indunas had been arrested by Lieutenant Richards of "C" squadron, Natal Carbineers.

On the following day Colonel Mackay's force left Nkandhla and returned to Helpmakaar in the Umsinga division. Trouble was anticipated in this part of the Colony as Kula's people were disaffected. Major Murray-Smith made an attack on the kraal of Mteli (Kula's head Induna) on the 12th May with the force at Helpmakaar and succeeded in killing twenty-nine rebels; which had the effect of discouraging them from carrying out their intended attack on the Helpmakaar laager.

On the 12th May the force operated in the Insuzi Valley between Nkandhla and Ntingwe and was accompanied by about 450 native levies called out from loyal tribes in the Nkandhla division by order of Mr. Saunders.

Colonel Royston with four squadrons of Royston's Horse operated on the left flank along the ridge overlooking the Ofeni stream, whilst Colonel McKenzie with two squadrons of Royston's Horse and one company of D.L.I. operated on the right, overlooking the Insuzi Gorge. The country was exceedingly rough, the banks of the Insuzi being precipitous on both sides and almost 1,600 feet in height. Many

kraals were burnt and 100 head of cattle and many goats were captured. Two rebels were killed. During the operations many women and children came out of the valley. They were closely interrogated but absolutely refused to give any information. They were unmolested and permitted to return whence they came.

The 13th being Sunday, the Zululand Field Force attended church parade at the Magistracy.

On the 14th the Column moved out in the direction of the forest and Colonel McKenzie got in touch with Colonel Mansel at Fort Yolland from the Nomanci Hill. It was decided to carry out a sweeping movement, the three forces to meet at Cetshwayo's grave on the 16th May at 11 A.M. Colonel Mansel's force was to leave Fort Yolland on the afternoon of the 15th, bivouac at or near Mfanefile's Store, and work up the Insuzi Valley towards the grave at daylight. Colonel Barker's force camped at Ntingwe was to descend the Umsugana Hill and work its way by the old wagon track down the Insuzi Valley ; whilst the Column under Colonel McKenzie's own command was to march down one of the sharp spurs which abruptly drops into the Insuzi from the Nkandhla range of mountains.

The spur that the force intended to take was described by the natives as being so narrow and sharp that a strong wind would blow a man over into the deep ravines on one side or the other ; and although this may have been slightly exaggerated yet a strong gale would have rendered the ridge almost impossible of descent. This spur was named the Gcongco. The

description given did not encourage the attempt to take guns with the Column. On the 15th, the force made another demonstration on the Nomanci Ridge, and the guns and pom-poms were brought into action and shelled the Mome¹ stronghold from the top end for the first time. They were posted on a kopje on the right bank of the Mome near its source. The Mome stronghold was a natural fortress, being a cave at the foot of a waterfall from 60 to 80 feet in height. It was considered to be almost inaccessible excepting from the lower side, as the banks were precipitous and densely wooded for 300 to 400 feet from the base. On the left bank on a prominence facing the waterfall stood Sigananda's chief kraal. It was impossible to gauge the result of the day's operations. Whether the shelling made it uncomfortable for the enemy in their forest fastness it was difficult to say. The troops bivouacked at a Native Mission house about five miles south of Nkandhla Magistracy and prepared themselves for the march to Cetshwayo's grave in the morning.

¹ Pronounced *Mamma*.

CHAPTER VIII.

CETSHWAYO'S GRAVE.

CETSHWAYO, the last of the Zulu kings, the son of Mpande, and the grand-nephew of Chaka, was buried on the right bank of the Nkunzana in the Insuzi Valley. He died at Eshowe in 1884 and his Indunas had his remains conveyed in a wagon for burial at the Royal Kraal north of the White Umfolozi. At that time Usibepu, the Chief of the Mandhlakazi tribe, was at feud with Cetshwayo and was in possession of the country north of the Umhlatuze River between Eshowe and the royal burial ground. The mourners of the late King, in order to avoid passing through the enemy's country, conveyed the remains to the Insuzi in the hope of surmounting the Nkandhla Range *en route* to Makosini, in what is now the Vryheid district of Natal, where former kings of the Zulu nation were buried. On arrival at the Nkunzana River in the Nkandhla district, the range of mountains proved too formidable for vehicular traffic. The Indunas, unable to find any feasible track, were at last obliged to bury the royal remains in the centre of the indigenous plantation. On Cetshwayo's tomb, there still remain



CETSHWAYO'S GRAVE.
The grave is in the centre of plantation in the foreground.

the few broken clay pots and tyres of the wagon wheels. The hallowed spot is held in great respect and veneration by all natives, who never pass it save with awe and reverence.

At 5.30 A.M. on the 16th May in a dense mist, the column left without transport of any kind. Each man carried with him three days' rations. The force, consisting of five squadrons Royston's Horse under Lieut.-Col. Royston, a detachment (60) of the D.L.I. under Major Molyneux and about 600 native levies under Lieutenant London, moved in the direction of the Nomanci Ridge. The N.F.A. guns and the pom-pom section, as well as all regimental transport, returned to the Nkandhla Magistracy under an escort of D.L.I. Colonel McKenzie and staff rode at the head of the column and followed the ridge in a westerly direction. After proceeding for about two hours the force reached the summit of the Gcongco spur, when the mist lifted and revealed the course of the Insuzi River winding through the valley about 2,000 feet immediately below us. The troops at once dismounted, and led by Colonel McKenzie descended the precipitous spur. The infantry took the spur named Ncucu to the left. Colonel McKenzie, acting in the belief that his movement could not but be a surprise to the enemy—as indeed it was—ran down the steep incline. On nearing the bottom he at once directed his followers to search the wooded ravine on the right where a great number of cattle had to be rounded up. The rebels who were herding them took

refuge in the bush at the appearance of the troops. The Maxims were brought into play on the enemy who were retreating up the kloofs. The forces met in the valley, and many cattle and goats were captured by Lieutenant London and his levies, who were operating down a spur on the right. This spur was dominated by a sharp rugged point which was afterwards named London Kop. The whole force now worked down the valley, crossed the Mome stream near its junction with the Insuzi river, and traversed several of the spurs near their base. The kloofs were thoroughly searched with Maxims. Small parties of the force under the cover of rifle-fire rounded up more cattle, and burnt many kraals in the valleys and on the kopjes. Colonel Barker's column was now sighted and he reported that his rear-guard had been engaged with Bambata's rebels, who swarmed down the northern slopes of Macala Hill with the intention of cutting off the rear-guard. Supports were sent back by Colonel Barker and the rebels were eventually driven off. Captain Wilkins of the Northern District Mounted Rifles, who formed the rear-guard, was assegaied in the arm whilst on the point of crossing a drift. In this engagement the rebels lost about six killed. With Colonel Barker's force in rear Colonel McKenzie was now able to dispense with his rear-guard and he rapidly pushed forward towards the grave.

At five minutes to eleven which was the time given for the three columns to meet, provided they were unopposed, Colonel McKenzie's column was at Cetah-

wayo's grave, having captured 600 head of cattle and 1,500 sheep and goats. Colonel Mansel's column arrived in sight from the direction of Fort Yolland, having experienced considerable difficulty with his transport over very bad roads. A large number of "Mahlangalas" or temporary huts erected by the natives in war-time were found in the vicinity of Cetshwayo's grave, and whilst in the act of burning them the native levies unfortunately set the grass alight and the fire soon spread in the direction of the grave. The plantation, however, was uninjured. It was generally said to be infested with snakes which sought its shelter to escape the annual grass fires in the vicinity. Several officers who entered to inspect the tomb had to make a hasty retreat before the large puff adders which threatened their advance. Strict orders were given to all ranks, both white and black, to respect the grave, as the native mind would have been greatly disturbed at any desecration of the spot. As it was not possible to co-operate with Colonel Mansel's force, owing to its being delayed, Colonel McKenzie left that portion of the forest on his left, between the grave and the lower slopes of the Bobe Ridge. Many of the enemy must thus have escaped.

Before sundown the three columns arrived and bivouacked about half a mile south of the grave near the junction of the Nkunzana and Insuzi Rivers. A heavy thunder-storm broke over the camp during the night and made things generally uncomfortable.

On the following morning native scouts reported

an impi to the east of the camp in the vicinity of Fort Yolland. A force consisting of the Natal Police (200 strong under Colonel Mansel), three squadrons of Transvaal Mounted Rifles and two squadrons of Royston's Horse proceeded in pursuit of the enemy. The force came up with the impi which, however, turned out to be a large body of women and children, who had apparently had enough of the sufferings in the bush and were turning their steps in the direction of the Tugela to seek more comfortable homes with their friends who had as yet not risen in revolt. Though it was conclusively proved that a good deal of the trouble was caused by the women, who goaded their husbands and relatives to rebellion, their sex secured for them protection by the troops. This the women only knew too well, and on frequent occasions availed themselves of their privilege, probably to the detriment of ourselves, as it was not only difficult but impossible to guard against female spies, who carried information of our movements to the enemy. Amidst drizzling rain the force returned to camp early in the afternoon. Colonel McKenzie's operations in the Insuzi Valley must have given Sigananda and his tribe considerable discomfiture. The force, which was in full view of the rebels from their positions on the wooded slopes of the Nkandhla Range north of the camp, numbered over 1,700 strong (mostly mounted troops), exclusive of 2,000 native levies. The valley was black with horses and captured stock which were denuding the cornfields of all crops on which Sigananda and his leaders had

depended for the maintenance of their army. Many of the fields had been reaped and the corn stored in underground pits at the various kraals. These pits were most carefully concealed, and it was only by striking the surface of the ground that they could be located. Mr. R. H. Addison, Magistrate of Estcourt in Natal, who had spent many years in Zululand during the troublous times between the Zulu War and the annexation to Natal, and who was attached to Colonel Mansel's column as Intelligence Officer, remarked to Colonel McKenzie, "You have given Siganda a very severe knock. He has never had such an experience as to have lost such a number of cattle. He never reckoned on the invasion of the Insuzi Valley by your troops." Pointing northwards to the hill on Bohe Ridge Addison continued, "That was where Siganda surrendered to the late Sir Melmoth Osborn in the eighties. He then had suffered no loss to be compared with this." Colonel McKenzie replied, "I cannot look upon this as a severe knock at all. I hope to warm him up much more than this." Had it not been for the native mealie and Kafir corn-fields, both man and beast in the force would have fared badly. The chief food consisted of fresh meat, which as sole diet soon told on the men. The place near Cetshwayo's grave at which the troops were camped at this time soon became insanitary (there were no picks or shovels brought with the column as there was no intention of remaining in the valley longer than a day or two) and the conditions were not im-

proved by the discovery of the body of a rebel, who had been killed some days previously, in the stream from which water was drawn. The camp became known to the men afterwards as "Stinkfontein".

Colonel McKenzie decided to follow up his recent operations by entering the Mome stronghold with white troops, and thus dispel once for all the sense of security which the rebels possessed in their mountain fastness.


CHAPTER IX.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR SURRENDER.

THE morning of the 18th broke fine and clear. Every man was expectant of participating in an exciting day when the whole force marched out of camp. Mr. B. Colenbrander, Magistrate of Nkandhla, accompanied the column as Political Agent. Every one had heard so much of the Mome stronghold that curiosity rose to a high degree. One gun of the N.F.A., under escort of the Naval Corps, and a detachment of the Natal Police as scouts were ordered in advance to take up a commanding position overlooking the Mome Valley. Just as the force reached Cetshwayo's grave, a native scout met us and delivered the message from the rebel leader that they desired to surrender. The force halted, and Colonel McKenzie, accompanied by Colonels Wools-Sampson and Royston, and Captain Hosking, proceeded up the ridge where the guns were posted. The scout was ordered to bring the rebel emissaries from the forest. They soon appeared carrying a white flag. A long "indaba" ensued between Colonel McKenzie and the rebel emissaries, who departed apparently satisfied with the terms given

them, which were that Sigananda and his sons were to bring in the whole of his tribe and their arms and to surrender unconditionally by 11 A.M. on Sunday, the 20th May, two days hence. The forces rested on the two following days. There was much speculation on Sunday the 20th May. All eyes were turned to the wooded slopes of the Nkandhla but there were no signs of the enemy. Vain hopes of an early peace were entertained. It was difficult to conceive the folly of Sigananda and his people who were singularly blessed with a location teeming with cattle. They had lands both on high and low veldt with abundant grazing for their stock, a forest unsurpassed in beauty in Zululand, and the Insuzi Valley second to none in fertility. In the midst of so much good fortune, and after so many years of peace and plenty, they threw in their lot with Bambata, a man of doubtful character and practically no position, with the object of overthrowing the government of the whites, and to replace it with they knew not what. The day passed slowly away, and as the sun set the troops felt they had hoped in vain for the welfare of the Colony and of these misguided people.

Before nightfall emissaries carrying a white flag came into camp to interview Colonel McKenzie. They explained the difficulty they had experienced in finding Sigananda and his principal headmen in the extensive forest and begged for an extension of time which was granted to the 22nd May, Colonel McKenzie intimating that up to that date his force would not operate on the




north side of the Insuzi River. In the evening, an impromptu concert was arranged round the camp fires. In the middle of a recitation of the "Charge of the Light Brigade," several shots were fired by the sentries. Everyone rushed to his post and stood to arms. It turned out to be a false alarm; the sentries having mistaken a troop of cattle in the darkness for a body of Zulus.

On the 21st May the forces were paraded at 9 A.M. They consisted of 540 T.M.R. under Lieut.-Col. Barker; 200 N.D.M.R.; 100 Z.M.R.; 300 Royston's Horse under Lieut.-Col. Royston; 128 Natal Police; 30 Mounted Infantry of the D.L.I. and 100 Nongqais under Colonel Mansel; and 1,500 native levies. The column marched up the Insuzi River westwards to the Macala Hill where Bambata was reported to be encamped with an impi of 500 rebels.

A native scout met the column on its march and reported that the rebels had fled from Macala on the previous evening. Notwithstanding this intelligence, Colonel McKenzie decided to move forward with the object of carrying out a reconnaissance. It was a long, tedious climb up to the Macala. Colonel McKenzie carefully noted the country and particularly the Mome Gorge and had a sketch made of the entrance showing where guns could be advantageously posted to effectively shell the gorge. On arriving at the Macala troops were posted round the perimeter of the krantz, and a drive of the bush underneath the krantz was contemplated, but as it was getting late in the after-

noon and we were many miles from camp, the column retired. There were recent marks of occupation by rebels in the bush, proving the accuracy of the information supplied by the native scout in the morning that the rebels had left the previous evening. The return to camp down a very rough country was accomplished in the dark and many riders with their horses narrowly escaped from rolling down the precipitous banks of the Insuzi River, which could only be negotiated in single file. It was close on midnight when the column reached camp after a most fatiguing day. On the following day, 22nd May, a message came from Sigananda to the effect that his people had been collected but they asked permission to surrender at the Nkandhla Magistracy, which place was much nearer for the old chief. Accordingly Colonel McKenzie gave them time up to 11 A.M. on the 24th May and intimated that he would proceed with his force to Nkandhla to take their surrenders, and the movement of troops was not to be interpreted as a hostile act.

On the morning of the 23rd, Colonel Mansel with the T.M.R., the Natal Naval Corps, the Natal Police and Nongqais were left at the Insuzi camp, whilst Colonel McKenzie with Royston's Horse, the N.D.M.R., the Z.M.R. and two companies D.L.I. returned to Nkandhla by the way they had come. The formidable Gcongco spur appeared even higher from the bottom than from the summit. The forces divided, some ascended by the London Kop spur, others by



GUNS NEGOTIATING STEEP HILL EN ROUTE TO LONDON KOP.

the Gcongeo. In spite of its being a cold day and the horses led, fourteen horses had to be abandoned and three dropped down dead on the hill. One of the native levies died from heart failure before reaching the summit. Several shots were fired by our men who were severely reprimanded. The rebels, however, sniped at a troop of Royston's horse in the rear the whole way, which certainly did not strengthen or encourage the belief that Sigananda was sincere in his stated intentions. After a halt on the summit, the column marched along the Nomanci Ridge *en route* for Nkandhla. Large herds of cattle were seen, and quite 200 rebels marched unconcerned and singing their war song in single file on the Bonvana Ridge, within range of 1,500 yards of our column. The force arrived at Nkandhla at 5 P.M. and were glad to get back to the wagons and rations.

The news was received by the column, with consternation and regret, that on the night of the 16th the natives had murdered a European named Walters—in charge of a road-party—in his tent at the Mbiza stream, ten miles from the Magistracy.

At this time reinforcements for Colonel McKenzie's column were despatched from Natal, and the regiment of Natal Rangers under Lieut.-Col. Dick, D.L.I., consisting of four companies recruited from Transvaal volunteers and four companies from Natal, were on their way to add to the force in the field in Zululand.

CHAPTER X.

THE FIRST NIGHT-MARCH.

VICTORIA Day was a beautiful winter's day. Long before the appointed hour we had lost reliance on Sigananda's sincerity. It was clear that the rebels only wanted to gain time to induce others to join them. Colonel McKenzie had given them every opportunity to surrender and had shown the utmost patience and leniency. Nothing remained but to renew the attack on them with vigour and inflict exemplary punishment. The rebels had been doctored for war according to their custom and apparently nothing would satisfy them until they had dipped their spears in the white man's blood.

On the afternoon of the 25th intelligence was received that Bambata and his impi were located in the Ensingabantu bush on the Qudeni Mountains. Colonel McKenzie at once decided on a night march to surround the rebel position at daybreak. At sundown, the column—consisting of "C" squadron of Natal Carbineers, under Captain Richards (which had arrived at Nkandhla on the previous day with convoy and was attached to the force as Colonel McKenzie's bodyguard);

100 Z.M.R., under Major Vanderplank ; 300 Royston's Horse, under Colonel Royston ; 120 N.D.M.R., under Major Abraham ; 20 T.M.R., under Major Pickburn ; 25 Mounted Infantry, D.L.I., under Major Campbell ; and 300 native levies under Lieutenant London—left the camp at Nkandhla Magistracy. The route taken was along the bridge path across the central Insuzi Gorge—known as the "Devil's Gorge"—to the Ntingwe, thence up the wagon road to the Madhlozi Mountain on the Qudeni Range above the Ensingabantu bush. The night was very dark, there being no moon, and the path so rugged as to necessitate marching in single file. Any loss of distance over bad places by the advance became accumulative for the rear-guard, and the advance had frequently to halt to mass, otherwise the column would have straggled in the darkness on the rough ground. On this night one small party lost itself and had considerable difficulty in finding its way back to the column. The descent of the "Devil's Gorge" was accomplished without mishap, with the exception of a Maxim pack-horse with ammunition which rolled down the precipice and was killed. In the still night, with the river about 1,000 feet almost immediately below, the descent was greatly intensified and gave the feeling of dropping into a bottomless pit. A slip would have resulted fatally almost in every case. It took the force three hours to cross the drift, due to the difficulties under which it moved. The damp chill hung about the river and as the column ascended the cold became sharper. At about 2 A.M. the column

arrived at Ntingwe. A Kafir kraal was surrounded to obtain information from the inmates who showed no signs of alarm in being wakened at that hour, but calmly stated that the rebels were in the Ensingabantu bush. The column moved on and passed the edge of the Ekombe Forest and by 4 A.M. halted on the bleak plateau, about 5,000 feet above sea-level and just below the Madhlozi peak. Ensingabantu lay within one and a quarter miles to the right. Every man stood to his horse shivering with cold. A heavy mist rolled up from the valley and completely enveloped the force. At 6.15 A.M. the column moved off. The Z.M.R. and native levies were ordered to operate on the left flank at the head of the Iqobazo stream, in order to cut off the enemy's retreat in the direction of the Buffalo River. Colonel Royston with two squadrons worked round to the right below the Ensingabantu Store to take up his position on the extreme right, east of the bush we had to surround. The N.D.M.R. were ordered to the store on the left, whilst Colonel McKenzie with the Carbineers proceeded along the ridge, and after posting the D.L.I., one troop N.C., and half troop T.M.R., at the head of the bush, descended and took up his position between Royston's Horse and the N.D.M.R. The whole of the movement was carried out in dense mist which, lifting about 7 A.M., presented a very fine sight. The various units were in their respective positions and the bush was completely surrounded, but alas! the bird had flown during the night. The enemy had evidently been warned of the

approach of the column. The hard march of twenty-eight miles throughout the cold night over very rough country resulted in "drawing a blank". There was nothing for it but to halt and rest, as the horses had been under the saddle for fourteen hours. After a couple of hours off-saddle, the column returned to Nkandhla by the wagon road. A great many of the horses showed signs of distress, and on arrival at Calverley's Store on the Insuzi in the afternoon the column bivouacked for the night. Early next morning, 27th May, we left for the Nkandhla Magistracy where we arrived at 10 A.M., having marched fifty-two miles since the evening of the 25th.

General Stephenson, who was accompanied by Captain Lipsett, joined Colonel McKenzie on this day, and, as a representative of the Imperial Government, was to accompany the column to witness the operations. Once more preparations were made and the force left the Magistracy on 28th May at 10 A.M. for the Nkandhla Forest.

CHAPTER XI.

PUKINYONI FIGHT.

WHILST Colonel McKenzie's force was harassing the rebels in the Nkandhla district, Colonel Leuchars crossed into Zululand from Natal with the Umvoti field-force with the object of effecting a junction with Colonel Mackay's column. Colonel Leuchars experienced considerable difficulty in traversing the rough country in the Buffalo River Valley. The following is Colonel Leuchars' official report of his operations, which resulted in what is known as the Pukinyoni fight:—

“May 28th. 420. I moved out with three Squadrons U.M.R. and one Squadron Reserve yesterday at 6 A.M. and worked up the Buffalo on Zululand side to Pukinyoni Hill. Surprised small party rebels driving cattle, killed 8. Sibindi's impi joined me at 4.30 P.M. Camped for the night near Pukinyoni Hill. At 5.30 my Camp was attacked by large impi, they surrounded camp and approached under good cover to within 50 yards, my rifle fire caused them to retire at 7.30. Sibindi's men then cleared the dongas. My casualties caused by snipers are H. Steele, First Umvoti District Reserves, killed; S. McKenzie, 1st U.D.R., wounded

head slight; Sub-leader T. Van Rooyen, Krantzkop, Reserves, serious, both arms and hip. Sibindi's levies lost 2 killed and 11 wounded. 57 of enemy found dead round camp, about 13 more killed after their retirement. Supposed to be impi about 600 strong composed of Faku's, Mehlokazulu's and Mteli's men. Force is now on way back to camp.

"May 29th. No. 423. Following my No. 420 I moved out on 27th in consequence of receiving wire from Col. Mackay at 9 P.M. 26th stating that he was working 10 miles down river from Rorke's Drift on Zululand side. I decided to take a force up river to try and meet him. Left camp at 6 A.M. and after riding continually for seven hours through terrible country arriving at Pukinyoni Hill where I off-saddled for an hour at 2 P.M. I occupied ridges overlooking rough country down to Buffalo. Party of rebels were surprised driving cattle off. On being fired upon they concealed themselves. I sent a troop down supported by troop of Reserves. The rebels were turned out of their lair and seven killed. Sibindi's impi now arrived and drove through the bush killing one man. I returned at 5 P.M. to a mealie field about half a mile from Pukinyoni and camped for the night, my men occupying two sides and Sibindi's men two sides of a square owing to necessity of camping near water men and horses having had very little during day. The site was not a good one for defensive purposes, there being dongas and mimosa scrub all round. About 5.30 P.M. the last troop to come in reported having

seen large impi from 800 to 1,000 strong four miles off coming from direction of Hlazakuzi Hill. At dawn on the 28th I sent out a troop to see if any signs of enemy's camp fires and if possible to ascertain whereabouts of Mackay's Column. At 5.30 the troop returned to camp and reported approach of large impi, enemy could be heard shouting 'Usutu'. The men quickly took their places behind their saddles and awaiting the onslaught. At 5.15 a small troop of cattle were rushed out of donga towards face of square occupied by Headquarter and City squadrons U.M.R. The cattle dropped at first volley within 25 yards of square. This checked rush. Enemy then proceeded to surround square under good cover, and I had to spread my riflemen round the sides occupied by Sibindi's men. To enable me to do this, it was necessary to lessen size of square by 20 yards which was done with the utmost coolness by all ranks. A few men were retired at a time until the movement was complete. Every attempted rush by the enemy was met by steady rifle fire from every side of square. All this time two snipers armed with Mausers were pouring in a very accurate fire from ridge 400 to 600 yards away. Having such a large target I regret to say they caused many casualties. They could not be located, but their ridge was carefully searched by picked marksmen, and after the engagement a kehla¹ was found dead on the ridge. He is said to be son of Faku. When enemy's attack slackened, Sibindi was

¹ A "kehla" is a man who wears a headring.

ordered to clear scrub and dongas which work they carried out in fine style killing a number of the enemy. The bulk of enemy escaped down the gorge leading towards Buffalo. Owing to the great distance from my base and fact of so many wounded men having to be carried on improvised stretchers I could not follow. At 10.30 A.M. I commenced my return journey and reached a point on Umsinga Mountain at 7 P.M. where I halted for the night. Left there at 7 A.M. to-day and arrived in Camp at noon. One of Sibindi's wounded died en route. Trooper H. Steele first U.D.R. was carried 10 miles and buried at the copper mine on Umsinga Mountain. I cannot speak too highly on the steadiness displayed by all ranks and by Sibindi's levies. Although only half a day's rations were carried and the force had to live on a country practically denuded of grain, not a grumble was heard. During the action the steadiness displayed by every one, even to the young reserve, was splendid. The wounded men, European and Native, were carried cheerfully by relays of men from U.M.R. reserve and Sibindi's levies. All wounded are doing well. Sibindi and the young Chief Nyoniyezwe behaved splendidly and gave me valuable assistance. The burial of Trooper Steele was most impressive, a portion of burial service being read and last post blown. The country crossed during these operations is the worst I have struck in my travels. The enemy's dead numbered 70. The total strength of my four squadrons was 220."

CHAPTER XII

THE ITATE GORGE.

ON the 28th May Colonel McKenzie moved towards the Nomanci Ridge and bivouacked on the source of the Itate stream about six miles from the Magistracy. At 6.30 A.M. on the following morning the two guns and pom-poms ascended the hill southwards, where they were joined by the main column. Major Vanderplank with the Z.M.R. took the ridge on the right of the Itate Valley with the object of working round the right flank. The levies under Lieutenant London took the valley below the Z.M.R. All spare supply wagons were returned to Nkandhla. Lieut.-Col. Royston with two squadrons was in the advance making for London Kop. The guns were posted on Green Hill to cover the rear-guard, consisting of the D.L.I. and regimental transport. At Green Hill Colonel McKenzie got in communication with Colonel Mansel's column in the Insuzi Valley opposite the mouth of the Mome Gorge when the previous instructions to block and operate up the gorge below London Kop were repeated to Colonel Mansel. The guns were then pushed along towards London Kop and had to climb a very steep hill which at first sight looked almost impossible.


On reaching London Kop, the Natal Carbineers, under Captain Richards, were ordered to descend into the gorge and search the valley down the stream. Colonels McKenzie, Wools-Sampson, and Royston also proceeded down the steep mountain slope and occupied a position on a jutting rock immediately over the waterfall. The gorge from this rock presented a sight which could be compared in grandeur to a cañon in the Rocky Mountains. Precipitous krantzes on both sides converge at the bottom. Immediately below the rock of observation, two rebels were shot by Colonels McKenzie and Royston. One of them, an immense Zulu, was just on the point of throwing his assegai when a bullet found him and rolled him down a precipice 150 feet high. Meanwhile the Carbineers and Royston's Horse were working down the gorge when a rebel hidden behind a rock shot Trooper Malone of Royston's Horse within 20 yards.

Near the mouth of the gorge, London and his levies came into possession of a large quantity of stock. Colonel Mansel's force was not there, as by mistake they had proceeded up the Mome Gorge. London seeing there were no troops to block the entrance, made his way up the gorge, which was strongly held by the rebels, who had taken up their positions behind huge rocks. The levies killed about thirty-six of the rebels but were obliged to retire. The official return of the day's operations reported forty of the enemy killed, and 460 head of cattle, besides numbers of sheep and goats, captured. The column bivouacked

for the night on the heights about one mile east of London Kop. A wagon containing Mr. Davies' dry-canteen was captured by the rebels on the Nomanci ridge on the evening of the 29th May. It was on its way to join the column when it was attacked by a small party of rebels. The two white men in charge made their escape to the Nkandhla Magistracy.

Early on the morning of the 30th, Colonel McKenzie, accompanied by General Stephenson and Colonels Wools-Sampson and Royston, proceeded to examine the Mome Valley with the object of carrying out a combined attack with all available troops. It was decided to commence operations as soon as possible.

At noon, Royston's Horse, D.L.I. and native levies marched to London Kop for a second attack on the Itate Gorge. "C" Squadron of the N.C. rode in advance and took up a position on the western side of the gorge for the purpose of cutting off the enemy's retreat in the direction of the Insuzi River and Macala Hill. From the summit of London Kop, the levies were ordered to take the ridge to the east and descend into the gorge near where it joins the Insuzi; then to work up the gorge northwards to effect a junction with Royston's Horse and the D.L.I. who were searching down the bed of the stream. Colonel McKenzie and staff took up the commanding position on the jutting rock as on the previous day. As the staff moved to take up this position and were leading their horses down a precipitous slope in advance of the D.L.I., Colonel McKenzie halted and, sniffing the air, ex-



TROOPS RETURNING FROM LONDON KOP
(Pointed Hill on right of Picture), 29th May, 1906.


claimed, "I smell burnt porridge," and immediately dashed into a small bush on the right in search of the rebel *vivanta*. The scent proved to be accurate, as a fire was found with mealies cooking in a cave in the bush, but the cooks had disappeared. The descent along the bed of the stream was exceedingly rough, precipitous rocks and deep pools greatly impeded the progress of the troops, and only Colonel Royston and a few followers were able to effect a junction with London's levies. The rest of the force emerged from the gorge above the waterfall, and negotiated a most precipitous ascent to the western ridge on the right of the valley. In climbing up this precipice the grass was somehow set alight and a number of the men suffered the loss of their eyebrows and moustaches. Colonel Royston discovered in the valley caves barricaded by palisades. There was every indication that the rebels intended to make a firm stand in the Itate, judging by their extensive preparations, and an impi of 300 to 400 strong must have been in these fortified positions on the previous day. In one cave twelve of the rebels killed on the previous day were found laid out by their relatives.

The day's operations accounted for twenty-one of the enemy killed. The invasion of the Itate Gorge by Colonel McKenzie's troops undoubtedly had a demoralising effect on the enemy; as they had been, up to this time, under the impression that the gorge was inaccessible to the white man. Colonel McKenzie and the troops returned to camp where Colonel Barker

had arrived from the Insuzi Valley to discuss the plan of the combined attack on the Mome stronghold. On this day Colonel McKenzie was appointed to the command of the Natal and Zululand field-forces.

The 31st May was bitterly cold, even too cold for the vultures—which were generally seen hovering over the Itate and Mome gorges—to venture out.

Colonel Barker was supplied with a copy of the sketch showing the black kopje below the mouth of the Mome Gorge from which position the guns could shell the gorge and stronghold at effective range. Colonel McKenzie had this sketch prepared on the day he marched to Macala Hill. In the evening Colonel Mansel with 120 Natal Police and 100 Nongqais under Inspector Fairlie arrived in camp to take part in the operations planned for the following day.



CHAPTER XIII.

BUSH DRIVES—NKANDHLA FOREST.

THE first day of June was to be the day of days; the attack on Sigananda's stronghold at the Mome having been fully planned. It was also the first drive through what appeared to be an impenetrable forest. Long before daybreak the two N.F.A. guns and pom-poms left camp under escort to take up their position on a peak on the right bank of the Mome and immediately dominating the stronghold. This kopje has since been named and known as "Gun Hill". At 6.30 A.M. the whole force marched out of camp and massed on a tongue of open land above the Mome. Here Colonel Wools-Sampson was instructed to send the troops into the bush in the following order:—

100 Nongqais, under Inspector Fairlie.

400 Royston's Horse, under Colonel Royston.

150 Z.M.R., under Major Vanderplank.


140 D.L.I., under Major Molyneux.

100 Natal Police, under Sub-Inspector White.

800 Native Levies, under Lieutenant London.

It was about 7.30 A.M. when the Nongqais entered the bush. The guns on Gun Hill had an hour pre-

viously poured a hot shell fire into the Mome stronghold and surroundings. Colonel Mansel's guns posted opposite the mouth of the Mome stream also opened fire. Unfortunately several shells burst beyond the stronghold amongst our own people, with the result that one of the native levies had his leg nearly blown off and a trooper of Royston's Horse was slightly wounded on the forehead by a shrapnel. Great consternation was caused amongst the native levies when they beheld one of their number being taken out of the bush on a stretcher, and the accident was particularly unfortunate as it had a demoralising effect on them. The force of nearly 2,000 men now worked their way down in the bush. To those who witnessed their march it was surprising that twenty minutes after the troops entered the forest not a sound could be heard, nor was it possible to locate them with any degree of certainty. The troops seemed lost for the time being. Meanwhile the T.M.R. advanced up the left ridge of the Mome, afterwards known as "Transvaal Ridge". A troop in the advance occupied a kopje and sent ten of the men up the ridge to round up cattle which they succeeded in doing. In retiring, a sniper on their left flank concealed in the bush shot Trooper Steyn, who some days afterwards died from the effects of the wound. Three of his comrades immediately went to his assistance and carried him along, whilst two men went in advance and the remaining four protected the rear. The retirement was conducted with coolness and precision, and both General



WOMEN COMING OUT OF THE BUSH FOR PROTECTION, 1ST JUNE, 1906.

Stephenson and Colonel McKenzie, who witnessed the movement from Gun Hill, openly expressed their approval of the men's conduct. Three or four rebels again appeared on the skyline, intent on the search for the white man whom they had wounded. Had he fallen into their hands his fate would have been a terrible one. Seeing the retirement of the party down the ridge several of the enemy began sniping whilst the rest of them proceeded under cover of the fringe of bush on the left, with the object of cutting off the party from the troop on the kopje below. In this the rebels would have succeeded had not the party wisely left the ridge and taken a path sharp to the right to Sigananda's kraal, where other troops were operating and thus evaded their pursuers.

Our forces were now making their way towards the Mome stronghold, having met with no resistance in the bush. The stronghold was only guarded by two rebels, one of whom was armed with a rifle. They fled at the approach of the troops. The stronghold, though accessible, was almost impregnable, and had the rebels made a stand and contested the troops' entry into the gorge, the day's result would have been productive of more casualties. As it was the day's work was very arduous, and demanded great physical endurance from the men, and all ranks were disappointed in the absence of any decided result. Nearly 300 head of cattle were captured and a great number of women came out during the day at Gun Hill. They seemed quite unconcerned notwithstanding the unusual

activity around them. It was generally known that they had great influence over the men and could have induced them to surrender if they had so chosen.

When the day's operations were ended, the women returned to the bush and no doubt were employed in preparing food for their men. The accompanying illustration taken on this day will give an idea of the casual manner in which these women appeared to treat the rebellion.

Sigananda's chief kraal was destroyed on the 1st June. The flight of his impi from the Mome led to the belief that they had proceeded eastwards in the direction of the Sibudeni, in another portion of the Nkandhla forest. Colonel McKenzie decided to move his camp along the Nomanci Ridge to a point near the source of the Mome stream in order to drive the bush to the east on the following day. Orders were issued to Colonel Mansel to send his force up the Transvaal ridge (Bonvana Ridge) at daybreak. In order to prevent the enemy from returning to the Mome stronghold during the day one N.F.A. gun and one pom-pom remained behind on Gun Hill with the Z.M.R., for the purpose of shelling the stronghold up to a late hour. The last shot was fired at 7 P.M. Colonel Wools-Sampson left on this day for Pietermaritzburg to confer with General Dartnell and the Government.




SIGANANDA'S ENILWENI KRAAL IN FLAMES, 1ST JUNE, 1906.

CHAPTER XIV.

MANZIPAMBANA—FIGHT OF ROYSTON'S HORSE.

EARLY on the morning of the 3rd June the force marched out of camp for the Bonvana Ridge, a long precipitous climb. On this ridge the enemy had invariably made a point of parading themselves but were now no longer to be seen. The troops were instantly placed in formation to drive the forest from west to east; Royston's Horse taking the extreme right, the D.L.I. in the centre and the N.D.M.R. on the left. London's levies operated more or less on the right flank of Royston's Horse. The line of drive both of Royston's Horse and the levies was a very extensive one and the bush particularly dense. Royston's Horse were to come out on the wagon road at the end of the drive close to the source of the Nkunzana stream. The Z.M.R. were ordered to take up their position on a commanding kopje about one mile west of the terminus of the drive. The Natal Carbineers followed Colonel McKenzie and General Stephenson and proceeded along Bonvana Ridge. Very few rebels were met with in the forenoon. About midday a party of fifty of the enemy was seen from the Bonvana Ridge marching in single file along the wagon road and entering the bush


above the source of the Nkunzana stream towards Royston's Horse. This body of the enemy came from the direction of the Sibudeni. About 2 P.M. Colonel McKenzie, accompanied by General Stephenson, arrived on the kopje held by the Z.M.R., from which a troop was temporarily detached to strengthen the Colonel's bodyguard of Natal Carbineers. On descending from the kopje to an open tongue of land to the east, where many of the levies were resting, very heavy firing was heard on the right below where Colonel McKenzie was, and the war cry of "Usutu" rang through the forest. Colonel McKenzie and General Stephenson immediately entered the bush towards the wagon road with the Natal Carbineers and the Z.M.R., to support the left flank of the troops engaged in the fight but the firing had ceased. Colonel McKenzie and General Stephenson reached the wagon road without coming in contact with the enemy as the fight was confined to the spot whence the firing was first heard. At the wagon road the Colonel met the N.D.M.R. and the D.L.I. who had little success after their laborious toil through the forest. Colonel Royston then came out of the bush and reported that his men had had a very severe fight close by. Captain Clerk and eight men of "C" squadron, Royston's Horse, had found themselves considerably in advance of the rest of the squadron and were crossing a dry donga in the bush, when they were attacked by the enemy who came at them from the opposite bank. Clerk's position was a perilous one as he was too far out of touch with the



rest of his squadron. To retreat would have meant certain death. He and his men faced the enemy from their position in the donga as the rebels came down the steep, wooded hill. Captain Clerk was shot in his left arm and received an assegai wound in his right. When he was no longer able to shoulder his rifle he emptied his revolver, until Colonel Royston and Major Fraser came to his assistance. Four of his men were killed and three wounded. A dozen or more of the enemy lay dead round the donga. The timely arrival of reinforcements forced the enemy to retreat down the valley but not before several of the men who followed Colonel Royston were wounded. This fight, though short and fierce, was the first which took place in the heart of the forest, and the rebels, who had vainly been labouring under the delusion that they were invulnerable in the bush, received a rude awakening. It was also the first fight in which Royston's Horse had engaged and they had every reason to be proud of Captain Clerk and his little band. Following close on the heels of Colonel Royston came Captain Austin Robinson, N.M.C., who went to the aid of the wounded and dressed them in the donga. Whilst the operations were in progress, the wagons had moved along the Nomanci Ridge and camped on a high, stony peak overlooking the source of the Fungwini stream. The dead and wounded were safely conveyed to the camp. Trooper Hawkins, who was shot in both lungs, died on the way. The following were the casualties :—

- 237 Corporal E. Alexander, killed (assegai wound abdomen, right to left from back).
- 604 Trooper J. L. Bonck, killed (bullet wound, left thigh; assegai wound, throat).
- 181 Trooper Harding, killed (24 assegai wounds, body).
- 495 Trooper S. J. Robertson, killed (bullet wound—Martini—entering right chest coming out left chest at back).
- 303 Trooper J. Hawkins, died of wounds (gunshot left chest—dum-dum).
- Captain G. E. Clerk, assegai wound, right arm; gunshot, left arm.
- Lieutenant Male, foot, splinter.
- Lieutenant Oswald, shoulder (very slight).
- 32 Trooper D. C. Swart, left elbow, severely.
- 612 Trooper W. H. E. Hopkins, gunshot, head, severely.
- 564 Trooper J. Mann, jaw, very slightly.
- 591 Trooper H. D. M. Barnet, breast, slight.
- 133 Trooper F. Flynn, breast, slight.
- 211 Trooper W. C. Holmes, right thigh, severely.

The official return of the day's operations gave 140 as the number of the enemy killed inclusive of those killed by levies. The dead were placed in a bell-tent to await burial in the morning.



THE COUNTRY ABOUT THE MANZIPAMBANA, NKANDHLA FOREST.

CHAPTER XV.


MORE BUSH DRIVES—NKANDHLA FOREST.

COLONEL MCKENZIE lost no time in following up his drives towards the Sibudeni, for which purpose Colonel Mansel's column met him at the junction of the roads on Bobe Ridge on the 4th June. The Natal Naval Corps, the Transvaal Mounted Rifles, and native levies formed the left flank of the drive, the D.L.I. and Nongqais in the centre, and the Natal Carbineers, Zululand Mounted Rifles, and Royston's Horse operated on the right. The drive, as usual, was downhill in an easterly direction; the objective point being the confluence of the several tributaries of the Fungwini stream. The N.D.M.R. were ordered to hold the ridge overlooking the end of the drive. All horses were led round the northern slope of the Sibudeni to meet the beaters at the end of the drive. Colonel McKenzie made his observations from the Sibudeni Peak and afterwards descended to an open ridge parallel with the drive. The enemy were not encountered during the whole day and the force marched back to camp in the evening weary, disappointed and footsore. On the 4th June the infantry regiment named the "Natal Rangers,"

recruited from Natal and the Transvaal for special service, arrived in camp from Dundee. The regiment was 800 strong under the command of Lieut-Col. Dick of the Durban Light Infantry. Four companies belonging to the Transvaal contingent were recruited from the volunteer regiments in that Colony—the Transvaal Light Infantry and the Witwatersrand Rifles. There was also a company of Highlanders in the regiment. The men looked stalwart and serviceable and their timely arrival added greatly to the strength of Colonel McKenzie's force.

Major Moe and a detachment of Natal Native Horse recruited from Christian natives living on the Mission Stations at Edendale and Driefontein, arrived on the same day with 200 remounts for the troops. A great many of Major Moe's men had served in the Zulu war of 1879 in a similar capacity under Colonel Durnford.

Judging from the manner in which they evaded the drives, Sigananda's impi was apparently supplied with excellent intelligence of the movements of the troops, Colonel McKenzie was, however, determined to chase them from one quarter of the forest to another until he had cornered them. On the 6th June he organised an extensive drive from the Bonvana Ridge across the Manzipambana to the Bobe Ridge. The area of the bush to be driven was from five to six square miles. It was reported that the neighbourhood of the Manzipambana contained many dark recesses which afforded shelter to a large impi. Colonel Barker marched up the Transvaal Ridge from Cetshwayo's grave. His




THE BUSH NORTH-WEST OF THE SIBUDENI, NKANDHLA FOREST.
The junction of the Roads on the Bobe Ridge, shown on the right of Picture.

force, consisting of the Natal Naval Corps, the T.M.R., the Natal Police, and Nongqais, operated on the right flank to the south. Then came the D.L.I., Z.M.R. and N.D.M.R. in the centre; and the Natal Rangers and Royston's Horse on the left. The native levies were put between the white troops. The troops who were engaged in this drive will never forget the terrible country traversed and the hardships endured on that day. In their line of advance they had to scramble up and down many cliffs and precipitous places. This was the first experience for the Natal Rangers in the field, and it proved a severe test. Towards sundown the column made its way down the Bobe Ridge towards Cetshwayo's grave, and bivouacked there for the night on the bank of the Nkunzana stream. Seven officers and 132 men of the Rangers occasioned some anxiety as they did not arrive. It appeared subsequently that when they emerged from the bush it was almost dark, and they wisely took the road they knew back to the Nomanci camp rather than venture down the Bobe Ridge which they had never seen. This was the night of the full moon when according to some wild reports, Dinuzulu had ordered a general rising. The troops were tired and were just making themselves comfortable amongst tall grass and old mealie stalks when an alarm was raised and every man stood to arms. The origin of the alarm, as subsequently ascertained, was a particularly talkative individual in the Z.M.R. lines who was keeping his comrades awake. The N.D.M.R., on the right of the

Z.M.R., passed the word, "Shut up Z.M.R.". The next man passed the word as, "Stand up Z.M.R.," and then it ran all along the lines, "Stand to arms". General Stephenson, that keen soldier, immediately turned out from his bivouac, went quietly down the lines, critically inspected the troops and appeared pleased with the absence of confusion and the steadiness of the men.

Intelligence having arrived in the night that Sigananda and 200 of his followers were in the wooded ravines on the south-western slopes of the Sibudeni facing the Nkomo Hill, Colonel McKenzie marched the whole force up the Bobe Ridge early on the following day in the hope that the rapid movement would take the enemy unawares. The sun on this day was particularly fierce and tried the dismounted troops sorely as they climbed the long ascent of the Bobe Ridge. The mounted troops of Colonel Mansel's force were sent forward towards the Sibudeni to hold the wagon road, whilst a squadron of the T.M.R. descended into the stream of the Ndhlovana below the Nkomo Hill to cut off the enemy's retreat in the direction of the Insuzi and Tugela Rivers. A helio message was sent to the Nomanci camp to bring down the guns and pom-poms. The dismounted men at last arrived at the top of the Bobe Ridge weary and thirsty. Indeed they had undergone great hardships, their boots were worn and in many cases the soles were completely gone. Some of the men of the D.L.I., in addition to the hardships of the campaign, had to contend against attacks of



NOMANCI CAMP, 3RD TO 11TH JUNE, 1906.

malarial fever. The pluck with which some of these good fellows bore the hard times, which were not brightened by the blanks so often drawn after a big drive, was admirable.

Some of the men, including the Nongqais, went into the bush and came into contact with the rebels, of whom they killed about twenty. It was felt that had the bush been thoroughly driven better results would have been obtained and probably the capture of Sigananda himself would have been effected. For such work, however, men must be hardened and vigorous, but in the then state of the troops there was nothing for it but to order a general retirement to Nomanci camp. Ox wagons met the forces half way and conveyed the tired and hungry men back to camp.

Colonel Mackay's column, consisting of the right and left wings of the Natal Carbineers, was at this time operating in the neighbourhood of Isandhlwana. He was joined by the Maxim detachment of the Cape Mounted Rifles which came to assist Natal at the express instructions of the Cape Government. Colonel Mackay also had attached to his column Mr. Abe Bailey's contingent of 150 Volunteers, Lancashire and Yorkshire, with Colonel Peakman, C.M.G., in command. This contingent was raised in the Transvaal and equipped at the expense of Mr. Abe Bailey.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE MOME FIGHT, 10TH JUNE, 1906.

AFTER the return to camp on the windswept spot on the Nomanci Ridge, Lieutenant Hedges and Sergeants Calverley and Titlestad, of the Z.M.R., who had been residents for many years in that part of the country, had been actively engaged in tracing the whereabouts of the rebel Chief Sigananda. One of the rebels of Sigananda's tribe had surrendered at the camp on the previous day and was recognised by Calverley as a native he knew intimately. The prisoner was at once made use of as a spy. In the afternoon he was taken to the Mome bush by Calverley and Titlestad, and ordered to go down to the valley to seek out one, Mandisindaba, of Sigananda's tribe, who had been known to Calverley for many years. It was not very long before Mandisindaba appeared with his family and cattle in company with the prisoner. Mandisindaba appealed to Calverley for protection for himself, his family and stock as he was tired of the rebellion. A bargain was there and then struck that for the protection Mandisindaba required, he would undertake to descend at once to the Mome to locate Sigananda, and



MOUTH OF THE MOME VALLEY,
Where Col. Barker first attacked the Impi on 10th June, 1906.

Calverley would ask Colonel McKenzie (having already been authorised to do so) for a free pardon for Mandisindaba, should his information prove accurate, otherwise he need never hope to see his family or stock again.

Mandisindaba readily assented, and leaving his belongings to the care of Calverley descended to the valley for the information required. During his progress in the forest, he met another native. After the usual salutation they soon learned that both were in search of Sigananda. Mandisindaba further learned from his fellow-traveller that the latter was carrying the message to Sigananda that Mehlokazulu with twelve companies and Bambata with eight companies (a company varied from 50 to 100 men) were leaving the Qudeni that very night with the object of entering the Mome. Continuing their journey, Mandisindaba saw a boy carrying food in the direction of one of the ravines just below the stronghold. He also recognised one of Sigananda's wives who was intent on the approach of the boy with food for her aged husband. Sigananda, driven from one hiding-place to another, had apparently given up the luxury of a fire for fear of detection. Mandisindaba had seen sufficient to convince him where and how to find Sigananda, and as darkness was fast gathering in he suggested to his companion that they should separate and search for Sigananda's refuge, the successful one shouting to the other as soon as he found the place. Immediately his companion was out of sight, Mandisindaba quickly re-

traced his steps to Calverley and Titlestad, who lost no time in reaching camp. At half-past nine on the night of the 9th June, Lieutenant Hedges and his ready assistants were able to bring the intelligence to Colonel McKenzie, that Sigananda had been definitely located in the vicinity of the Mome stronghold; and further that Mehlokazulu and Bambata's impi, consisting of twenty companies—more than 1,000 men—were moving to join hands with Sigananda.

Knowing the native superstition connected with the bush during the hours of darkness, Colonel McKenzie anticipated the impi would halt on their night march at the entrance of the Mome and that they would enter the wooded gorge at the break of day. With his usual alacrity the Colonel laid his plans, and volunteers were called for from amongst the ranks of the Z.M.R. to carry despatches to Colonel Barker who was in command of the column camped near Cetshwayo's grave, in the absence of Colonel Mansel who was in Maritzburg on duty. Troopers Johnson, Dealy and Oliver were the three selected. These men rode a distance of about fourteen miles through the enemy's country and through the Nkandhla Forest in the dead of night and succeeded in reaching Colonel Barker at 1.15 A.M. Had they failed in their mission, the result of the Mome fight could not have been so successful as it was. The following is the despatch from Colonel McKenzie to Colonel Barker forwarded from camp at 10.30 P.M. :—

" ZULULAND FIELD FORCE,
" CAMP, NOMANCI RIDGE,
" 9th June, 1906.

" From O.C. Troops to Colonel Barker.

" On receipt of this despatch you will please move *at once* with all available men (leaving sufficient for the defence of your camp) to the mouth of the Mome Valley. I have information that an impi is coming from Qudeni to enter the Mome Valley between this and to-morrow morning. Please try and waylay this impi and prevent them from entering the Mome and at daylight block the mouth of the Mome at once. It is anticipated that they will not enter the Mome till daylight. I have reliable information as to almost exact spot Sigananda is in, and I am moving from here to surround him. He is supposed to be just below the Mome stronghold a little lower down than where we burnt his kraal. I will cut off this portion at daylight and drive down towards you so please do all you can to prevent his escape and co-operate with me generally.


" At daylight please send the Zululand Police and Native levies up to Sigananda's kraal which you burnt the day we attacked the stronghold where they will join my forces. You must take your gun and maxims in case you meet the impi which is reported to be of strength.

" Look out for my signals."

Addressed " COLONEL BARKER,
" Cetshwayo's Grave.

" Very urgent. Sent 10.30 P.M."

The order for Colonel McKenzie's forces was issued at 10 P.M. for all mounted units to move at 3.30 A.M. and guns and infantry at 3 A.M. The search-light was to be worked all night from the centre of the camp. Before 11 P.M. a messenger arrived from the Magistrate Nkandhla, confirming the report of the movements of the impi of Mehlokazulu and Bambata. Colonel McKenzie's object was to leave nothing to chance, and in the event of the report of the arrival of the impi at the mouth of the Mome being incorrect, he could still effect the capture of Sigamanda, of whose whereabouts he had no doubt.



THE BANKS OF THE MOME.

The stronghold is directly below the right hand bottom corner of illustration.

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CHAPTER XVII.

THE MOME FIGHT—(CONTINUED).

THE waning moon had passed the zenith in the early hours of the 10th June when the whole camp on the Nomanci Ridge was astir and moving. The Natal Rangers, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Dick, left camp at 3 A.M. with Lieut.-Col. Shepstone as guide. They marched in a south-easterly direction along the bush road, branching off to the right near the scene of the fight of the preceding Sunday for the Bonvana Ridge, to follow down the same to the site of Siganda's kraals, which were destroyed on the 1st June. At the same hour the D.L.I., under Lieut.-Col. Wylie marched along the Nomanci Ridge in the direction of London Kop.

At 3.30 A.M. "C" squadron of the N.C., under Captain Richards as Colonel McKenzie's bodyguard—followed by the N.D.M.R., under Major Abraham; the Z.M.R., under Major Vanderplank; one N.F.A. gun and two pom-poms; and Royston's Horse, under Lieut.-Col. Royston—took the same route westwards as the D.L.I.

Colonel McKenzie accompanied by General Stephen-

son rode at the head of the column, Sergeants Calverley and Titlestad acting as guides.

A cold, cutting wind sprang up in the early hours of the morning as the column moved silently forward. Aided by the pale moonlight there was no difficulty in picking up the track. At 5.30 A.M. the force halted below the brow of the sharp kopje known as Gun Hill from which the Mome stronghold was shelled on the 1st June. Here Colonel McKenzie commenced to make his dispositions for the capture of Sigananda. The Z.M.R. were given the place of honour and, dismounting, took up a position in the advance. The D.L.I. were to follow immediately behind, but no sooner had they fallen in than heavy firing was heard below on the right front in the direction of the Insuzi Valley. The Z.M.R. and D.L.I. were at once ordered to withdraw, and were led by Colonel McKenzie up to Gun Hill. Colonel Royston, who was close by, was also impressed with the idea that the enemy were fleeing up the Insuzi Valley. The direction of sound-travel in the valley 2,000 feet below was distinctly deceptive. A hard gallop brought the whole force to the summit of the ridge leaving the Mome Valley to the rear. Colonel McKenzie's impulse was to go down the Gcongco spur as the shortest route to the Insuzi, but through the mist and rain he just caught a glimpse of the flash of the gun shelling up the Mome Gorge, and then discovered his mistake. The order "Fours about!" instantly ran along the lines and not a second was lost in returning to the former position on Gun Hill.



GUNS ON GUN HILL OVERLOOKING THE MOME.

The gun and the pom-poms were then ordered to take up their position there, and Captain Mullins of the staff was detailed to take a squadron of Royston's Horse to strengthen the escort with instructions on no account to quit the guns. The remainder of the mounted force galloped after Colonel McKenzie towards the Mome. That gallop through the mist and rain, over fallen horses and men, down to the Mome, by Gun Hill and the precipitous descent, will always live in the memory of those who followed Colonel McKenzie. All were oblivious to dangers and difficulties. The men were exhilarated by the dash of the commanding figure who was leading them into action. At that moment they would have followed him anywhere. Indeed when some of them at the close of the day scrambled on foot along the very path below Gun Hill down which they went at a hand gallop in the morning, they marvelled exceedingly that not one of them was dashed into the chasm below.

As the Colonel galloped down the mountain side, the outlines of the western ridge were but dimly visible. His unerring eye for country grasped the situation at a glance. Turning round sharply to Captain Bosman of his staff, he ordered this officer to station troops to hold the ridge above the pear-shaped bush, and to extend southwards to where it overlooked the entrance of the gorge, and join hands with Colonel Barker on that flank.

On arriving at a lower spur, Colonel McKenzie pushed forward the men (who were then dismounted)

directing them to cut off the enemy at the Mome. At the same time he sent back Captain Hosking, Intelligence Officer on his staff, to make sure that his order to Captain Bosman to station troops on the western ridge had been carried out.

The men ran down in double-quick time, the first among them being Captain Hulley of the Z.M.R., who was shouting to his men "Buck up, Z.M.R. ! this is a chance in a lifetime". Then came Colonel Royston with two or three of his active followers, then some men of the N.D.M.R. with Major Abraham and Captain Ente. At the word of command from the Colonel to cut off the Mome, Major Abraham, not hearing the order distinctly, was seen to halt ; but it was only for a moment, as at one more word from Colonel McKenzie this officer was seen running down the steep mountain side like a hare. It was not a moment too soon that the troops blocked the upper end of the Mome to which Colonel McKenzie, justified by subsequent results, attached the greatest importance. At the same time the N.C., D.L.I., detachments of the N.D.M.R. and Royston's Horse were extended along the western ridge towards the mouth of the gorge, so as to secure against the enemy breaking over in that direction. By 7.45 A.M. the enemy were in the Mome completely surrounded. The fire of the Z.M.R., N.D.M.R., and Royston's Horse at the Mome stream turned the enemy's flight to the Mome stronghold, and they precipitately retreated into a pear-shaped bush immediately under Colonel McKenzie's main position.

A few rebels who formed the advance guard in the retreat made their escape up to the Mome stronghold earlier in the morning, and it was then feared that Bambata was amongst the number, though from subsequent report he also turned to seek shelter in the pear-shaped bush. Not more than fifty yards below where the troops cut off the Mome, Lieutenant Rundle, of the N.D.M.R., shot Chief Mehlokazulu. He was a fine-looking Zulu, wore a head ring, and, judging by the iron-grey hair, would be about fifty years of age. Mehlokazulu won his spurs as a warrior and leader in the Zulu war of 1879. In 1878 he it was who led a small party across the Buffalo River into Natal in pursuit of two of his father's (Sirahyo) wives, who were brought back to Zululand and put to death. Cetshwayo was asked by the Natal Government to hand over the perpetrators of the crime to justice, which request was not complied with. The death of Mehlokazulu was considered an irreparable loss to the rebels, who looked up to him as one of their great leaders. Continual firing ran down the valley as the two forces met below the pear-shaped bush, the Natal Police and the Nongqais from Colonel Barker's column joining hands with the Z.M.R., the N.D.M.R., and a troop of Natal Carbineers under Lieutenant Lindsay.

It is now necessary to revert to the operations of Colonel Barker's force in the early morning. On the previous day, Colonel Barker had for sanitary reasons shifted his camp near Cetshwayo's grave to the Halambu, a couple of miles towards Fort Yolland.

The camp was so situated that it was not visible from the Upper Insuzi Valley, which fact no doubt led the rebel impi to believe that the white force had evacuated the country in the vicinity of the grave. The searchlight flashing from the Nomanci camp also played the rebels false, as they marched down the Insuzi Valley during the night. They took it for granted that Colonel McKenzie's force was quietly resting there. Feeling therefore confident that there was no force at hand to molest them, they bivouacked at the entrance of the gorge there to await daylight to enter the Mome. The three Z.M.R. troopers delivered Colonel McKenzie's despatch and orders to Colonel Barker at 1.15 A.M. The Halambu camp was between seven and eight miles from the mouth of the Mome Gorge. Colonel Barker's force, which consisted of three squadrons ("B," "C," and "D") of the T.M.R.; 90 Natal Police; one section of the Natal Field Artillery; one Maxim and one colt gun of the T.M.R.; 100 Zululand Native Police (Nongqais) and levies, marched at 2 A.M. After having proceeded some distance up the Insuzi Valley, Inspector Fairlie with the Zululand Native Police and Lieutenant Bettington with the native levies, were ordered to turn west and occupy a position above the Mome Gorge, with the object of blocking the entrance. At 3.30 A.M. the enemy's camp fires were seen and reported by the advanced guard. Colonel Barker counted fully sixty fires on the open crescent-shaped valley on the right bank of the Mome stream im-

mediately below the entrance to the gorge. The enemy were apparently enjoying a rest after their march from the Qudeni and could have paid little heed to the advance of Colonel Barker's guns. Colonel Barker at once made his dispositions to surround the enemy's main laager. Two squadrons of the T.M.R. and one Maxim were ordered to line the ridge east of the crescent, whilst one squadron of the T.M.R. and detachment of Natal Police and one colt gun took their position on the western ridge. These two forces by extending north were to get into touch with Inspector Fairlie. The guns were posted on the Black Kopje southwards with escort and reserve of Natal Police to cut off the enemy's retreat towards the Insuzi. The guns were about 1,200 yards range from the enemy's camp. It was misty in the valley, as it was on the mountains.

Before dawn the firing commenced on the western ridge, due to the eagerness of the men. The enemy, surprised from their slumbers, endeavoured to form up in their usual crescent formation to return the attack on "C" Squadron, which was within 200 yards of the rebel laager. This was the signal for all arms to open fire including the guns on Black Kopje. Captain Macfarlane, D.S.O., commanding "C" Squadron of the T.M.R., was killed at the very outset of the engagement. He was a gallant and distinguished officer held in the highest respect by all ranks. Under the deadly fire the rebel impi broke and scattered in all directions. It was reported that Bambata endeavoured in vain to

rally his men. Seeing the bed of the stream still clear, Bambata and Mehlokazulu and other leaders, with the remnants of the impi, eventually fled towards the Mome stronghold, but only to fall into the hands of Colonel McKenzie's force. Other rebels took refuge in the fringe of bushes and long grass close by. In clearing them many instances occurred of rebels "playing possum". These rebels, pretending to be dead, rose suddenly to assegai our men nearest to them. In one instance a rebel lying down snatched a rifle from one of the men but was luckily bayoneted in the very act of using the rifle. The rebel impi had some firearms, as eighteen were picked up on Colonel Barker's battlefield, amongst which three were Martini-Metfords and one a .303 sporting rifle. In the fight with Colonel McKenzie's force Mauser rifles were also captured. Colonel Barker estimated the number of rebels killed by his forces at 300. The enemy was completely routed and their leaders could not have had any idea that their way to the Mome stronghold was cut off by another and a larger force. On the western ridge, Lieutenant Marsden of Royston's Horse was mortally wounded in the early part of the day. Whilst the various units were clearing the small patches of bushes bordering on the Mome stream, Colonel McKenzie prepared his drive in the pear-shaped bush by first having the upper portion shelled by Colonel Barker's guns.

The Nongqais under Inspector Fairlie and Sub-Inspector Lindsay now came up to join in the bush

drive. They had been in the very thick of the fight and were spoken of in the highest terms by Colonel Barker, D.S.O., who reported: "I have much pleasure in bringing to your notice the keen manner in which the Zululand Native Police under Major Fairlie carried out their part of the operations and their courageous behaviour during the fight".

Next came the Natal Rangers who had been on the eastern ridge above Sigananda's kraal. Their presence served a useful purpose as it was a likely quarter for any rebels in the stronghold to make for.

The bush was to be driven downwards. The Nongqais were on the right, the levies and N.D.M.R. in the centre, the D.L.I. and Rangers on the left. Quite 100 of the rebels were killed in the drive. Whilst the drive was in progress Colonel McKenzie went down the Mome stream and later retraced his steps to the bush to meet the beaters at the end of the drive. He met the Nongqais coming out of the bush on their way home to Colonel Barker's camp. Unfortunately the bugle sounded for their retirement—on the order of Inspector Fairlie—was taken by the other units as an order for general retirement by Colonel McKenzie. The incident had the effect of leaving a small portion of the bush at the bottom end undriven. The sun was now setting and the men had been fighting for sixteen hours over the roughest country imaginable. After the Nongqais, came Lieutenant London with the levies, then the N.D.M.R., and lastly the D.L.I. under Major Campbell, when it was quite dark.

Though fatigued from the physical strain of the long day, and suffering both from thirst and hunger, the troops marched back to camp in excellent spirits, borne up by the hope of the prospect of an early peace. It was otherwise a very long and weary march and close on midnight before they arrived to partake of the good things which their comrades in camp had prepared for them.

The casualties were :—

Killed—

Captain S. C. Macfarlane, D.S.O., commanding "C" Squadron, 1st T.M.R.

Wounded—

Lance-Corporal A. E. T. Leigh, "B" Squadron, T.M.R., assegai wound, left shoulder (slight flesh wound), and severe blow on the chest above heart by knobkerrie.

Lance-Corporal P. McEvoy, "C" Squadron, T.M.R., bullet wound, left arm (flesh and slight).

Trooper F. H. Glover, "A" Squadron, T.M.R., bullet wound through right thigh (flesh only), and right arm (serious, severing main artery).

Trooper F. Hosford, "C" Squadron, T.M.R., bullet wound through arm (flesh wound).

Trooper F. Carlick, "C" Squadron, T.M.R., splinter of metal in hand (slight).

Trooper R. McLean, "C" Squadron, T.M.R., bullet wound through right leg (flesh only).

Trooper Scabbert, N.D.M.R., slight.

Sergeant-Major King, Z.M.R., slight.

Lieutenant Marsden, Royston's Horse, mortally wounded.

Trooper F. Ferguson, Natal Police, assegai wound, left groin (slight flesh wound).

Sergeant Malaisahasha, Zululand Native Police, assegai wound, leg.

The number of rebels killed was given as 575, which, if anything, would be an over-estimate. This number included six rebel leaders of importance, *viz.*: Bambata, Mehlokazulu, Mteli, Nondubela, Mavuguto and Lubudhlungu. Bambata was reported wounded early in the fight, but there was a doubt whether he had not escaped up to the stronghold with Mangati, his lieutenant. The fight was believed to have broken the back of the rebellion in Zululand. Fortune had favoured the troops, but it was a fitting reward to the indefatigable efforts of Colonel McKenzie and his forces after their persistent flogging of the Nkandhla bush. It was also gratifying that the men of the T.M.R. from the sister Colony of the Transvaal were so situated as to have been engaged in the main fight, and under the excellent leadership of their Colonel, had acquitted themselves in a most creditable manner. As to the column under Colonel McKenzie's immediate command, there could be no greater recommendation than that given by the Zulus, who said:—

“A clean column came to the bush, looked at it, went round it, and left it.

“A second clean column did likewise.

“A third column, consisting of small and dirty men,

came to the bush, looked at it once, and looked at it a second time, then not caring for death, went through it and killed everything before them."

The first clean column was meant for Colonel Mansel's small force at the beginning, and the second clean column for Colonel Mackay's left wing, Natal Carbineers.

CHAPTER XVIII.

AFTER BAMBATA—WE CROSS THE OFENI.

IN spite of the severe strain of the previous day, all troops were in excellent spirits as they shifted the camp from the exposed position on the Nomanci Ridge to a more sheltered spot about a mile nearer the Nkandhla Magistracy. All intelligence pointed to Bambata having been wounded at the Mome. Some said he was killed, while others affirmed that he had fled with a few followers in the direction of the Macala. Captain Hosking, Intelligence Officer, having received what he considered reliable information that Bambata was killed, asked to be allowed to take a squadron to search the Mome. His request was not granted, as Colonel McKenzie did not wish to run any risk by delaying his operations. So long as there was the possibility of Bambata being at large, the danger of his gathering strength remained, and Colonel McKenzie felt that no time should be lost and no stone left unturned to vanquish the fighting power of the Chief and his adherents. With Bambata at large, even if wounded, it would require a considerable column to effect his capture. Accordingly Colonel McKenzie

formed a column consisting of the following units under his direct command:—

“C” Squadron, Natal Carbineers, under Captain Richards.

N.D.M.R., under Major Abraham.

Z.M.R., under Major Vanderplank, and

Natal Police, under Sub-Inspector White.

The latter force, amounting to 150 men, arrived in camp from Cetshwayo's grave at midnight.

Colonel Royston was given the command of a column consisting of Royston's Horse, the D.L.I., under Lieut.-Col. Wylie, and a detachment of the Natal Rangers.

On the 11th June instructions were sent to Colonel Leuchars, who was in command of the Umvoti field-force encamped on the Natal side of the Tugela in Sibindi's location, to co-operate with Colonel McKenzie's forces by crossing into Zululand. Colonel Mackay, who had up to the present been operating at Isandhlwana and Mangeni, got into communication with Colonel McKenzie's column on the Madhlozi Mountain. He was instructed to demonstrate with his column on the following day on the Qudeni Plateau in the neighbourhood of the Saw Mill. This demonstration was calculated to drive the rebels with all their cattle from the summit of the Qudeni Forest to the valley below the Mfongosi stream. Colonel Leuchars' force was to make a night march, cross the Tugela on the morning of the 13th, at or near the Ngobevu Drift, and then work right down under the bush to the Mfongosi Valley, to effect a junction with Colonel McKenzie's



THE EKOMBE, QUDENI.

column which was to make a similar night march from the direction of Nkandhla. The wagons of Colonel McKenzie's mobile column, under the escort of three companies of the Natal Rangers in command of Major Boyd Wilson, as well as the two N.F.A. guns under Lieutenant Acutt and a section of pom-pom under Lieutenant Swain, left early on the 12th June for the Ekombe Forest, by the circuitous road *via* Nkandhla Magistracy and the Qudeni Mountain. It was not expected they would join Colonel McKenzie for several days as he was making across country almost in a straight line to the Ntingwe from Nomanci Ridge. At the last moment Colonel Royston was instructed to accompany Colonel McKenzie with three squadrons of Royston's Horse as far as Ntingwe, and to leave the remainder of his column on the Nomanci in temporary charge of Lieut.-Col. Wylie of the D.L.I. Lieutenant Hedges and Sergeant Calverley also remained behind, with special instructions to locate and if possible to capture Sigananda. Two days' rations were carried and the force marched out of camp after breakfast.

It was reported that Makahleleke, one of Sigananda's principal sons, was in hiding in the Ofeni. The Ofeni stream is a tributary of the Insuzi north of the Itate Gorge. It took its name from an extraordinary crack in the mountain overlooking the stream. A convulsion of nature in some remote period must have rent the mountain in twain. The severance was complete except for a very narrow natural bridge, barely three feet in width, which

connects the two portions of the mountain. On either side of the bridge are chasms 300 to 400 feet in depth, and it seemed incredible that any native could take refuge in such a place, overshadowed as it was by tall trees and shrubs into which the sun never penetrated. Before driving down the Ofeni Valley towards the Insuzi River, Colonel McKenzie ordered the Z.M.R. and one troop of Natal Carbineers to take up their positions overlooking the junction of the Ofeni and Insuzi. The chasms were then thoroughly searched by the N.C. and N.D.M.R., whilst the levies proceeded down the bed of the Ofeni stream. The Natal Police were posted on the left bank which had been recently occupied by the rebels, who had constructed stone sangars and loopholes on the rocky slopes with the apparent intention of making a firm stand. Their evacuation was no doubt accounted for by the result of the Mome fight on the 10th June. In one of the chasms the Natal Carbineers put up a rebel who was hotly pursued. In his flight he threw away a revolver and coat, but the failing light and rough country assisted him in making good his escape though he was wounded. This rebel proved to be no other than Makahleleke, Sigananda's son. The column halted at the Insuzi River for an hour, and in the dusk of the evening commenced to journey to Ntingwe. The force reached Ntingwe a little after nine o'clock and bivouacked in the wattle plantation at Titlestad's Store. The trees afforded warm shelter during the brief period allowed for sleep. The order was given for the column to move at 2.30 A.M. on the following morning.

CHAPTER XIX.

MACALA HILL.

INTELLIGENCE having been received that the rebels were in hiding at Macala Hill, Colonel Barker was ordered to co-operate in this movement on the 13th June, by taking up a position below Macala Hill for the purpose of cutting off the enemy's retreat towards the Tugela. Colonel McKenzie's column moved off from the Ntingwe by the wagon road to the Insuzi Valley and Fort Yolland. It was a bright starry morning, the atmosphere clear and cold, and after proceeding for about three-quarters of a mile orders were sent back to the Z.M.R., in the rear of the column, to turn to the right and proceed westwards to Ejokweni Hill, with the view of getting into touch with Colonel Leuchars' column, which was working up from the Mfongosi Valley. All Colonel McKenzie's night marches were planned with the object of mystifying and surprising the enemy. Vigilance and the value of time seemed to be ever uppermost in his mind. He was most careful in avoiding any risk of disclosing the movements of the troops to the enemy, and orders were invariably issued at the last moment with no given destination, and in the case of native levies they were only warned

to fall in before marching. Absolute silence on the march was rigidly enforced, and smoking strictly prohibited. On this occasion the staff officers were taken severely to task for galloping instead of going quietly to the head of the column to receive their orders from the Colonel. The column descended Umsungani Hill, which is separated from the Macala by a very low neck which the force had to pass. When within 200 yards of the summit of Macala Hill a halt was called. The bush was in the shape of a crescent. Colonel McKenzie directed the N.D.M.R. to the extreme right on the western limit of the bush, whilst Royston's Horse moved forward to the left. The Natal Police followed the N.D.M.R., and "C" Squadron of the N.C. was to make for the centre of the crescent and keep in touch with the Natal Police and Royston's Horse. The lower end of the bush below Macala Hill was left to Colonel Barker's force. Within twenty minutes of day-break, Colonel McKenzie led the men at a sharp trot over the stony ground and completed his enveloping movement as soon as daylight appeared.

Below the crescent rebels were seen herding cattle. The manner in which they ran showed that they were completely taken by surprise. Colonel Barker's column was also seen advancing up the valley to join hands with Colonel McKenzie. The levies were put in to drive the bush from west to east. The bush was small in extent and by 11 A.M. they had completed the drive and met Royston's Horse. The troops halted for breakfast, and one of the levies was brought up to have his

wound dressed. It appeared that while Lieutenant Lindsay of "C" Squadron, N.C., and a few men were standing on the rocks in the bush a rebel beneath them struck out with an assegai at a passing friendly native, which act immediately put the few Carbineers on the alert, with the result that they killed two of the rebels in ambush. The rocks in the bush at this place are piled up in an extraordinary manner and are so large that the spaces between them form caverns and subterranean passages. Colonel McKenzie, accompanied by his staff, and Captain Richards, made a close examination of these caverns which disclosed evidence of recent occupation by natives. It was here that Malaza, the Basuto witch doctor upon whom Bambata relied so much, was killed by Colonel McKenzie. The man refused to give up his arms when called upon and preferred to die fighting. Meanwhile Major Vanderplank on the Ejokweni, about five miles to the west, had not succeeded in getting in touch with Colonel Leuchars. No more could be done but to return to Titlestad's Store, which was reached at 4.30 P.M. On arrival news was received from a private source that the rebel Chief Sigananda and his son Ndabaningi had come out of the Mome bush and surrendered unconditionally at the Nomanci camp. General Stephenson and his Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant McGill, who had parted with the column on the 11th, had been eye-witnesses of the surrender. The General left for Pretoria, *via* Pietermaritzburg, on the 14th June, and before leaving Natal he expressed his satisfaction with the conduct of operations in the field.

CHAPTER XX.

BAMBATA DEAD.

THE column moved at 5.30 A.M. on the 14th June for the Ekombe Forest towards the Qudeni and arrived there shortly after sunrise. From the Qudeni Mountain is a magnificent view of the forest which clothes the rugged country from the summit of the Qudeni Range almost to its base at the source of the Mfongosi stream—a fall of quite 3,500 feet; but the difficulty of operating in such country with the force at Colonel McKenzie's disposal was apparently insuperable. Accordingly the Natal Carbineers and Royston's Horse descended to the upper branch of the Mfongosi stream whilst Lieutenant London and his levies drove a small portion of the bush above towards them. The drive however had no result. In the distance, ten or twelve miles below the valley, the columns of smoke announced the presence of Colonel Leuchars' column. In the afternoon Colonel McKenzie rode out to meet Colonel Leuchars. The horses by this time were suffering from the hardships of the campaign, for the wagons with rations had not been seen for days. The Natal Police, on account of their forced march, had to leave everything behind

them at Cetshwayo's grave, and they only had a blanket each which by this time was worn threadbare, and the nights were particularly cold. The consultation with Colonel Leuchars resulted in a combined movement to take place on the following day on the Ekotongweni on the left bank of the Tugela, below the junction of the Mfongosi and Tugela Rivers. Mangadi and Cakijana, Bambata's lieutenants, were supposed to be in hiding in the caves at the Ekotongweni. It was the intention of Colonel McKenzie to make a night march to surround this position which, however, was abandoned on the representations made by Colonel Leuchars.

Instead, the column moved out at 7 A.M. the next morning to co-operate with Colonel Leuchars' force which left camp at Mfongosi at daybreak to work down the Tugela River on the left bank. The Krantz-kop Reserves were to guard the Natal side of the river at the junction of the Dimane stream with the Tugela River. After proceeding about six miles from camp, Colonel McKenzie was intercepted by a messenger from Colonel Wylie at the Ejokweni Nek, who reported under date "14.6.06 7.30 P.M." to the effect that he had ocular proof that Bambata was dead; that three native spies, who were handed over to Sergeant Calverley by Mr. Saunders, proceeded on that day to identify Bambata. The spies were (a) Satushukana, brother of Bambata, brought up from childhood with him, (b) Magwakwana, late of Bambata's tribe, also brought up with him, (c) Nongqai Chief Tulwana. Colonel Wylie further reported that seventeen

prisoners had come in, one of whom was Makahleleke, fourth son of Sigananda, who was wounded in the Ofeni. Colonel Wylie also informed Colonel McKenzie that Sigananda's surrender was absolutely unconditional and the rebel Chief was detained at Nomanci camp pending Colonel McKenzie's return.

The despatch was carefully perused by Colonel McKenzie, who thereupon announced to the troops the death of Bambata at the Mome fight. The enthusiasm with which the news was received was boundless. Cheer upon cheer rose from every lusty throat and echoed from the hillside along the route of march. To work off the exuberance of the men's spirits, Colonel McKenzie led the column at a gallop for several miles until Colonel Leuchars was met, to whom the joyful news was promptly imparted. The definite news of the death of Bambata, as well as that of the Chief Mteli, was at once despatched by helio to Maritzburg *via* Nkandhla. The victory of the Mome was indeed complete, and the timely blockage of the upper portion of the Mome stream accounted for the deaths of all the rebel leaders.

CHAPTER XXI.

SIGANANDA'S SURRENDER—GENERAL ARMISTICE— BAMBATA'S HEAD.

ON arrival at the Ekotongweni, which greatly resembled the Macala in formation, the Natal Police took up their position on the right, the Z.M.R. and the N.D.M.R. in the centre, and Royston's Horse on the left. The trumpet was then sounded for a general advance in the bush towards the Tugela. There was, however, no evidence of recent occupation by the enemy. After a most exhausting drive over terribly rough country, the forces returned to camp in high spirits, as, with the death of Bambata and the surrender of the once unconquered Chief Sigananda, the rebellion in Zululand was felt to be at an end, unless indeed the greater Chief of royal blood, Dinuzulu, in Northern Zululand was foolish enough to follow the example of Sigananda. Dinuzulu's Indunas were at the time on their way to Maritzburg, accompanied by the Commissioner for Native Affairs, Mr. C. R. Saunders, C.M.G., to interview the Government. Mr. Saunders, who has spent the last twenty years in Zululand and is held as a great authority in native


matters, staked his faith on Dinuzulu's loyalty; and although Dinuzulu's name was widely used by the natives themselves to stir up strife and sedition throughout Natal and Zululand, and possibly other parts of South Africa, no evidence of active disloyalty on his part has up to the time of writing been brought to light. Almost every white man in the country believed in Dinuzulu's complicity with the rebels and entertained few doubts but that he would openly manifest hostility to the Government. Mr. Saunders' position was one of the gravest responsibility; and that his confidence in Dinuzulu's loyalty was not misplaced, speaks highly for his having the courage of his convictions.


It was decided by Colonel McKenzie to give time for the rebels to surrender. Most of the levies were disbanded, and they were commissioned to spread the news of the rebels' defeat far and wide. The column moved to the Ndikwa stream in the valley of the Insuzi to rest both men and horses. It is fitting here to mention Sergeant Titlestad, of the Z.M.R., in connection with the work of obtaining surrenders. He was well known to the natives as "Elias," and was looked up to by them as a friend and adviser. He had permission to go into the Qudeni Forest, where he spent two days and nights alone. On the third day he brought in with him 284 rebels to surrender. Meanwhile surrenders freely came in at the Nkandhla Magistracy, which place then held two objects of interest—the remains of Bambata and the person of

Sigananda. The decapitation of Bambata—which called forth so much bitter condemnation of Natal from those people in England who unfortunately seem to seize upon any pretext to vilify their countrymen abroad—was an act which has been amply justified by the effect it has had. Amongst the hundreds of dead bodies which lay in the Mome Gorge, Bambata's was recognised by a native who chanced to go through the gorge a few days after the fight. The discovery was reported, but more certain identification was required than the recognition by a single individual. It was not possible to convey the body to the camp owing to decomposition and to the almost inaccessible place in which it lay. Accordingly the head was severed from the trunk and conveyed to the camp, where it was recognised as Bambata's by all those who had been acquainted with him and who were available. The exhibition of the head (to be seen by official permit only) undoubtedly had the effect of dispelling a superstition, deep rooted in the mind of the natives, that Bambata was invulnerable. So long as the belief was held that Bambata was alive, waverers would have thrown in their lot with the rebels and, with them, continued the struggle. The news of his death was discredited at the time in many quarters. A native messenger sent by Mr. Walker Wilson, Magistrate of Babanango, arrived at Nkandhla two days after Bambata was buried. He knew Bambata well and asked many questions concerning him from those who saw the remains. He also recognised a relative

of Bambata's at Nkandhla. The messenger returned to his home satisfied, and it was by his confirmation that the natives of the Babanango Division, who had also indulged in the superstition concerning Bambata's invulnerability, believed that Bambata was dead. Repulsive as the decapitation might appear, the object it served was a humane one; as in the remarkably short period of a few days nearly 1,000 rebels laid down their arms and the restoration of peace and order in that part of Zululand was an accomplished fact. Colonel McKenzie caused the head to be taken back to the Mome bush and placed with the body, which was decently interred on the right bank of the Mome stream.

Bambata possessed a distinct personality. He had been merely a petty chief in the Umvoti country on the bank of the Tugela River. After defying the Government and attacking the police at Impanza, Bambata crossed into Zululand with a small body of men and induced Sigananda and his tribe to join him. It had been held by a large section of the white people, including experts in native matters, that Sigananda welcomed Bambata under the influence of a high authority; but it should be remembered that Sigananda was in trouble about thirty-five years ago in the days of Mpande when he fled into Natal and was received by Bambata's grandfather, Jangeni, the Chief of the Amazondi tribe. By the law of gratitude Sigananda was bound to receive Bambata. Having secured Sigananda as an ally, Bambata had need of little





SIGAMANDA.

persuasion to enlist the sympathies of Mehlokazulu, and thus became the commander-in-chief of the rebel Zulu impis. His enemies could not help admiring his intrepidity and his rapid advance to the position of leader, in which he was found on the day of the Mome fight when he paid the penalty of his defiance of law and order.

The Chief Sigananda presented a more pathetic picture. A man of about ninety-seven years of age, he had ruled over a large tribe in a beautiful and fertile district of Zululand for years. Little troubled by the white man whose civilising influence had hardly reached his people, he had apparently no cause to feel discontented with his lot, but rather, one would think, his inclination would have been to have ended his days in the state of peace and plenty which he and his people had so long enjoyed under the rule of the British. As Colonel McKenzie and the officers who accompanied him looked on the old man attended by his sons Ndabaningi and Makahleleke, both of whom Sigananda addressed as his "Umfanas" (young boys, and who were between the age of sixty and seventy), they could not help feeling sorry for the rebel chief. He had staked all that he held most dear he knew not for what. He was a man looked up to by his tribe not only with respect but with veneration; and in the sere and yellow leaf of his life to have lost all for the grim walls of a prison was a poor exchange indeed. When he was questioned why he did not surrender immediately after negotiations at Cetsh-

wayo's grave, he replied, "You had not fought us then. We were not conquered." When asked how he had spent his time in the forest when our forces were operating there Sigananda replied, "I never had occasion to move very far. When your big guns shelled in one direction, I got behind a rock in the opposite direction. On the day that you burnt my chief kraal, your troops passed me quite close, but they did not see me. I am very fond of the sun; even in the hottest days in summer in the valley of the Mome I always sat out to warm myself. I never found it too hot. My eyesight is not so good now, and I do not find my way so well in the forest, but I hear quite distinctly. I do not sleep well as I suffer from an irritation in my skin. Otherwise I have nothing to complain of."

For his age he was a very active man, and his memory was apparently perfectly clear. He spoke of incidents of which he had personal knowledge, of the reigns of the old Zulu kings, Tshaka, Dingana, Mpande and Cetshwayo. His narrative of items of ancient Zulu history was exceedingly interesting, more especially his story of the massacre of Piet Retief and his party of Boers in 1838 by the Zulu king, Dingana, at which he stated he was present. The following is the story told by Sigananda to Colonel McKenzie at Nkandhla on the 18th June.

CHAPTER XXII.

SIGANANDA'S STORY OF THE MURDER OF PIET RETIEF.

SEATED on an old wooden box in the full glare of the sun which he so dearly loved, Sigananda called on Ndabaningi by his side for a pinch of snuff, and respectfully addressing Colonel McKenzie began his story:—

“Chief,” he said, “I have now only four wives, two of whom are old and aged. I have had fourteen wives altogether. Two of them were given me by Mpande and one of these is still living. Yes, I was present at the killing of the Boers under Piet Retief. I even remember when Piet Retief came. I will tell you what took place at the massacre. At that time Mondisa and myself had been ordered to put rings on, and I was married.” The old man paused and seemed to be absorbed in deep thought. “I was at the Umgungunhlovu kraal when the massacre took place,” he continued. “The kraal was at Mahlabatini, between the Nkumbana and Inzololo. There are signs of the kraal even to this day. I can see no man who was present then.” Calling for more snuff, the old man

resumed his story. "The dispute was through cattle. Dingana sent his men out twice to Mzilikazi. When they returned with the cattle after the second trip, the Dutch people said, 'We cannot allow you to pick up the figs when we have already knocked them off the tree'. Dingana's answer was, 'Well, if they were your figs why did you leave them? If you have conquered Mzilikazi why did you knock the figs off and leave them behind?' Then the answer came, 'The Dutch people will come and take those figs'. Dingana's answer was, 'Let them come and take them, and then they will be able to tell me why they left them behind'. After some little time we heard definitely that they were coming. They came on horses in pairs, and in sight of the kraal passed the gate of the main kraal. By that time Dingana had ordered his regiments in. When the Dutch arrived they came all round the place in different little parties. They were hidden all round. As their advance was coming round the kraal the rear was visible. Then they made the turn and entered at the gate. There were two entrances to the kraal. When they made the half turn at the kraal the rear was at the spruit."

Here Sigananda graphically described the crossing of the spruit, and imitated the sound of the splashing water by the horses' feet as they crossed.

"It was a very large kraal," he said. "They made two turns in the kraal. When they were about to make the third turn, Dingana left and entered into the cattle kraal and Manyosi remained. Manyosi was

Dingana's Induna. Then the last of the Boers entered the kraal. Then Piet appeared, a tall man, and walked forward to Manyosi. They opened the way as Piet walked up to Manyosi, and when he got there he stood up and shook hands. Piet thought Manyosi was the king. They laughed because Manyosi couldn't shake hands properly. The Indunas came from Dingana inside the kraal to Manyosi to say, 'Tell Piet now to review his men and let me see'. Piet told Manyosi that he had come there to make a parade. Then Piet left Manyosi and returned by the same track as he had come in and they again opened a space for him to go through. They fired their guns and there was a smell of powder and smoke in the kraal. Then they divided again. Then they met and fired again. Then the Indunas came to Manyosi with a message to say that Piet's men had to camp at the lower end of the kraal. They said 'No, we will go and camp in amongst the trees in front of the kraal gate'. Then they left and passed through the two gates and camped in their own place which they had chosen for themselves. Aye, the trees are still there to this day," said Sigananda in anticipation of Colonel McKenzie's question.

"After we had been there some time looking at them, two red oxen appeared. Then there came three large pots of maas. They kept dipping the maas out of the pots with their little cups. Then the two oxen were killed. They shot the oxen. Then about three o'clock the Indunas came to tell Piet that Dingana was

very pleased with the show they had made and that he would dance for them in the morning. In the afternoon of their arrival there was a thunderstorm and rain. During the night, after the storm cleared up, the Dutchmen moved and made an attempt to surround the kraal, just to measure to see how far they could extend around the kraal. In the morning they fed on meat. We knew nothing of Dingana's intentions. The owners of the land were no doubt informed. It was quite late before Dingana could get them up to the dance. Dingana was coaxing them to come up. We didn't know if they had any suspicion or not but they would not come up. Messenger after messenger went down to them asking them to come up into the kraal. Dingana sent to them saying, 'We are not going to carry assegais, neither do I want you to come up with your guns, we are only going to have a friendly talk'. He went on coaxing them and sent beer down to them and maas. Then they were seen to move and then they came up. They left one white man in charge of the horses and rifles and some black servants and two carts which they brought with them. When they came up there were four large pots of beer put out for them, and they sat all round against the inside of the kraal. Dingana was in the kraal. It was a high kraal fenced with wattles buried into the ground and then entangled. They sat on one side of the kraal, and we were on the right-hand side and between the huts there were also natives sitting. Then Dingana stood up and said, 'Piet, we will speak to-

morrow morning on the matter which you have come to see me about'. Then he gave the order to 'keta' the 'inkondhlo'."

Sigananda then stood up, and with his staff raised above his head, his feet beating time to the chant, and a merry twinkle in his eye, sang the "inkondhlo":—

INKONDHLO EYA TSHAYELWA AMABUNU.

"Eyayi ya! yayi, yayi, yayi, yayi, yayi, yayi ya!

"Babete bayaku si tela obisini

"Abafokazana babeti ka si su ka

"Ngena Engome sangena—sa kusa

"Iwawa. Ubusa ba? Ngi busa wena

"Nhlajaniso. Wa u pika inkani

"wa uti ka si su ku wu tshisa

"umhlahlandhlela sawu tshisa

"kau seko.

"Eyayi ya! yayi, yayi ya!"

The writer is indebted to Mr. J. W. Shepstone for the following translation:—

"Eyayi ya, yayi, yayi, etc.

"They said they would throw us into the milk.

"The commoners said that we would not enter

"the "Ngome" but we entered. We shouted

"(or remonstrated). Whom do you ask?

"I ask you 'Nhlajaniso'. You were

"defiant and said that we would not burn the

"road maker and we burnt it—it is no more.

"Eyayi ya, etc."

Sigananda astonished his audience by the activity he displayed in his rendering of the song, and, resuming his seat, continued the narrative. "This song does not apply to the Boers at all. It is simply a war

song. After that they closed upon the Boers. While they were sitting down Dingana was sending messengers to tell them to close around the Boers. Dingana's people were ordered to cut short clubs and they pretended to carry them for the purpose of dancing with them. Then the Boers worked hard with their short knives, but it did not help because we were great in numbers and they were only a small party. No one shouted out aloud, word was sent round amongst the people. Dingana got up and gave the order for the song to be sung. I did not take part in the fight. I belonged to the kraal. The order was given to the regiments, Izinyosi, Udhlambedhlu and Umkulutshane. These were the three regiments which danced. They were three large regiments. The Boers were not assegaid, they were clubbed. One man jumped from hut to hut and tried to get away, but it was no use; there were too many Zulus. They were all killed in the kraal. Not one came out. None were taken prisoners. No, they were all killed on the spot. I saw it done. The man in charge of the horses was also killed, but one of the boys who was with the horses ran and got away as far as the place of a Dutchman on a ridge some little distance away and reported what had happened to the Dutchman, who escaped. After this we had another thunderstorm and the impi went out and bathed in the river. Before they had completed their bath they heard a call ordering them to arm. They armed and slept near the kraal. After the thunderstorm Dingana came out and said, 'I have

finished them'. This was after he told them to arm, and then they went murdering the Boers in the districts far away. We went through the country, and when we got to Weenen we were driven back. Dingana had given the order that we were not to murder the women because they were women and could not carry assegais. After we came back from Weenen we remained one year at home. Then the Boers advanced at Itala and were driven back by Dingana's army which seized their cattle. The Boers then attacked again one year afterwards at the Blood River, and we were defeated and lost heavily. After the battle the Boers burnt the great kraal of Umgungunhlovu. Then peace was made after the Blood River fight. The Dutchmen demanded cattle, horses and sheep to be returned to them."

In reply to Colonel McKenzie, Sigananda told him that in those days the Boers were dressed in braided sheepskins and wore broad rimmed hats. Sigananda appeared to have appreciated the rapt attention paid to his narrative by his audience, for which he was thanked by Colonel McKenzie.

On the 21st June a court-martial composed of Lieut.-Col. Wylie, D.L.I., as president, Lieut.-Col. Shepstone, N.C., Lieut.-Col. Furze, Natal Rangers, Major Molyneux, D.L.I., and Captain Ente, N.D.M.R., was convened at Nkandhla for the trial of Manqomankulu (who was charged with the murder of Road-Party Overseer Walters at the Mbiza stream in the Nkandhla district) and of Sigananda and his sons for rebellion.

Note.—Mr. J. W. Shepstone, C.M.G., who visited the scene of the massacre in 1847, and is a recognised authority on native matters by reason of his long administrative experience in the offices he held at different periods as Secretary for Native Affairs, Commissioner for Zululand, and Judge of the Native High Court, Natal, has kindly furnished the writer with the following notes upon Sigananda's story:—

"Keta the Inkondhlo" is a royal dance in which the dancers form a complete and dense circle round the party for whom the dance is given. I doubt if Sigananda was actually on the spot. Why was he not asked to what regiment he belonged? The cattle brought or taken by Retief to Dingana were not cattle from Umzilikasi but from Sikonyela, a Basuto Chief. There must have been a previous meeting or communication between Retief and Dingana as Retief actually went or sent a party to Sikonyela and got the cattle of which the Dutch could have known nothing, had no prior communication taken place. The meeting when Retief and his party were massacred was the farewell meeting, as everything had been arranged as regards land, as was actually shown by the treaty found on Retief's body. The excuse or reason given by the Zulus for the murder of Retief was that a party of Dutch had, during the night, been round the royal kraal. There was not a particle of truth in this, and the reason given was nothing more than an excuse for having taken the step they did. Dingana had asked Retief to show his friendly feeling by fetching his cattle from Sikonyela, a long distance from this, as that Chief lived on a mountain very near the Caledon River, now in Orange River Colony. It is doubtful whether Retief made any demonstration on arrival at Dingana's, as Sigananda states, having only sixty men; and I very much doubt their having carts with them, carts not being part of their belongings. All Sigananda's replies make me doubt his having been present at the massacre. I do not know that Dingana had a head Induna named "Manyosi," his chief Indunas were "Ndhlela" and "Dambusa".

CHAPTER XXIII.

OUTBREAK AT MAPUMULO, NATAL.

WHILST the surrenders were freely coming in at Nkandhla Magistracy, an attack was made by natives on a convoy near Mapumulo on the Natal side of the Tugela. The details of the attack on the convoy and the subsequent repulse of the rebels on the 19th June, as related to the writer by Lieut.-Col. Ritchie of the Natal Mounted Rifles, are as follows :—

“A convoy of seven wagons trekking from Stanger to Mapumulo with supplies was outspanned on the Otimati River, about seven miles from Mapumulo Magistracy, on the night of the 18th June. The district was considered to be perfectly quiet and no troops therefore accompanied the wagons, but Sergeants Knox and Powell of the N.M.R. travelled with them. The wagons left the river very early next morning. After proceeding for a couple of miles the wagons were attacked in a sandstone cutting on the main wagon road. Knox was on the first wagon and Powell on the last. On the appearance of the natives, Knox jumped off the wagon and his rifle was taken out of his hands. He was hit on the head and knee with a knobkerrie

as he broke through the rebels, who threw their assegais after him. It was close on 7 A.M. when they were attacked. Knox being a powerful athlete ran the whole distance of five miles with an assegai wound on his arm and another through his leg and arrived at the Mapumulo laager a few minutes after eight o'clock. Powell fell into the hands of the enemy and was killed.

"On the receipt of the news at the laager a patrol which, fortunately, was just on the point of leaving camp, was at once ordered to the scene of the attack. Captain Knox was ordered to saddle up and to follow on with the remainder of the mounted garrison which consisted of forty N.M.R. Lieut.-Col. Ritchie, who commanded the patrol of sixty N.M.R., galloped to the sandstone cutting where he found the wagons had been looted. He followed on with his force to Ogilvie's Store and saw one rebel whom they hotly pursued. They then came on to the tracks of a large impi. On arriving at the Otimati Mission Station, they saw four rebel scouts on the hill to the left of the Mission Station, overlooking the kraal of the Chief, Ndhlovu ka Timuni. The dismounted scouts proved no match against mounted troops who successfully cut them off and took the main impi, about 400 strong, gathered at the kraal, completely by surprise.

"Colonel Ritchie's position was above that of the rebels and his force opened fire at a range of 100 yards. The enemy took to the line of bush with the object of making a flank attack, which however failed. At the same time a frontal attack was also made up the

hill, but they could not push it home, owing to the timely arrival of Captain Knox and the remainder of the squadron. A hot fire was poured into them and the rebels broke and fled down the valley. During the attack some of the enemy charged to within five yards of the troops. It took the first troop with Colonel Ritchie exactly fifty minutes from the time the report was received to get into action, the distance covered being about seven and a half miles. The rebels had two snipers who kept up a persistent fire but fortunately without any effect. The number of rebels killed and counted near the kraal was 93 and subsequent reports indicated that quite 180 of the enemy were killed at the fight. The N.M.R. squadron spent the rest of the day on patrol in the direction of Thring's Post and returned to Mapumulo just before sundown."

At 5 A.M. on the 19th June the store at Thring's Post was attacked by a party of natives. Mr. Robbins, Government Stock Inspector, a man well known to the natives in the district, happened to be at the store. On hearing voices Robbins went to open the door under the impression that it was his servant who came to wake him. No sooner had he done so than a number of natives sprang upon him. He was assailed by knobkerries and assegais and was severely wounded. In the midst of the struggle he asked the natives if they knew whom they were killing. He was at once recognised by three members of the party who ran to his assistance and placed their shields over him, which timely act no doubt saved his life. He was taken out

to the garden at the back of the store where he remained unmolested. Meanwhile the storekeeper, Sangreid, a young Norwegian, made a desperate struggle for his life in front of the store but was overpowered by superior numbers. His body was afterwards discovered under the gum trees by the side of the main road about thirty yards distant. There were seventeen assegai wounds found on him and his hands were bruised by knobkerries. After looting the store the party of rebels probably rejoined the impi in Ndhlovu ka Timuni's location in the direction of the Tugela. No mutilation was attempted by the rebels, and the body was safely conveyed by the Rev. Mr. Coombe, Mr. Hopkins of Kearsney, and Mr. Ernest Bull to Kearsney for burial. Robbins was taken by easy stages to Stanger where he made rapid recovery from his wounds. This fresh outbreak of rebellion directed all attention and action towards Natal proper. Royston's Horse, with three companies of Natal Rangers and two fifteen pounders, "B" Battery, N.F.A., were formed into a column under the command of Colonel Royston to remain in Zululand to clear up the Nkandhla and Nqutu districts generally. Colonel Wools-Sampson was also given the command of a column consisting of the N.D.M.R., Z.M.R., N.P., D.L.I., and a section of N.F.A. guns and pom-poms.

On the 21st June further reports came to hand to the effect that the powerful Chief, Messeni, of the Amaqwabe Tribe, and the Chief Ngqokwana, Amazulu Tribe, both of the Mapumulo division, were in open

rebellion. Colonel Wools-Sampson's column was ordered to proceed to the Isiwazimanqa (*via* Fort Yolland), on the Zululand bank of the Tugela, opposite the Isiwazimbuzi, on the Natal side of the river, where the enemy was located.

Colonel Mackay's column, consisting of the right and left wings of the Natal Carbineers, the York and Lancashire (Mr. Abe Bailey's contingent), under Lieut.-Col. Peakman, and the C.M.R. Maxim detachment, under Captain Humphreys, was recalled from the Qudeni to proceed to Natal *via* Middle Drift with the least possible delay. Unfortunately he had to move with ox transport. Lieut.-Col. Dick with his 500 Rangers was also ordered to proceed to Natal *via* Middle Drift.

CHAPTER XXIV.

NATAL—HLONONO FIGHT.

COLONEL MCKENZIE having despatched the several columns *en route* for Natal, and having left Colonel Royston with his column in Zululand, left Nkandhla on the 25th June with "C" Squadron of the Carbineers. The loyal Chiefs and natives of Nkandhla assembled at the Magistracy to bid the Colonel good-bye. Their farewell was a striking one. They said: "Great Chief 'Chaka' McKenzie. We had neither rest nor slumber before you came. You have changed it all. Remember that these people who have been crushed are like unto the withered weeds. A little dew may spring them up again. As you have your face towards Natal, do not forget us but turn your eye behind you to watch over us. Indeed, Great Chief, our forefathers have told us what the great Chaka did in their days. Happy are we that we have been permitted to see a Chaka in our time."

The Colonel found it difficult to suitably reply to the genuine expressions of regret at his departure. The cold was intense when Colonel McKenzie and his column left Nkandhla, and the warm shelter of the forest

through which the route lay was very welcome. The scene of Royston's fight which took place on the 3rd June was visited. The forest was as silent as death. The very birds seemed instinctively to have left it. As the column traversed the forest road, memories of various bush drives presented themselves vividly to the mind. There was a feeling of thankfulness mingled with pride that persistent flogging of the forest had resulted in the complete conquest of the rebels, who at one time vainly thought themselves invulnerable. Towards sun-down the Umvusana stream was reached, and here the column camped for the night.

Supplies were sent forward next morning from Fort Yolland to meet Colonel McKenzie on the Middle Drift road. After a good survey of the Nkandhla Range of mountains and the vast extent of bush-clad country amongst which were distinguished the familiar London Kop, the Mome Bush, the Transvaal Ridge and the Nomanci Hill, the column turned towards Natal and arrived at Colonel Mansel's camp at Middle Drift. The force under this officer consisted of the T.M.R., under Colonel Barker; the N.N. Corps with two N.F.A. guns, under Commander Hoare; the Zululand Police (Nongqais), under Inspector Fairlie.

The Tugela Drift was crossed early in the morning, and after a long ascent up the wagon road Krantzkop was reached in the afternoon, when news was received of the fight near Thring's Post on the Hlonono Ridge.

Colonel Leuchars had left Thring's Post on the 27th June at 11 A.M. for the purpose of making a reconnais-

sance down the Hlonono Ridge to the Mission Station in Messeni's location. His force consisted of three squadrons of the N.M.R., under Lieut.-Col. Murray-Smith; two squadrons of the B.M.R., under Lieut.-Col. Arnott; "D" Squadron, Natal Carbineers, under Captain Montgomery; and two guns of "C" Battery, under Major Currie. The force moved down the Hlonono Ridge, and when within two miles of the Mission Station saw a great number of rebels moving on a kopje above the station, whilst on a nearer kopje one solitary native was seen. This immediately roused Colonel Murray-Smith's suspicion, as he rightly thought that the solitary rebel was placed on the near kopje as a "draw". He accordingly had the country very carefully scouted. One troop under Lieutenant Addison was ordered to advance to the kopje. The troop halted half-way up the hill and Addison went on alone. When he was within fifty yards of the summit, an impi rose in one black line and sat down again preparatory to making their charge. Addison turned and shouted to his men, "Here they are, here they are"; and galloped back to rejoin his troop. The impi rushed down after him and his troop shouting their war cry, "Usutu". The troop lost no time in falling back on the main body. As the rebels charged down the kopje the guns dropped a couple of shells into them which had the effect of scattering them. Some of them however managed to get within ten yards of the advance guard when they were shot down. The impi then divided and broke on either

side of the kopje down the valleys. Then the guns opened fire on the kopje above the Hlonono Mission Station and scattered the second impi estimated to have been 500 strong. The troops advanced and took up the position on the near kopje evacuated by the enemy. It was reported that a fresh impi of 1,500 strong was seen coming up the valley towards Colonel Leuchars. As it was getting late the force retired to the Otimati camp. Sixty of the enemy's dead were counted on the field on the Hlonono.

CHAPTER XXV.

PLANNING ATTACK ON MESSENI—MURDER OF OLIVER VEAL.

THE Umvoti Mounted Rifles under Major Newmarch were camped at Eland's Kop on the farm "Jamerdaal," about nine miles from Krantzkop on the main road to Mapumulo. By arrangement Colonel Leuchars was to come up from Mapumulo to meet Colonel McKenzie at Eland's Kop to discuss plans for future operations. It was reported that the Chief, Messeni, had by this time gathered considerable strength and that a very large impi, variously estimated between 5,000 and 7,000, had congregated near this Chief's kraal at the junction of the Insuzi and Umvoti Rivers. Colonel McKenzie planned the movements of the several columns in such a manner that by a night march they could all converge at Messeni's kraal at daybreak. Column commanders were instructed to regard the movements of the different columns as of an encircling nature, to hem in Messeni's impi and with this object in view they were to co-operate as far as possible.

Both Colonel Mansel's and Colonel Wools-Sampson's columns were in Zululand at the Tugela amongst



UNVOTI VALLEY, MESSENI'S LOCATION.

loyal tribes, and although the original intention of enveloping the smaller impi at the Isiwazimbuzi, on the Natal side of the Tugela, in which these two columns were to take part on the Zululand side, was abandoned in favour of the attack on the larger impi of Messeni at the Umvoti it was imperative that a force should remain on the Zululand border to prevent the Natal rebels breaking over to that country, as was the case with Bambata and his followers. Colonel Leuchars' force was divided between Mapumulo and Thring's Post, both being situated on the watershed between the Tugela and Umvoti Rivers. But before any combined movements could take place a column would have to operate from the southerly quarter of the Umvoti River. Colonel Mackay with the Carbineers had not yet arrived, being considerably hampered by ox transport. The most mobile force near at hand was that of the T.M.R. under Colonel Barker, then at Middle Drift. Orders were at once despatched to Colonel Mansel to send Colonel Barker and his regiment with its mule transport to the Isidumbeni, to call on their way at Krantzkop for further orders. Colonel Wools-Sampson was instructed to march his column down the Tugela to Bond's Drift, leaving the Natal Police at the Isiwazimanqa, to be joined there by Colonel Mansel's column which was ordered to move down from Middle Drift. On arrival at Bond's Drift Colonel Wools-Sampson was to leave 200 of the D.L.I. to form a strong post on the Zululand border, and to march with the re-

mainder of his column to Thring's Post by the Bond's Drift-Bulwer road.

Colonel Barker arrived at Krantzkop on the 29th June and after a short halt proceeded to Dalton Station on the Greytown and Maritzburg railway line. From there he was to march over the Great Noodsberg to the Isidumbeni near the head of the Insuzi River. The Rangers also arrived in the forenoon and proceeded direct to Mapumulo. Colonel Mackay's column reached Krantzkop at sundown.

During the day a Cape cart drawn by six mules arrived from Greytown. As the occupant, with Captain Tanner of the Militia staff in attendance, alighted in front of the headquarter staff tent, he received a hearty greeting from Colonel McKenzie and his staff. The name of General Sir J. G. Dartnell, K.C.B., is a household word in Natal. He had served the colony faithfully and well as Chief Commissioner of Police and Commandant of Volunteers. As a soldier he first distinguished himself in the Indian Mutiny at the storming of Jantje. Since the Langalibalele disturbances in 1873 his name has been associated with every war in South Africa. During the last Boer war, 1899-1902, he was given command of a division by Lord Kitchener and promoted to the rank of Major-General. For his special services he was created a K.C.B. In 1904 General Dartnell left the Colony for England to enjoy his well-earned pension. At the outbreak of hostilities he returned to Natal and brought out with him the Rexer guns, the gift of patriotic

Natalians in London. On the arrival of the General in Maritzburg in June, Colonel Bru-de-Wold, the Commandant of Militia, who had been working at high pressure, was ordered away by his medical adviser on sick leave. General Dartnell once more came to the assistance of the Colony by undertaking the duties of Commandant during Colonel Bru-de-Wold's absence. On Colonel Bru-de-Wold resuming his duties in July, General Dartnell was thus able to visit Colonel McKenzie in the field.

During the night it was arranged for one section of the N.F.A. guns, "A" Battery, under Lieutenant Black, to be detached from Colonel Mackay's column to Colonel Barker's. The gunners left at 5 A.M. on the 30th June and were subsequently entrained at Hermannsburg Road for Dalton where they joined Colonel Barker on the same afternoon. Excepting Colonel Royston's column at the Qudeni in Zululand, and Colonel Mansel's at the Tugela near Mfanefile Drift, all the columns, four in number, were now ready and on their way to operate against Messeni; viz., those of Colonels Leuchars, Wools-Sampson, Mackay and Barker, amounting roughly to 3,500 men. The strength of the force in the field in Natal and Zululand under Colonel McKenzie's command at this date was close on 5,500 men.

At 9 A.M. on the 30th June Colonel McKenzie accompanied by General Dartnell and staff, with "C" Squadron of Natal Carbineers as bodyguard, left Krantzkop for Mapumulo.

On the 1st July the U.M.R. moved from Eland's Kop to Thring's Post, and the N.M.R., stationed at Mapumulo, had orders to join Colonel Wools-Sampson on his arrival there. At 2 P.M. Colonel McKenzie left for Thring's Post by way of the Nyamazana Hill, on the summit of which he took observations of the valleys and ridges running in a south-westerly direction down to Messeni's kraal. Close on midnight Colonel Wools-Sampson's column arrived at Thring's Post from Bond's Drift. Colonel Arnott with two squadrons of the B.M.R. "D" Squadron, N.C., and two guns, "C" Battery, and 100 Durban Reserves under their chief leader, Commander Chiazzari, D.S.O., had also moved on to Thring's Post.

In the forenoon a civilian riding on a bicycle passed Colonel Mackay's column on his way to Mapumulo. He was an official of the Public Works Department travelling on duty, a man of good appearance and of strong physique. His name was Oliver Veal. On arrival at Mapumulo he was advised to take the road to Stanger *via* Kearsney. Apparently anxious to push on to Durban and relying on the good faith of the natives not to molest a civilian unarmed, he took the road to Tongaat by the Upper Umvoti Drift. He was captured by a party of armed rebels near the Umvoti River and taken to Messeni's kraal where he was given a mock trial. Surrounded by a large impi and in the presence of the women of the kraal, he was most foully done to death and mutilated beyond description. This officer, who had the highest reputation for integrity and



OLIVER VEAL.

(From Photograph by the Bower Studio, Durban).

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uprightness, in the simplicity of his nature, placed such trust in the natives as to have ventured alone into the very heart of the rebel country. His action may have been foolhardy, but it was not deserving of the horrible punishment meted out to him by the natives. The treatment he received only shows too clearly that beneath the thin veneer of civilisation the natives are as barbarous and inhuman as they were in the times of Chaka and Dingana. It seemed incredible that while so much had been made of the decapitation of the rebel Bambata so little had been said of this most cruel, wanton butchery and mutilation of one of our own kith and kin. The Colonist is inclined to ask, "Do the negrophiles realise the fate of the white man when he falls into the hands of rebel savages?" Had our enemy met with any success, one trembles to think of what might have befallen our brothers and sisters living on the isolated farms in the Colony.

CHAPTER XXVI.

INSUZI FIGHT AND ATTACK ON CONVOY.

ON the morning of the 2nd July, Colonel McKenzie proceeded to Hlevana Hill to get into touch with Colonel Barker by helio across the Umvoti Valley, which he successfully effected.

Colonel Barker had been making for Isidumbeni since he left Krantzkop on the 29th June. He bivouacked with his force at Dalton on the 30th. At eight o'clock in the evening he received a message from chief leader Ehlers, in command of seventy New Hanover Reserves who were encamped at Little Noodsberg, to the effect that they expected an attack that night. Within an hour of the arrival of the messenger, Colonel Barker left Dalton with three squadrons T.M.R., to reinforce Ehlers. The guns, under the escort of one squadron T.M.R., were instructed to follow early next morning. Colonel Barker arrived at the Hall, Little Noodsberg, at midnight, where he found Ehlers and the Reserves in safety. The night passed without incident. On the 1st July, the guns having joined Colonel Barker, he proceeded with the whole of his force and the Reserves to Great Noodsberg where they

bivouacked for the night. On the morning of the 2nd, Colonel Barker moved forward for Isidumbeni. Whilst descending through "wattle scrub" to the Insuzi Drift, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the Great Noodsberg, his advance guard, consisting of "B" Squadron, T.M.R., was attacked by an impi estimated at 350 strong. The attack was repulsed and the enemy put to flight. The advance guard and two troops of "A" Squadron went in pursuit. In the engagement sixty rebels were killed. For about two hours Colonel Barker continued his march. When nearing Butler's Store at 9.30 A.M. the advance troop, after crossing the Insuzi immediately below the store, was attacked by an impi 500 strong at the police camp on the ridgesouth of the road. As the troop dismounted to meet the attack, its left flank was threatened by an impi of great strength which was seen charging down the slope from the ridge to the north of the road. The troop retired for about forty yards on to its support on the crest of the southern ridge immediately above the drift. The two impis which had now joined hands pressed forward to envelop the advance guard. Colonel Barker pushed up supports before the rebels completed their enveloping movement, and they were driven off by steady magazine fire. The enemy charged with such determination to push home their attack that they did not use their throwing assegais. Had they done so, seeing they charged to within five yards of the firing line, the casualties in Colonel Barker's force would have been very great.

"A" and "B" Squadrons and two troops "D"

Squadron, T.M.R., went in pursuit, whilst two guns of the N.F.A., under Lieutenant Black, came into action on the northern ridge and the machine guns of the T.M.R. on the southern ridge. As the rebels retired in a northerly direction down the Insuzi Valley, the two field guns poured shells into them with great effect at ranges from 600 to 1800 yards. The squadrons in pursuit were attacked by a third impi of about 500 strong. The attack was beaten off and the rebels in great confusion joined the others, who were engaged at the police camp, in their retreat. The number of the enemy killed was reported to be 600. During the charge of the two impis on the advance guard, Trooper Knight of "D" Squadron was killed and Troopers Sincox and Tobin were wounded. Colonel Barker resumed his march at 1.30 P.M. and arrived at the Isidumbeni Mission Station at 4 P.M. where he bivouacked for the night.

This attack on Colonel Barker was the first made by the rebels of the Chief Messeni, and the lesson they received must have been a sufficiently severe one to diminish their faith in their witch doctor. They were so anxious to get to close quarters that they depended more on their stabbing than on their throwing assegais. They did not reckon that they had seasoned troops to fight against. The extremely small casualties on Colonel Barker's side showed not only the superiority of the modern weapon, but the good marksmanship and steadiness of the Transvaal Mounted Rifles.

Major Campbell with a force of seventy-two D.L.I.;

fifty Z.M.R., under Captain Flindt; a detail of seventeen N.D.M.R.; and one gun under Lieutenant Beningfield, proceeded from Bond's Drift in charge of a convoy to follow Colonel Wools-Sampson by the road to Bulwer and Thring's Post. He had strict orders to push on with all possible speed. It was close on 7 P.M. on the 2nd July when Captain Armstrong of the N.M.R., who accompanied the convoy, was sent ahead to look for a camping ground. Captain Hulley was in charge of the advance guard of fifteen men. After passing Macrae's Store on the right-hand side of the road, he threw out four flankers on his right and two on his left; the two men on his left accompanied by a black dog. Captain Hulley with four men was in advance of the flankers, whilst a sergeant and four men brought up the rear of the advance party. Singular to relate, it was only on the previous day that Hulley wanted to shoot the black dog as it worried Kafir sheep, but he was prevailed upon not to do so by Captain Flindt, who assured him that dogs had been known to save a column in times of war. Captain Flindt was actuated more by feelings of pity for the dog than respect for its protective powers. The black dog on approaching a clump of bush on the left-hand side of the road barked loudly, and Captain Hulley, remembering the conversation of the previous day, shouted to his men to look out for natives. Immediately there rose from the bush to right and left a long black line which stretched across the road. Through this line Hulley and his men had to charge to join the main

body. Trooper McColl, a young soldier of the Z.M.R., whilst cutting his way through the rebels, was mortally assegaied in several places. The black dog which gave the timely warning was instantly killed by the enemy. As the advance guard galloped back to the main body the enemy rushed down. Meanwhile Major Campbell had placed his men in horseshoe formation, with the right flank resting on the road. The Maxims were soon brought into action as the enemy, shouting their battle cry of "Usutu," made their first charge which was repulsed. Whilst the fight was raging Captain Armstrong, who was in the advance, felt it his duty to join the main body. He not only had to force his way through the rebels but had to face the hot fire from our own men. He and his horse reached the lines unharmed.

The rebels had now taken up their main position behind a wattle plantation on a hillock and round the store to the right front, not more than eighty yards distant from the force; whilst a portion were in the long grass to the left front. Orders were sent to the rear-guard in charge of Captain Flindt for reinforcements, and he, with thirty of the Z.M.R., carrying three Rexer guns, galloped past the long line of wagons, two of which in the excitement of the moment had been capsized and almost completely blocked up the road. The N.F.A. gun commenced firing case-shot through the store. The motto of the Z.M.R., "Watshetsha," the war cry of the great Mandhlakazi tribe, the old enemy of the Zulu Royal

or Usutu party, was frequently shouted in answer to the enemy's war cry "Usutu". Undaunted, the enemy crept nearer to our flanks and made their second charge which was also repulsed with success. The rear-guard had now come up, and the Rexer guns came into action as the third and last rush was directed against the right rear. The enemy broke and fled down the valleys on either side of the ridge completely baffled and thoroughly beaten. This was the only night attack the rebels made during the war. The enemy were known to be men belonging to Chief Matshwili who lived about two miles from the scene of action. His impi was reported to be quite 600 strong. The number which attacked the convoy was estimated at about 500. They were finally driven off at 9 P.M. and the wagons were then drawn up with all speed to form a laager for the night. The late hour at which this attack was made, the determination shown by the rebels, and the unwieldy string of ox-wagons to be defended, combined to make Major Campbell's position a difficult and dangerous one, and the coolness which characterised this officer and all ranks under him made this little action one of the most successful in the campaign.

A watchful and anxious night was spent by the force and at the first streak of dawn Major Campbell ordered the discharge of all loaded guns preparatory to resuming the march towards Thring's Post. The firing of charges of case-shot and the remainder of the belts in the Maxims and the magazines in the Rexers saluted

the rising of the sun. Forty of the enemy were found dead immediately round the laager. Two rebels were discovered close by, wounded. Their wounds were dressed by Major Campbell himself who in civil life is one of the leading medical men in Durban. McColl died of his wounds on the way to Thring's Post.

The Rexer guns, which were used in repelling the attack on the convoy for the first time in active warfare, were a gift to the Colony from patriotic Natalians in London, and were brought to Natal by Major-General Sir J. G. Dartnell. Three of the guns were handed to the Z.M.R. Their portability and utility were fully demonstrated on the night of the attack. It may be of interest to those old Natalians, whose patriotism prompted the gift, as well as to others who are more closely concerned with machine-guns and their uses, to quote the following from a report by the Officer Commanding the Z.M.R. who, after the guns had been some time in use, wrote:—

“I am of opinion that the Rexer gun is admirably adapted for military purposes and is probably the best rifle calibre machine-gun of to-day. I have experimented somewhat largely with this gun since issued to the Zululand Mounted Rifles, and can speak with confidence of the following advantages possessed by the weapon.

“Its handiness and portability, which qualities are far in excess of other machine-guns. Being handled by one man only, who assumes the same position as an ordinary rifleman, the gun would be very difficult

to locate while in action. The same cannot be said of the Maxim gun which almost invariably offers a good target calculated to draw a heavy fire. The lightness of the gun renders it capable of being used in the roughest country with far less trouble than other machine-guns, the supply of ammunition also presenting less difficulties:—

“Its rapidity of fire is nearly, if not quite, equal to that of the Maxim or Colt gun, and I am of opinion that its accuracy is greater. During the time the guns have been in use not one single instance of a cartridge ‘jamming’ has occurred, a valuable point that needs no comment.

“The number of spare parts that have to be carried are few, and easily adjusted, and the fact that no tools are required to strip the gun for minor repairs or cleaning, naturally tends to lessen the impedimenta that must necessarily be carried in the field.

“The ammunition magazines are rapidly and easily filled and the cartridges cannot take any but the proper position. In guns with a belt feed, hitches may occur through cartridges being improperly placed in the belt, other difficulties of a like nature arising, as can readily be vouched for by anyone with a knowledge of such guns.

“I may mention that it would be advantageous for the magazines to be ‘browned’ similar to the barrel, etc., of the gun itself. At present they are of bright white metal which would necessarily be very conspicuous on a bright day.

“Of the equipment supplied with the guns, I cannot speak favourably. The cavalry pattern saddle and bucket supplied are quite unsuitable for the class of horse common in this country. It would appear to have been overlooked that a man riding in this saddle, carrying the gun and a supply of ammunition, would be quite unable to carry his personal equipment, such as cloak, blanket, etc. The weight of the gun and bucket, *viz.* 22½ lbs., is too much to carry on one side of the saddle, and quickly causes rather bad cases of sore back. By having a few alterations effected on an ordinary general service pack saddle, I was enabled to have three guns in their buckets, and a supply of ammunition carried by one pack horse, the weight of the load being well under the maximum a horse is capable of carrying. This method of carrying the guns answered thoroughly well.

“The ammunition pack-saddle supplied is in need of much improvement. The attachment of the magazine cases is wrong in principle, and the weight of the ammunition quickly tears the cases apart. This fault could however be rectified. Although these criticisms do not apply to the gun itself, it can easily be appreciated that such defects interfere with the capabilities of the weapon, as presenting possibilities of impeding the supply of ammunition, such supply being of vital importance.”

CHAPTER XXVII.

CORDON ROUND MESSENI.

ON the afternoon of the 2nd July, Colonel Wools-Sampson's column, consisting of 400 N.M.R., under Lieut.-Col. Murray-Smith; 200 N.D.M.R., under Major Abraham; the Cape Colony Squadron of Royston's Horse; detachments of the Z.M.R. and D.L.I., left Thring's Post for Mapumulo in order to take part in the combined movement on the following day. Colonel Wools-Sampson received orders to carry out a night march from Mapumulo, and to time the arrival of his column at the Umvoti River, opposite the junction of the Insuzi with that river, by daylight. Here he would come in touch with Colonel Barker's force on his right, and by working down the Umvoti towards Messeni's chief kraal, his left should close with Colonel Mackay's right.

Colonel Leuchars' column, consisting of two squadrons of the B.M.R., under Lieut.-Col. Arnott; three squadrons U.M.R., under Major Newmarch; "D" Squadron N.C., under Captain Montgomery, left Thring's Post at 8 P.M. for Glendale, there to bivouac; and by an early march to proceed up the Umvoti Valley towards Messeni's kraal.

Colonel Mackay's column, consisting of the right and left wing of the Carbineers; the Natal Rangers, under Lieut.-Col. Dick; the L. and Y., under Lieut.-Col. Peakman; two sections, N.F.A. guns, under Major Wilson; and two pom-poms was to follow down the Hlonono Ridge and reach Messeni's kraal as soon after daylight as possible.

Colonel Barker's column of the T.M.R. was to march down the Insuzi River to its junction with the Umvoti River above Messeni's kraal. The object of the operation was to form a cordon round Messeni's kraal at the Umvoti with the four columns, by means of night marches from the four points of the compass.

At ten o'clock on the night of the 2nd July a native scout came in to report the capture of Mr. Veal at Messeni's kraal. The scout further reported that it was the intention of the impi to attack Colonel Barker in the morning. This intelligence was at once despatched to Colonel Barker by the informant who, however, only succeeded in reaching Colonel Barker at eleven o'clock the next morning, having experienced the greatest difficulty in finding a passage through the rebel lines.

At four o'clock on the morning of the 3rd July, Colonel Mackay's column moved out of Thring's Post, accompanied by Colonel McKenzie and General Dartnell. The Durban Reserves, with details, remained to protect the camp under the command of Chief Leader Chiazzari, D.S.O.

At daybreak the column arrived at the Hlonono

Mission Station, where a small body of the enemy was surprised in the scrub, and fled down towards the Umvoti. A squadron of the N.C. went in pursuit to head them off, in which they partly succeeded. Meanwhile very heavy firing was heard on the right about four miles distant. The enemy posted on a kopje had attacked Colonel Wools-Sampson in a most determined manner. Chief Messeni led this impi, which charged within ten yards of Colonel Wools-Sampson's position. The N.D.M.R. in the advance bore the brunt of the attack, and Major Abraham was highly commended for the manner in which he handled his men. The Major shot with his revolver several rebels who were charging down on him. The D.L.I. advanced and succeeded in taking the enemy in flank. Ninety-two of the rebels were killed here, but the total number who fell in this engagement was subsequently found to be close on 200. The enemy broke towards the long reeds and scrubs in the Umvoti, and thus fell into the hands of Colonel Mackay's force.

Colonel Barker was also attacked at the Insuzi in the early part of the day by an impi led by Macabacaba, Messeni's chief Induna, when Captain Mitchell of "C" Squadron, T.M.R., was wounded. The enemy emerged from the bush and advanced toward Colonel Barker in fine form, but were driven back with heavy loss. The columns were, owing to attacks and other causes, late in arriving at the points of cordon. It was, however, generally understood that the time of junction was only given roughly provided the columns met no

serious opposition on the march. Several patches of bush were driven in the afternoon with success. At Messeni's kraal the mutilated body of Mr. Veal was buried by the troops—Captain Helbert, of the L. and Y., reading the burial service. The number of the enemy killed on this day, as officially returned, was 440. The forces bivouacked at the Umvoti Drift, where the main road from Mapumulo to Isidumbeni crosses the river. Messeni's large impi was now dispersed, and the dwellings of his people were in ashes. His attacks on the white forces had failed all along the line, and his witch doctors were of no avail.

On the following morning the forces worked up the Umvoti Valley. Many small bushes were searched but few rebels were seen. The troops had a long, tiring day, and again bivouacked on the bank of the Umvoti River. Early on the 5th July Colonel McKenzie ordered the retirement to Thring's Post, whilst Colonel Barker and the T.M.R. went back to the Isidumbeni. The valleys on either side of the Hlonono ridge were thoroughly searched. In riding up to a kraal Trooper Christopher of the N.C., "J" Squadron, was assegaied by a rebel concealed in a quick growing fence. Christopher died almost immediately. His horse, which was wounded, was found within fifty yards of where he fell. His body was carried to camp by his comrades and sent to Ladysmith at the special request of his relatives for burial.

CHAPTER XXVIII

INSIMBA FIGHT.

ON the 6th July the camp was moved three-quarters of a mile eastward, close to Mr. Thring's house. In the afternoon it was reported that Messeni and the remnants of his people had taken up their quarters in the bush overlooking Glendale in the Umvoti Valley. Three squadrons, N.C., and two squadrons, B.M.R., were at once ordered to proceed to the scene under the leadership of Colonel McKenzie. The distance, however, proved to be too great as the day was far spent. Colonel McKenzie had to be satisfied with a general reconnaissance of the country. It began to rain heavily, and the troops were ordered to retire to camp.

At 3.30 A.M. on the 7th July the three columns moved out of camp towards the Umvoti, each taking a different ridge, Colonel Leuchars on the left, Colonel Wools-Sampson on the right and Colonel Mackay in the centre. Colonel McKenzie rode at the head of Colonel Mackay's column.

The bush in which Messeni was reported to be was surrounded by daylight and thoroughly searched, but no enemy was found. After a short halt for breakfast, the combined forces proceeded westwards to an adjoin-

ing bush, overlooking the cane fields by Mr. Nicholson's sugar mill. Immediately above the bush was a precipice 200 to 300 feet high of solid perpendicular rock in the shape of a horse-shoe. The rebels were reported to have taken up their position beneath the precipice. The U.M.R., under Major Newmarch, were ordered to hold the bottom end of the bush whilst the N.C., B.M.R., and N.D.M.R., descended to the foot of the precipice. There was only one means of descent, which nature appeared to have carved out of the rock for the convenience of man. In the centre of the horse-shoe was a straight shaft about eight feet in width between perpendicular walls of hard sandstone. This narrow passage would not have been discovered, had it not been for one of the prisoners captured in the forenoon who had endeavoured to escape in that direction. The rocks and bush below the precipice were almost inaccessible, and after a tiresome search the troops were ordered to retire. Six rebels were killed and thirteen taken prisoners during the day's operations. In the morning Trooper Reed of the Newcastle troop, N.C., met with an unfortunate accident in the bush. His rifle was accidentally discharged and the bullet passed through one of his lungs. He was removed to the field hospital and recovered from the effects of the wound in the course of a fortnight. The intelligence concerning Messeni was conflicting. From one source he was said to have joined Ndhlovu ka Timuni in the Tugela thorns, whilst from another he was in hiding in his location at the Umvoti River.



TROOPS GOING INTO BUSH ABOVE GLENDALE, UNVOTI VALLEY.

In the location between Thring's Post and Bond's Drift there dwelt the Chief Matshwili of the Umtetwa tribe. He was the son of Mgoye and grandson of Dingiswayo, famous in Zulu history for riding the first horse ever seen in Zululand in the beginning of the nineteenth century. Dingiswayo held sway over the most powerful tribe of his time—the Umtetwa—and was the founder of the military system on which Chaka built up the Zulu nation. It was due to his influence that Chaka succeeded to the chieftainship of the Zulu tribe, on the death of Chaka's father, Senzagakona. Dingiswayo was slain in battle by Zwedi, head of the Indwadwe tribe. The Zulu tribe under Chaka fought for Dingiswayo, and when he fell, both tribes, Umtetwa and Zulu, acknowledged Chaka as their ruler. Matshwili was a man past the prime of life. The active leadership of the revolt amongst his tribe was readily taken up by his warlike son, Langalibalele. The tribe first made themselves conspicuous by their attack on the convoy at Macrae's Store on the night of the 2nd July. Though they had to be dealt with, Colonel McKenzie preferred first to push home his vigorous attack on Messeni, whose impi was by far the most powerful. Like the other rebels, those of Matshwili relied on the cover afforded by bush and rocks to assist them in resisting the advance of the white force. This reliance was altogether misplaced, as in this location, near the coast, the country, undulating as it was, possessed no features which could be considered either formidable or inaccessible. The impi was located in

the Insimba Valley, immediately below Matchwili's chief kraal. On the night of the 7th July, Colonel McKenzie planned his enveloping movement with the three columns encamped at Thring's Post.

Colonel Wools-Sampson's column, consisting of four squadrons N.M.R., under Lieut.-Col. Murray-Smith; two squadrons N.D.M.R., under Major Abraham; one squadron Z.M.R., under Major Vanderplank; a section N.F.A. guns, under Lieutenant Acutt; and detachments of D.L.I. and Natal Rangers, left camp at 3 A.M. on the 8th July, and moved towards Macrae's Store, with orders to hold the store with the guns and infantry, and to place the mounted men on the next ridge to the west and extend them down to and block the Insimba Gorge, and get in touch with Colonel Leuchars' forces at daybreak.

Colonel Leuchars' column, consisting of two squadrons B.M.R., under Lieut.-Col. Arnott; three squadrons U.M.R., under Major Newmarch; the L. and Y., under Lieut.-Col. Peakman; and a section of N.F.A. guns, under Major Currie, marched out at 3.30 A.M., with orders to hold the ridge on the left bank of the Insimbo Valley, opposite to and north of Colonel Wools-Sampson's position.

Colonel Mackay's column, consisting of the right and left wings Carbineers, and a section of N.F.A. guns, under Major Wilson, left camp at 3.30 A.M. accompanied by Colonel McKenzie.

Colonel McKay's column marched along the main road to Bond's Drift for about three and a half miles

before branching off to an open ridge on the left, which ran in a north-easterly direction towards Matshwili's chief kraal. It was a mild morning with a heavy dew. The moon shone brilliantly overhead. This night march seemed a pleasure trip to the troops, under such favourable conditions, as compared with other night marches, particularly the first one carried out on a dark night entailing the passage of the Devil's Gorge at the Insuzi.

The column halted within two miles of Matshwili's kraal. Colonel McKenzie dismounted and led two squadrons of the Carbineers, under Captains Brandon, Barter and Park Gray, with fixed bayonets, to surround the kraals which lay between him and that of the Chief Matshwili. The men followed the Colonel stealthily over the long grass, exposing themselves as little as possible. When within seventy yards of the first kraal, the advance developed into a charge. It was a fine sight to see the men responding to the silent signal of their leader, and to watch the glitter of the moonlight on the bayonets as they made each rush forward. Two men were posted over the door of each hut with strict orders not to fire on any account until after daylight. Colonel McKenzie then pushed forward to rapidly and successfully surround the second kraal. He now made for the final objective, when faint streaks in the eastern sky announced the near approach of dawn. There was no time to spare; the final rush was made at full speed, and the home of Matshwili fell into Colonel McKenzie's

hands just as the day broke. The men were drenched with perspiration as they entered the kraal. Their efforts, however, were of no avail, as, save a few fowls in the bushes close by, the inmates of the kraal had fled. So engrossed was Colonel McKenzie with the operations, that the report of a rifle in his rear was not heard by him or his officers who followed him. It was fired by one of the men at the first kraal at a rebel endeavouring to escape out of a hut. On hearing the shot, Colonel Wools-Sampson, on the right, rushed down the ridge with his men and blocked the Insimba Gorge. The impi, who bivouacked in the valley, were awakened by the rattle of the guns over the rough ground, and endeavoured to make their escape down the gorge which they found to their dismay blocked by Colonel Wools-Sampson's force. Meanwhile Colonel Arnott and the B.M.R. had joined hands with Colonel Wools-Sampson. As daylight broke, the forces of the three columns were in their positions lining the ridges which commanded the valley of the Insimba. The impi was completely surrounded. They had either to fight or to surrender. The valley was densely wooded and there were kloofs and rocks which the impi could hold against the white force. It was no easy task to dislodge a determined foe from such natural strongholds.

Colonel Mackay's guns opened fire on the wooded kloofs below Colonel Leuchars' main position, whilst Colonel Leuchars also commenced shelling the ravines to his left. One squadron N.C. was ordered to the head of the Insimba, whilst another lined the ridge

Daylight, 8th July 1906.




REFERENCE

Colonial Forces

Rebels...

Line of march.

Roads.



overlooking the valley facing Colonel Leuchars' position. A third squadron, N.C., occupied the next ridge west of Colonel Wools-Sampson's force, on the right bank of the Impisinchanga, a tributary of the Insimba River. The remainder of the Carbineer regiment descended into the main valley and joined the L. and Y. from Colonel Leuchars' force, to take part in the drive. They were followed by the native levies. In order to save time the U.M.R. and B.M.R. squadrons searched the wooded kloofs (which were branches of the main stream) slightly in advance of the drive. In the afternoon the N.M.R. and N.D.M.R. from Colonel Wools-Sampson's column drove up the valley to meet the Carbineers. The enemy's battle cry of "Usutu" was frequently heard in the valley. They attempted to charge in small bodies but their hearts failed them. At the first volley they turned and fled. Others, posted on high rocks above the stream with the object of throwing their assegais at passing troops, found a watery grave. Lieutenant Hume of "D" Squadron, Carbineers, narrowly escaped from an assegai which cut the back of his wrist watch and the sleeve of his tunic, and there were several other escapes of similar character. Amongst the rebels there were many ricksha pullers and domestic servants from Durban, who left town for a day's outing to fight the white man. It was not to be wondered at that the surprise in the morning had the effect of demoralising such an undisciplined rabble. Matchwili, the Chief, his son, and principal Induna, took up a position amongst the rocks of the Impisin-

changa. They were armed with rifles, which were of no avail against the superior marksmanship of the Carbineers. The fate of Matchwili's impi was the severest blow dealt to any one tribe during the rebellion, 547 having been killed on that day. The effect of the Insimba fight was far reaching. It broke the back of the rebellion as the news of the defeat spread throughout the length and breadth of the land.

CHAPTER XXIX.

OPERATIONS IN TUGELA THORNS.

THE troops rested on the 9th July. Intelligence was received that Messeni and Ndhlovu ka Timuni had joined hands with the remnants of their impi in the Tugela thorns below the Isiwazimbuzi, a difficult thorn country practically inaccessible to mounted troops. Colonel McKenzie believed in following up the enemy with vigour and in surprising them by means of a night march. Colonel Mansel's column at the Tugela was ordered to operate in the combined movement by working up the northern bank of the Tugela River. Colonel Wools-Sampson's column left Thring's Post at 6.30 P.M. on the 9th July for the Hlungwini Drift on the Tugela, where he would get in touch with Colonel Mansel's force at daylight, and work up the river on the southern bank. At the same hour Colonel Leuchars' column left for Mapumulo, thence down the ridge by Allen's Store to the Imati stream. Colonel Mackay's column moved off at 3 A.M. on the 10th July, half an hour later than the Natal Rangers. Colonel McKenzie marched with Colonel Mackay's column,

After crossing the Otimati Drift on the main road, the column branched off to the right in a north-easterly direction towards the Tugela Valley. On reaching the Isiwazimbuzi, which was a huge krantz, the column proceeded single file down a narrow ravine densely wooded with thorn trees. Many a leader might have well hesitated ere he plunged the troops into the ravine, which could have been held by a hostile force against very heavy odds. The daring contempt for the enemy which characterised Colonel McKenzie's work had effected more good than evil. The maxim that fortune favours him who woos, more often than him who waits, was strikingly applicable to the conduct of all Colonel McKenzie's operations. The progress of the column was necessarily slow and tedious, and the troops were not sorry when they emerged from the dark bush to more open ground. There lay before them the valley of the Tugela veiled in soft mist at the first blush of dawn. As the sun rose and rolled up the misty curtain, vistas of Zululand hills appeared in a wealth of light and colour. Far down on the right, the waters of the broad Tugela sparkled in the thorn-clad valley. The scene was one not likely to be effaced from the minds of those who witnessed it on that bright balmy morning after their long weary march throughout the night. Their contemplation of the beautiful scene was, however, interrupted by the booming of guns from Colonel Mansel's and Colonel Leuchars' columns. Colonel McKenzie at once ordered a general advance to the Imati to where

it joined the Masweli stream. Communications were established between the other three columns. The area of operations was very extensive and the country traversed was sparsely inhabited. On this day, save for the presence of the troops, it was deserted. Without accurate intelligence it was hopeless to look for rebels in that vast wilderness of thorn veldt. Messeni and Ndhlovu ka Timuni were reported to have left their impi and crossed into Zululand on the previous day, which information was immediately communicated to Mr. Saunders at Eshowe. The day wore on and only seven rebels had been captured, and as the afternoon shadows lengthened, the columns converged on the Imati River, and after a general consultation, separated to look for camps on the bank of the river. The day had been intensely hot and the night came as a relief to the troops as they settled down to their camp fires. Many of the pack-horses which left Thring's Post the previous night missed their way and three of them were afterwards found dead, having fallen over the krantz of the Isiwazimbuzi.

On the morning of the 11th July, the forces proceeded up the valleys of the Imati and Masweli in Ndhlovu ka Timuni's country, through thickets and thorns, with no better result. The operations were carried out in a waterless country which appeared to be deserted. The infantry returned to Thring's Post by the Isiwazimbuzi, and the D.L.I. succeeded in killing the Induna of Ndhlovu ka Timuni, whilst the other columns made for Mapumulo *via* Allen's Store, which

they only succeeded in reaching the next morning. Colonel McKenzie and the Carbineers arrived in camp at Thring's Post late on the night of the 11th July.

On the 12th July, whilst the troops were taking their much-needed rest, news was received from Mr. C. R. Saunders of the surrender of Messeni and Ndhlovu ka Timuni at Eshowe.

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NNDHLOVU KA TIMUNI AND MSESINI AT MAPUMULO (JAOL).

CHAPTER XXX.

GENERAL SURRENDERS.

MESSENI and Ndhlovu ka Timuni crossed into Zululand on the 10th July, accompanied by three followers and a boy. The latter Chief was a member of the Zulu royal house, being a descendant of Sidinane, son of Ndaba, the great-grandfather of Chaka. Ndhlovu had blood-relations in Zululand, his sister having married Hashi, one of the Chiefs in Eshowe district. Messeni's connection with the Zulu tribe dates back before the time of Ndaba. The Qwabe tribe, of which Messeni was one of the Chiefs, took its origin from Qwabe, brother of Zulu and Cunu. The father of these held sway over a large tribe, which, on his death, was subdivided into three sections. The Chief of the Cunu is Silwane in the Weenen County. Messeni's father, Musi, Chief of the Qwabe tribe, lived at the Inanda. Messeni was named after Mr. Mesham, who was Magistrate of Verulam, and happened to be collecting hut-tax at the Inanda on the day Messeni was born. On the death of Musi, Messeni was appointed Chief by Government on the recommendation of the late Sir Theophilus Shepstone. The guardian of the rightful

heir, Siziba, who was then an infant, the grandson of Musi, appealed to the High Court against the appointment and won his case, with the result that a compromise was effected by dividing the tribe into two sections; the one under Messeni, who made his chief kraal at the Umvoti, and the other under Siziba.

Messeni was therefore a man of some position even amongst the Zulus. That these two Chiefs informed their followers they were on their way to Dinuzulu for reinforcements, there could have been little doubt, There was also evidence brought to bear that some of Gobizembe's men, who were at the Mome fight and made their escape back to the Mapumulo district, exercised considerable influence over the people of Ndhlovu ka Timuni and of Messeni. These outlaws knowing their case to be a hopeless one were only too anxious to obtain recruits to join them. They spread the story that the white men had wiped out the blacks at the Mome, and were now on their way to eat up Messeni and Ndhlovu ka Timuni's people before dealing with Dinuzulu's people in a similar manner; that Dinuzulu was also on his way with his impi to Mapumulo to assist them against the white troops. Such a story was not at all improbable, and the semblance of truth would more than likely turn the balance in the favour of its originators. As Messeni and Ndhlovu ka Timuni journeyed in Zululand, they could not fail to detect the feelings of the Zulu people on the situation generally, and abandoned their project of proceeding to the Usutu kraal; and, under the escort of one

of Chief Hashi's Indunas, gave themselves up to the authorities at Eshowe. On the other hand it was quite possible that these two Chiefs, anxious to escape from the troops, fixed upon Eshowe as the best seat of civil government at which to surrender.

With the surrenders of these two important personages, the rebellion in the Mapumulo division was felt to be at an end. Colonel McKenzie at once telegraphed for them to be sent from Eshowe to Mapumulo in order that he might proclaim cessation of hostilities, and send out messengers under the auspices of these Chiefs to persuade the rebels to surrender with their arms, as was done in the case of Sigananda and his impi.

On the 13th July the Durban Reserves were disbanded at Thring's Post. They were addressed by Colonel McKenzie, who thanked them for the ready manner in which they turned out as citizens to defend their country. In the evening, amidst the coldest rain experienced in the campaign, the two Chiefs Messeni and Ndhlovu ka Timuni arrived. On the following day they were taken to Mapumulo where they were lodged in gaol to await their trial. Colonel McKenzie shifted his camp to Mapumulo on the same day, the 14th July, leaving two companies of the Rangers at Thring's Post. It was reported that the remnants of the rebel impi were under the leadership of Sambela, who was located in the rough country at the Impi's stream north of Mapumulo. Colonel Leuchars' force made a reconnaissance in the Impi's Valley but found no rebels.

The Minister of Justice, the Hon. T. Watt, C.M.G., and the Commandant of Militia, Col. Bru-de-Wold, C.M.G., arrived at Mapumulo in the evening and returned to Pietermaritzburg the next day after having consulted with Colonel McKenzie. On the 15th there was church parade at the various camps. The feeling of thankfulness that the rebellion was at an end prevailed amongst all ranks. All column commanders were instructed to accept surrenders and to send out some of the prisoners to induce others to follow their example. The course adopted proved successful and was freely taken advantage of by the rebels. On the 16th July a court-martial was convened for the trial of Messeni and Ndhlovu ka Timuni. They were found guilty of high treason. The sentence of the court was commuted by His Excellency the Governor to one of penal servitude for life.

Demobilisation of the various units took place commencing with the N.F.A., the D.L.I., and the N.R.R., and the Umvoti and New Hanover Reserves. The mounted forces still remained in the field. On the 18th July news was received that Sambela was taken prisoner at the Umhlataze River in Zululand, which was followed by the capture of Messeni's general Macabacaba, in the Ndwedwe district. There now only remained two irreconcilables of note amongst the rebel ranks, Cakitshana and Mangati, both lieutenants of the late Bambata. These two men still haunt the country below Krantzkop and Macala Hill. Undaunted to the last they prefer to die as outlaws and

warriors. They have a vast extent of country in which to conceal their identity from the authorities, and it may be months before they can be hunted down. On the 16th July, Colonel Leuchars' column left Mapumulo to relieve Colonel Barker and the T.M.R. at Isidumbeni, who had orders to proceed to Durban *via* Tongaat.

On the 19th July Colonel Mackay proceeded with the left wing, N.C., to Bulwer *via* Thring's Post to accept surrenders of rebels in the vicinity of the kraal of Tshingamuzi. The rebels began to come in freely at Mapumulo and Stanger, and on the 22nd July the number of surrenders was over 1,000.

On the 23rd July Sigananda passed away at Nkandhla gaol. The poor old man, unaccustomed to new surroundings, died from natural causes. If his evidence may be relied on he played the rôle of a tool rather than a leader. The interest which surrounded his great age evoked much sympathy for the sad ending of the veteran. The living link with the past was broken, and his lifelong desire to die in the cherished shelter of the Mome was left ungratified. On the 23rd July Colonel Wools-Sampson's column was ordered to proceed to Glendale for the purpose of receiving surrenders in that locality. The column eventually marched down the Umhlali heights as far as Chaka's kraal on the north coast line. The right wing of the Carbineers left Mapumulo for Thring's Post on the same day. Colonel McKenzie was summoned to Pietermaritzburg on the following day. He arrived in the

city on the 25th, and returned to Thring's Post on the 28th July.

Colonel Barker and the T.M.R. received the thanks of the Colony on the 21st July in Durban at a public luncheon which was presided over by His Excellency the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum. Colonel McKenzie, who could not then be absent from the field, wired his congratulations and gratification that the Colony appreciated the excellent work rendered by the Transvaal Mounted Rifles under the able command of Colonel Barker, D.S.O. The whole Colony of Natal was unanimous in the reception accorded to the Transvaalers. The enthusiastic demonstration at every station from Durban to Charlestown was unprecedented in the history of Natal.

On the 29th July the Chief Tilongo of the Mid Illovo district submitted himself for trial by court-martial at Pietermaritzburg. He and his tribe had occasioned some uneasiness. With his ready submission to the authority of the Government the need of maintaining the militia force in the field no longer existed.

On the 31st July demobilisation of the forces commenced by movement of troops from Stanger, Chaka's kraal, and Tongaat.

On the 2nd August a general parade took place in Pietermaritzburg. The column, which was led by Colonel McKenzie, marched in the following order, the Cape Mounted Rifles being given the place of honour:—

Cape Mounted Rifles.

Right wing, Natal Carbineers.

Left wing, Natal Carbineers.

1 Squadron, Umvoti Mounted Rifles.

Natal Mounted Rifles.

100 Natal Police.

"C" Battery, Natal Field Artillery.

Detachment, Natal Medical Corps.

1 troop, Natal Telegraph Corps.

Details, Departmental Corps.

Royston's Horse.

His Excellency the Governor accorded the thanks of the Colony to Colonel McKenzie and his forces drawn up in the Market Square.

CHAPTER XXXI.

REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN.

IN April, 1906, when Colonel McKenzie's force took the field, affairs in Zululand were in a critical condition, and in Natal proper prospects were little or no better. It was generally believed that the Colony was on the verge of a native rising which might spread even beyond her borders. In the Nkandhla Forest Sigananda and his tribe were in open rebellion, holding an extent of bush country of thirty square miles or more, so intersected by precipitous ravines and gorges, as to be hardly accessible even to Zulus themselves. Bambata and his followers, roaming at large in the country between the Nkandhla and Qudeni Forests, were daily increasing in strength. Many natives in that part of the country had already thrown aside the weakened authority of their chiefs and joined the rebels. In the Nqutu district the Chief Mehlokazulu and his tribe were understood to be merely waiting on events.

In Natal proper, signs of discontent had manifested themselves amongst the powerful tribe of the Chief Kula in the Umsinga division, who was reported to be

contemplating an attack on the laager at Helpmakaar. A single reverse to the Colonial troops would have set the country in a blaze. Many of the Colonists in the disaffected districts had left their farms and sought shelter in the small towns and seats of Magistracies.

Such was the outlook when Colonel McKenzie with the Zululand Field Force, carrying twenty days' supplies, marched out of Dundee on the 3rd May for Nkandhla. The distance was ninety miles over indifferent roads and bad drifts. His force, including 90 Zululand Mounted Rifles at Ntingwe; 150 N.D.M.R. at Babanango; 431 Colonel Mansel's Police, Natal Naval Corps and a section of 15-pounders at Fort Yolland; two companies of D.L.I. at Eshowe, and half a company at Ginginhlovu, only amounted to 2,100 men of all ranks. Of this number 1,500, made up of 500 Transvaal Mounted Rifles, 550 Royston's Horse, and 240 Natal Militia, were mounted. In artillery he had four 15-pounders and a section of pom-poms. There were no troops available to guard his long line of communications. Whilst anxiety was felt for the safety of small detachments at isolated posts there was cause to fear a rising in his rear in the Nqutu district, which would not only threaten his communications but might effectively cut him off from his base of supplies. In the Nkandhla Forest Sigamanda's rebels were variously estimated at between 1,000 and 1,200, whilst Bambata was supposed to be moving about with 500 men.

The situation which faced Colonel McKenzie was

beset with difficulties. Whilst every precaution had to be taken to minimise the risk of a reverse, he had to adopt vigorous offensive measures in order to prevent the spread of the rebellion. He had to deal with an enemy who were assuming the defensive in a large forest of which they knew every hole and corner, who moved rapidly, unhampered by any kind of transport; and who had every facility for obtaining intelligence of the movements of the white troops; and last but not least who exposed themselves as little as possible. A survey of the country from the Empandhleni Hill on the 9th May decided Colonel McKenzie to despatch the 500 T.M.R., under Colonel Barker, to Ntingwe, to intercept the rebel communication between the Nkandhla and the Qudeni Forest. He had therefore only 550 Royston's Horse, one company D.L.I., a section of 15-pounders and pom-poms on the northern boundary of the Nkandhla Forest which held 1,200 rebels. Colonel Mansel's force at Fort Yolland, twenty-two miles away to the south-east, was separated from Colonel McKenzie by the Nkandhla Forest. There were three routes by which Colonel Mansel could effect a junction with Colonel McKenzie. The first lay in forcing a passage by the wagon road through the bush. This road runs for six or seven miles through dense bush and in many parts under cliffs and high banks. From the operations on the 10th May, Colonel McKenzie was aware that the rebels had a number of sharpshooters, who, concealed in favourable positions above the cuttings, could inflict considerable damage both in flank

and rear on a column confined to a twenty-foot roadway. The chances of the troops delivering a counter-stroke on the march were small. The road might be cleared by rifle fire and the enemy even put to flight, but pursuit would be impossible. No object could therefore be gained by forcing a passage through the bush at this early stage of the operations. The second course would be for Colonel Mansel to march to Nkandhla, by way of Eshowe and Melmoth, a distance of eighty-seven miles by road, which neither time nor circumstances justified. The third and last way of effecting a junction lay in concentrating the forces at Cetshwayo's grave, and this was adopted. The grave is only about twenty miles from Fort Yolland along a fairly open wagon track. The difficulties to be faced by the force on the north of the Nkandhla Forest were greater, as it had to descend the Qonxa spur nearly 2,000 feet to the Insuzi River. The combined movement also included the co-operation of Colonel Barker's force.

The concentration at Cetshwayo's grave not only had the immediate effect of cutting off the rebels' supplies of corn and stock, but determined Colonel McKenzie to hold the Insuzi Valley with a strong column. This decision was come to on the 22nd May, when Sigananda and his tribe expressed their intention of surrendering at the Nkandhla Magistracy. Had it not been for Colonel McKenzie's foresight, there would have been no column to waylay the impi at the mouth of the Mome Gorge on the 10th June. To the

circumstance that Colonel Mansel's column was retained to hold the Insuzi Valley, much of the success of the Mome fight may be attributed. From the 24th May to the 8th June the brunt of the campaign fell to the share of the troops who returned to the Nkandhla bush with Colonel McKenzie from Cetshwayo's grave. The first night march to Ensingabantu on the 25th May was a severe test to the men. The country was rough, the night dark, and a march in full ranks under such conditions could only be accomplished by the best disciplined troops under highly trained officers. Considering the circumstances stragglers on the route of march were comparatively few, and when the column halted at 4 A.M., after having made close on twenty-seven miles, there was not a single man missing. The worst straggling was at the Devil's Gorge, where the enemy should have seized the opportunity of attacking the troops.

Whilst Colonel McKenzie made use of every opportunity offered, and carried out his tactics with daring rapidity, the rebels, owing to the incapacity of their leaders, showed much lack of enterprise. The bush drives from the 1st June to the 8th June will always rank among Colonel McKenzie's most brilliant achievements during the campaign, and officers and men engaged in those operations will always look back upon them as accomplished feats of physical endurance of which they had never dreamt themselves capable. The example shown by Colonel McKenzie on these occasions inspired the men with confidence until they

were ready to follow him anywhere. His geniality had won for him the affection and devotion of all ranks. When off duty he always had a kind word for everyone from the column commander to the trooper; and his busiest day was when the troops were resting in camp, for all who wished to, might speak with the Colonel from early morning till late at night. Many a leader might well have hesitated to drive the bush with so few men. He was amply rewarded for his bold initiative which demonstrated to the rebels that the white men were capable of defeating them even in their strongholds and fastnesses. Colonel McKenzie perceived at the very outset the wisdom of converting the whole of his mounted force into infantry for the bush work, and the men responded to the call without a murmur. Amongst the many qualities which distinguish Colonel McKenzie as a leader, is an insight into character and an ability to choose the right man, which stood him in good stead when he selected Lieutenant Hedges and Sergeants Calverley and Titlestad, of the Z.M.R., to seek information of the rebels' intentions and movements. He gave them a free hand in conducting their work, which culminated in the intelligence of the movements of Bambata and Mehlokazulu's impis on the night of the 9th June. This enabled Colonel McKenzie to deliver the successful blow in the Mome Gorge. To his rapidity in formulating his plan that night and in carrying it into execution in the early morning, the success of the Mome fight was largely due. Had the attack failed, and Mehlokazulu

and Bambata made themselves secure in the Nkandhla Forest, the rebellion in all probability would have spread to other parts of Zululand, and the Nkandhla campaign itself would have been considerably prolonged with the accompaniment of greater bloodshed on both sides. The Mome fight demonstrated throughout the length and breadth of the land the utter inability of the natives to successfully oppose European troops; and its lesson to the natives will no doubt act as a deterrent for many a day against rebellion and sedition. It has been said that Colonel McKenzie was fortunate. No one will deny this, but in him fortune found one who wasted none of her favours.

On the fresh outbreak of rebellion in Natal towards the end of June, the field force under Colonel McKenzie's command amounted to 5,000 men. Two columns were retained in Zululand, and for actual operations in the Mapumulo district he had about 2,700 men and ten guns. In dealing with Messeni's and other rebellious tribes, Colonel McKenzie pursued his vigorous tactics with equal success. Though the enemy in Natal outnumbered that in Zululand by several thousands, the combined night marches of his four columns, bold in conception, swift in execution, and vigorous in attack, secured to Colonel McKenzie all the fruits of victory.

In the short space of a fortnight between the first and the fifteenth July the rebellion was completely crushed in the Mapumulo district. It was a matter for congratulation and surprise that the Natal rebels did not seek to fire the sugar plantations or to damage

property in their immediate neighbourhood, and whatever motive they might have had for the rebellion, the freedom from vandalism must be placed to their credit. To pierce the veil of native superstition and determine the causes which led them to revolt, is not within the scope of this work. For the convenience of those readers who wish to pursue the subject, the proceedings of the trial of Sigananda, which appeared in the several September issues of *The Transvaal Leader* are annexed as Appendix III. The evidence disclosed during the trial showed the immense influence the name of Dinuzulu had over the natives. It also showed the ruthless manner in which the name had been used for the purpose of sedition by evil doers. In the midst of conflicting reports, the fact remains that Dinuzulu could have plunged this country into a general rising if he had so chosen. He did not do so. He evidently foresaw the fate of the rebels; and wisely remained loyal to the British.

APPENDIX I.

NATAL FIELD FORCE.

GENERAL ORDERS.

BY COL. DUNCAN MCKENZIE, C.B., C.M.G., V.D.,
COMMANDING.

ON the occasion of the demobilisation of the Active Militia from the Natal Field Force, the Officer Commanding desires to place on record and to express to the units of the force, his hearty appreciation of the services rendered by every member thereof. Without this cheerful and loyal assistance it would have been an utter impossibility to have succeeded in so speedily and successfully suppressing the late rebellion.

It has been especially gratifying to the O.C. to have under his command the services of the troops so generously sent by the neighbouring Colonies. It is the first time that the South African Colonial troops have been combined together for military operations, and the O.C. feels proud to have had the honour to command such a force.

When all the regiments have acquitted themselves so admirably in the fighting line it would be invidious to single out any particular regiment for special attention.

The Natal Medical Corps has fortunately not had any extreme pressure of work to bear but they have met all demands made upon them.

To Captain Hosken, O.C. Transport, the greatest credit is due for the excellent manner in which his department has been conducted.

The Natal Service Corps has done most exceedingly well and the O.C. congratulates Captain Prior and the members of his corps on the splendid way in which the supply of rations has at all times been maintained.

The Natal Telegraph Corps has had a great amount of hard work to perform and has done it in a very satisfactory manner, and in this respect they have received most valuable assistance from the C.M.R. Detachment under Lieut. Stopford.

The cases of misconduct which have been brought to the notice of the O.C. have been exceedingly few.

Whilst not anticipating any call on the Active Militia in the near future, the O.C. would impress upon all ranks the necessity of maintaining the high state of efficiency which now exists so that every man will be ready to take the field at a moment's notice should circumstances require it.

(Sgd) C. RODWELL,
*Lieut.-Col.,
Chief Staff Officer,
Natal Field Force.*

PIETERMARITZBURG,
August, 1906.

APPENDIX II.

MILITIA ORDERS.

BY COL. H. T. BRU-DE-WOLD, C.M.G., V.D.,
COMMANDANT OF MILITIA.

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205. COMPLIMENTARY.

THE Commandant has great pleasure in publishing the following communications received from the President of the Legislative Council and the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly respectively :—

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, NATAL,
1st August, 1906.

SIR,

I have it in command from the Legislative Assembly to convey to you the following resolution, which was adopted on the 31st July ultimo :—

(1) That the cordial thanks of this Assembly are hereby accorded to the Militia and other Forces now or lately engaged in the field for the promptitude with which they responded to the call to arms for the purpose of quelling the rebellion of portions of the native population of this Colony.

That this Assembly, in congratulating the Officers

Commanding upon the success which has attended their arms, places on record its appreciation of the gallantry and endurance displayed by all ranks, and of the public spirit with which private interests have been sacrificed by all alike for the defence of the Colony.

I am further to add that it is the wish of the Legislative Assembly that the terms of this Resolution may be communicated to the various units engaged.

I have the honour to be, etc.,

(Sgd) R. M. ARCHIBALD,
Speaker of the Legislative Assembly.

COLONY OF NATAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL,
FOURTH SESSION, FOURTH PARLIAMENT, 1906.

EXTRACT FROM THE JOURNALS OF THE COUNCIL.

TUESDAY, 31st JULY, 1906.

V. Hon. Sir G. M. Sutton, K.C.M.G., moved, pursuant to notice, seconded by Hon. Minister for Justice and Defence (Hon. T. Watt, C.M.G.):—

(1) "That the cordial thanks of this Council are hereby accorded to the Militia and other Forces now or lately engaged in the field, for the promptitude with which they responded to the call to arms for the purpose of quelling the rebellion of portions of the native population of this Colony.

"That this Council, in congratulating the Officers Commanding upon the success which has attended their arms, places on record its appreciation of the gallantry and endurance displayed by all ranks, and of the public spirit with which private interests have been sacrificed by all alike for the defence of the Colony.

(2) "That a copy of this Resolution be conveyed to the Commandant of Militia with an expression of the wish of this Council that its terms may be communicated to the various units engaged."

After debate :

Motion put, and carried :

The Members rising.

Hon. Sir G. M. Sutton thereupon further moved, seconded by the Hon. Mr. Angus : "That entry be made in the journals that the foregoing Resolutions are unanimously adopted by this Council".

Motion put, and carried, and

Record ordered accordingly.

(Sgd) A. J. CRAWFORD,

President of the Legislative Council.

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, NATAL,

31st July, 1906.

APPENDIX III.

TRIAL OF SIGANANDA.


FULL REPORT OF THE EVIDENCE AT COURT-MARTIAL.


(From *The Transvaal Leader* of Johannesburg, 7th, 8th, 12th and 19th September, 1906.)

It will be remembered that after the capture, or surrender rather, of Sigananda, the aged Chief was brought to trial on charges of treason and rebellion. No details of that Court transpired beyond a bald statement to the effect that various witnesses gave evidence tending to implicate Dinuzulu in the rebellion. We are now in a position to publish a complete report of the proceedings at the trial, and the public can judge for itself how far the statements regarding Dinuzulu were justified.

The court-martial was held at the Nkandhla Magistracy on 25th June, and the proceedings occupied four whole days. No fewer than four eminent Natal advocates were concerned in the proceedings.

The composition of the court-martial was as follows: Lieut.-Col. J. S. Wylie, K.C., V.D. (D.L.I.), President; Lieut.-Col. Shepstone, N.C.; Lieut.-Col. J. J. Furze, T.L.I., N.R.; Major Molyneux, D.L.I.; Captain Ente, N.D.M.B., Magistrate at Utrecht.





FIVE ZULULAND CHIEFS.

**Reading from left to right: Mpiyake, Mayime, Nongamulana,
Mehlokazulu and Gadeleni.**

The case for the prosecution was conducted by Major Vanderplank (Crown Prosecutor for Zululand), while Captain C. F. Clarkson (D.L.I.) and Lieutenant H. Walton (N.C.), advocates of the Natal Supreme Court, defended the prisoner.

The indictment was very lengthy, but the three principal charges against the Chief were high treason, rebellion and public violence.

Chief Sigananda, who had recovered from the thorn in his foot, followed the proceedings very closely. All the evidence not given in Kafir was interpreted, and his occasional remarks to the Court and to his counsel disclosed his intelligent appreciation of every point raised.

The prisoner pleaded not guilty to the charges of high treason, rebellion and public violence.

THE PROSECUTION.

Polomba, called by the prosecution, duly sworn, stated : I am an Induna of the Chief Sigananda ; I live at Nkunzane, near Cetshwayo's grave. The first intimation I had that there was a certain amount of unrest among the natives, which has resulted in the present disturbance, was when Bambata came into the district. I was aware that there was some unrest amongst the people before Bambata arrived, regarding the poll-tax, but I thought that it was all over when they paid the tax. I do not know when Bambata crossed over into this district, but I only heard of his arrival after he was in the bush. I do not remember the exact day I heard of his arrival, but it was immediately after the case of the disturbance was tried before the Magistrate here. I was told by my Chief of the disturbance in the bush when the order was sent out for the natives of Sigananda's tribe to look for Bambata. After the order

to arm, a messenger arrived—Cakitshana, a son of Gezin-daba. Cakitshana came with Bambata from Dinuzulu. They crossed into Natal and came back into the bush. After that Cakitshana proceeded to Dinuzulu from Nkandhla bush. He went to report that Bambata was in the forest. After this Sigananda sent two messengers to Dinuzulu (Miganya and Masele) to ask his reason for sending this man into his, Sigananda's, ward. Sigananda said, "I am on the Government side". When these messengers returned, they brought a message from Dinuzulu saying that Bambata and Sigananda must not meet Makulumana, Dinuzulu's Induna. Makulumana received instructions from the Magistrate at Nongoma to see Sigananda and Bambata, and Miganga and Masele arrived with a message from Dinuzulu that Bambata and Sigananda must not meet Makulumana. In consequence of receiving this message Sigananda did not see Makulumana. When Sigananda was instructed by the Magistrate to seize Bambata he arrived and searched for him. After the message was received from Dinuzulu, the search was not pursued. After receiving this message Sigananda sent in a report to the Magistrate and said, "I cannot find him". Bambata was then in the bush right in the Mome, with two companies. Sigananda knew that Bambata was in the bush. The reason they did not find Bambata during this search was that they did not go right into the bush, as they were afraid, and only searched around the edge. After Makulumana arrived, Ndabeningi came with three other chiefs and told him they could not find Bambata. They also told him they could not find Sigananda. Makulumana said he was disappointed, as he came to see Sigananda and Bambata. He said: "I am disappointed, as Dinuzulu, Bambata and myself were in the know as regards this man's coming into the bush. Now



**CHARLES RENAULT SAUNDERS, C.M.G.,
Commissioner, Native Affairs, Zululand.**

you say you cannot find Sigananda. What is the meaning of it? You may think that because I come from the Court at Nongoma that I have nothing to do with this matter." Makulumana was not aware of the message that had been sent down by Dinuzulu. We did not tell Makulumana of the message, but kept it dark. We simply said we could not find Sigananda. A man named Gelijana said: "If Makulumana has come down—the owner of this impi—why does he not go to Bambata?" Makulumana replied: "I am not sent by Dinuzulu. I am sent by the Magistrate at Nongoma."

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Did you believe he came from the Magistrate, or did you think he only made that statement so that he could get an interview with Sigananda?—We believed that he came as a messenger from the Court, but our impression was that he did not come as he should have come, and that he was deceiving the Court. After Makulumana had told them all this, he said: "I do not know what message to take back to the Court. The only thing I can say is, you received me badly, in order that I may get through." He said he would go back to the Magistrate and say they had threatened to kill him. Makulumana was staying at Nfanamadhlozi's kraal, but I first met him at Babaga's kraal. Sigananda was staying at that kraal; but when I met Makulumana there Sigananda was staying at the edge of the bush. He was at the kraal when Makulumana was approaching; but owing to the message Magunga brought from Dinuzulu, Sigananda went away and hid. At the meeting at Babaga's kraal, of which I have spoken, at which Makulumana said he was disappointed at not seeing Sigananda, there were several present, amongst whom were Ndabeningi, Nogiya, Nomapu, and myself. This was a private meeting, but there was a

general meeting at Nfanamadhlozi's kraal. At the public meeting at Nfanamadhlozi's kraal, Lunyana, a brother of Sigananda's, said to Makulumana, "I am glad to see you, as you are responsible for all this". Makulumana answered: "Yes, you are right; this business was arranged by Dinuzulu, Bambata, and myself. I do not come from Dinuzulu, I come from the Magistrate at Nongoma, and these horses I am riding are lent by the Magistrate. I was sent for by the Magistrate, and was instructed to proceed here, but Dinuzulu knew nothing about it. I have come here, and Dinuzulu is displeased with the matter, but I am compelled to obey orders. I told Dinuzulu it will not break my feet, and I will deliver the message that has been entrusted to me." Cakitshana was present at the meeting, and he asked Makulumana: "Are you not going on to Bambata, as this matter is all in your hands?" At this time Bambata had built some shelters near Cetahwayo's grave, and was living there. He brought no cattle with him into the bush, but he purchased food from the women of Sigananda's tribe. We had now joined Bambata, as we had not brought him up to the Court as we were instructed. Cakitshana had come from Dinuzulu calling the regiments up, namely, Mavalana, Urayulengwenya, Velapakati, Imbogotibomun, and Umfalaza. The first three of these regiments are Dinuzulu's, and the last owed obedience to Dinuzulu, and the members were a mixture from different wards and chiefs. I was present when Cakitshana called all these regiments up. Four companies were called out, two of which went up the Bobe Ridge, and the other two went by the Edima stream. There were some of Mbugo's, Bambata's, and Sigananda's men in these companies.

Major Vanderplank: Do you know Gezindaba, the

father of Cakitshana?—He is one of Dinuzulu's own men—a man of some importance. He was Cakitshana's body servant. Owing to Cakitshana being the son of Gezindaba, considerable notice would be taken of him.

Major Vanderplank: Were you present at the first fight which took place?—I was not actually present at the fight, but near at hand. I do not know how many of Sigananda's men were present at this fight. Cakitshana was in command, and his four companies were sorted according to their ages, and not according to their tribes. Sigananda was at the kraal near Cetshwayo's grave when the impi left to go up the Bobe Ridge. Sigananda had spoken to Cakitshana about taking the young men to fight the white men, whereupon Cakitshana said: "This is no business of yours; it is my business. Dinuzulu has sent me to raise these regiments." Sigananda took no interest in the fight. He did not address the young men themselves and try to stop them, but only had conversation with Cakitshana.

Major Vanderplank: Was Sigananda present at the fight in the Nkandhla bush, near Manzipambana?—I heard he was at the Edima stream that day. I did not see him myself. When this fight was proceeding he went to Manzipambana, and when he saw the troops there he went down and remained in the circle his men had formed, and wandered about like a buck. His son Hlaza was with him. I do not know if any white men were killed on that day, as I was not present at the fight. I ran away to the Macala Hills. I was present at the fight which took place a week later. I was at the head of it—in the advance guard.

Major Vanderplank: Where was Sigananda the morning of the Mome fight?—He was at Ngogoo. He could

not see the fight from there. There were a few of Sigananda's men present at that fight, but the most of them were killed. The people of most importance at this fight, as far as I can remember, were Nankwyake, Ndabeningi, Fogoti, and myself.

Major Vanderplank: Who was responsible for keeping the tribe in order?—Mangati and Bambata, who had just returned from Dinuzulu, were the two who kept the rebels together. They visited Dinuzulu a little while after the Bobe fight. We old men had nothing to do with this affair, and Sigananda was not looked upon as a head in this matter. I know Mangati had been to Dinuzulu after the Bobe fight, because he told me so himself, and he also told me that Bambata had been there as well. Mangati, who is a son of Mpumela's uncle, came amongst us on the fifth day after Bambata had crossed. He is a headman, and he came armed, following up Cakitshana's own men.

Cross-examined by Captain Clarkson: I gathered from what Makulumana told us that Bambata paid a visit to Dinuzulu previous to all the disturbances that had taken place. Cakitshana did not arrive before the disturbance started. When intimation was received that Bambata was at the Macala Sigananda sent messengers to the Magistrate here with the information. These messengers returned with instructions that the tribe was to arm and search for Bambata. After Bambata's arrival Cakitshana came and said "What about the man who arranged this affair? What will you say to him?" Sigananda then sent messengers to Dinuzulu to ascertain for himself the meaning of what Sigananda had said to him. The messengers came back with word that Makulumana would come, and their return was hurried, so that they would arrive before Makulumana came. Makulumana arrived the day after

the messengers returned. He was received by Ndabeningi and others. When Makulumana was gone to the kraal Maginga, one of the messengers, said: "What did I tell you yesterday? Did I not tell you that this man was not to see you? What will you say if he sees you?" Sigananda said, "What should I be afraid of?" but Maginga took him away. Ndabeningi told Makulumana, "What you have to say to my father you can say to me". We told Sigananda that Makulumana was sent by the Government, and that he had nothing much to say. Sigananda said, "What has that to do with me, seeing that it is about his own affair?"—that is, Bambata. We informed Sigananda of the result of the meetings with Makulumana.

Captain Clarkson: If you reported the result of the meetings with Makulumana, why did you not allow Sigananda to be present?—Maginga prevented him.

Captain Clarkson: And is Sigananda so helpless that a man like Maginga can prevent him from attending meetings?—When Sigananda heard he had been prevented, he said, "This is not my affair; let them do as they like". Sigananda never called his men together to discuss the matter, and never gave any orders to his tribe to take up arms against the Government. He, however, sent portions of his tribe to search for Bambata. After the meeting at Nfanamadhlozi's kraal Sigananda had no control over the tribe, and the people were there in Cakitshana's power. Sigananda had nothing more to say, and left the control of his tribe in Dinuzulu's man's hands. Sigananda suddenly found himself plunged into this mess. He was trying to obey the orders of the authorities, but Dinuzulu's word was greater than Sigananda's. It was through Dinuzulu's influence that Sigananda's tribe went into rebellion.

Previous to Maginga bringing the message from Dinuzulu, Sigananda's tribe was certainly in earnest, and were endeavouring to catch Bambata, even though they were afraid of him. After the Bobe fight, messengers—Londhloon and Siyelanda—were sent by Sigananda to Dinuzulu to report that his people had been killed. Sigananda was angry and grieved at heart, and said that he would report it at where it originated from—meaning Dinuzulu. These messengers returned with the reply: "Why did my impi go out of the bush? they should have remained in the bush". Dinuzulu's instructions were that the impi were to remain in the bush.

Captain Clarkson: Were the people doctored for war?—After the arrival of Makulumana they were doctored for war by a doctor who came with Bambata.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Did you hear Makulumana state that although he was only carrying a message from the Court he ought to be with the impi?—He did not mention the word impi, but he said that what had occurred had been arranged by himself, Dinuzulu and Bambata. He did not use spoken words, but we believed that he was in favour of Bambata. That was the impression he conveyed to us.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Did Cakitshana tell you whether he had Dinuzulu's authority for using his name?—No, he did not say he had been given authority then, but when he returned from Dinuzulu he told us—on the day of the Bobe fight—that he had been given authority to take control of Sigananda's people by Dinuzulu.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Were any of Sigananda's people killed by the white men?—A great number were killed.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Is not the Governor in Maritzburg the Supreme Chief?—Yes.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: And you know the troops were here by the Supreme Chief's authority?—Yes.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: And that every time they disobey his orders they will be killed by the white people?—Yes; we saw it.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Do you not think it right that these men of Sigananda's tribe should be killed for disobeying orders?—Yes.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: You know the white people will protect you so long as you obey the laws?—Yes; we know that.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Sigananda is an old man?—Yes.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: And you are an old man?—Yes.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Do you remember when Sigananda was a police sergeant at Greytown?—Yes; I was here in Zululand at the time, but I know he was.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Sigananda, as an Induna, used to enforce laws against the people who broke them?—Yes.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Sigananda knew that the orders of the Supreme Chief, and not the orders of Dinuzulu, were to be obeyed?—Yes.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Why did not Sigananda send Cakitshana back to Dinuzulu and say we cannot take orders from you, but from the Great White Chief at Maritzburg?—He sent Maginga and Masele to Dinuzulu to find out.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Did not Sigananda do wrong in sending to Dinuzulu and not sending to the Magistrate here?—Yes; he did wrong. I admit that.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: You told us that Cakitshana said to Sigananda, "This is no business of yours, it is my business; Dinuzulu sent me to raise the regiments"?—Yes; I remember saying that.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: What reply did Sigananda make to

Cakitshana?—Do then as you please, since you have come to kill my people. My regiments have not been to Dinuzulu.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Do you remember when the troops went down into the Insuzi Valley to Cetshwayo's grave after the Bobe fight, and before the Mome fight, and when the troops were going to the stronghold Ndabeningi stopped them?—I was not present; I heard that occurred. Mbemi and Nankwana were the two Chiefs who came down to speak to the big white man, Colonel McKenzie.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Why were these men sent down?—I do not know.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Do you know that before any of the troops went into the bush you were given a chance to come in, and you were told not to fight the white men?—I heard of it from common talk that if we came in our cases would be tried by the Court.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Sigananda knew of this?—I do not know; he may have heard it where he was. He was at a different place.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: How many men were killed in the Bobe fight?—Over thirty of Sigananda's tribe; there may have been thirty-six. Besides this number a lot were wounded, and died in their homes. I do not know the number that were killed of the other tribes, but they were all finished.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Was Sigananda related to Bambata?—No; he does not even know him by sight.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Why did Bambata come over to Sigananda for protection and help if he did not know him?—He was brought there by Cakitshana. Cakitshana then went on to Dinuzulu and reported that Bambata was in the bush.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Did you hear of the policemen being killed by Bambata at Impanza?—I heard of it after Bambata's arrival.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: When the impi was doctored were you present?—Yes; I was there.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: What charms did they use?—Green.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Did they not use the arm of the policeman?—No; I do not know what the charm was made of.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Was Bambata's impi supposed to be bullet-proof?—Bambata's doctor said they were not to go in their huts or sleep on mats as then bullets would go through them.

Captain Ente: Is Sigananda related to Zulu royalty?—No.

Captain Ente: Do any of Bambata's wives come from Zululand?—I do not know.

Captain Ente: Did Sigananda come to the Magistrate last year and ask to be relieved of his responsibilities?—I was not present, but I heard Sigananda did come to this office and request to be relieved of the chieftainship.

Nkunya, duly sworn, stated: I am a constable attached to this Magistracy. I remember the time Bambata crossed over from Natal. After Bambata's arrival in Zululand the Magistrate sent me with a message to Sigananda. There were seven of us sent there. We went to ask how it was that the authorities did not hear from him of Bambata's whereabouts. We delivered the message to Sigananda personally. Sigananda told us that he did not know where this madman was, but he was searching for him. He told us that he had searched all the bushes at the Mome. That day they intended search-

ing in the Manzipambana. We told Sigananda that the Government was angry with him because Bambata had come into his ward, and that it appeared to the Government that Sigananda was with Bambata. Sigananda said he had not seen this madman, but had only heard of his arrival. We asked where Bambata had got his courage from, seeing he had come and hidden near his kraal. Sigananda had men with him who were armed, and we heard others with Manzipambana beating the bush.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant Walton: I do not know Cakitshana personally, but I have heard it reported that he is a man who accompanies Bambata. I have heard that his father is Gezindaba, and that he hails from Nhlazatshe. He is one of Dinuzulu's tribe.

Lieutenant Walton: Is it possible for Bambata to go into the Nkandhla bush and carry on his plans without Sigananda personally knowing anything of it?—To me it appeared that some one must have led some one right to Sigananda. I say so because Bambata, a man I do not even know, came into the Mome stronghold.

Lieutenant Walton: Had Sigananda, as Chief, influence amongst his tribe, or was he too decrepit recently?—I only know Sigananda as head of his tribe, but I also know that he brought Ndabeningi to this office as his successor. When the disturbance took place about the poll-tax matter, Ndabeningi was brought here as Sigananda was ill. The tribe have looked upon Ndabeningi as their active Chief in affairs of administration since this disturbance of the poll-tax.

Lieutenant Walton: If Ndabeningi was practically ruler of the tribe, was it not possible for Bambata to get into the bush and formulate his plans there without Sigananda, the decrepit old Chief, knowing anything at all about it?—No: it could not be done without Sigananda's knowledge;

although he is old he has his eyes. We spoke to Sigananda in the presence and hearing of his men. Ndabeningi was also present during part of the conversation. We were told that the men were armed to search for Bambata. We were not satisfied that Sigananda was making an effort to find Bambata, and when I returned I reported to Mr. Saunders (C.N.A.) they were not searching in earnest, and were fighting against the Government. I gathered this from their general demeanour, as they are people I know. All the heads were white with "tails". Sigananda was not wearing the "tail". He was lying down, as he was sick. We told Sigananda that Mr. Saunders wanted some of his headmen to remain with him while this affair was being settled, and that we were to bring back the men who had seen Bambata. We asked him what Bambata ate in the bush, and he said he did not know. We also said that any man who was found to supply Bambata with any food would be treated as one of Bambata's men, and that if they saw any corn broken down and they did not know who had done it they were to report it. We charged Ndabeningi with not performing his work properly, as he was responsible, his father being an old man. We then went away.

Njinjini, duly sworn, stated: I am a member of the tribe of Siswane. After Bambata's arrival I asked Sigananda for permission to live in his location. I met Makahleleke, a son of Sigananda, there. This was before the Bobe fight. I told Makahleleke I was in trouble, and I wanted him to ask his father to obtain permission for me to live in his location. He told me to remain at Ncapayi's kraal, while he reported me to his father, as they were searching then for Bambata. Whilst I was with Makahleleke Sigananda's men were fired on. Subsequently Makahleleke

told me I was wanted by his father. I went to see him. This was after the burning of the Royal Grave. Sigananda told me I would have to take a message to Dinuzulu to report the burning of Cetshwayo's grave. I was to go because I knew the road. The names of the messengers who went with me were Magandeyana, Sangani, and Tshingwayo. A fifth native went with me as my servant. We arrived at Dinuzulu's house at sunset. When we got there Dinuzulu called Tshingwayo by himself. The following day Dinuzulu called us all. He was sitting on the verandah with Makulumana and another Induna. Dinuzulu asked for the man who was really the messenger, and the others pointed me out as the real messenger. I said I had nothing much to say, but I had been sent to report that the Royal Grave had been burnt. He asked who had burnt the grave, and we told him the Government had done so. Then he said, "You have done it. Why did you build your war huts near it? Have I not sent Makulumana to tell you this madman Bambata is to be caught?" In the afternoon he asked us to leave his presence, which we did. Tshingwayo and myself were then called. We went into the house, where he put provisions before us. When we went into the house we saw Mangati there. Dinuzulu then said, "I have called you in here to tell you that this mischief-maker," referring to Mangati, "has been ordered to leave here in your presence, whose evil doings you have put down to me". Mangati then left. Dinuzulu sent a policeman after Mangati to see that he did not enter any of the headmen's huts. Dinuzulu also told us that he had sent word to Sigananda that Bambata was to be handed over to the authorities. Dinuzulu told us that Mangati had arrived the previous afternoon. I had no conversation with

Mangati there. I knew that Mangati had gone with Bambata from Macala to Nkandhla. We slept with the Indunas that night and left the following day. Whilst we were there a policeman from the Nongoma authorities came to tell Dinuzulu that the Royal Grave had been burnt. When we left Dinuzulu said, "I do not know how you are going to enter Nkandhla, as the forces are already there".

Major Vanderplank: Where is Tshingwayo?—I do not know. He may still be alive or he may be dead. Dinuzulu had a private interview with Tshingwayo, but Tshingwayo told us that he did not entrust him with any message. When I returned I saw Sigananda and related to him what I have just said, and told him that two other men would come from Dinuzulu and would report to him. Sigananda said: "This is a matter I know nothing about. How can I know? I am an old man. I merely sent you to report the grave had been burnt, as I am headman here."

Cross-examined by Captain Clarkson: I went to Sigananda's tribe to find a place to live. I do not belong to the tribe and therefore cannot say who the men were who were leading Sigananda's people in this rebellion. I know that Sigananda was too old to carry on the chieftainship, and Ndabeningi was pointed out as his successor. I am a prisoner, although I did not join Bambata's impi. I have never been sent on a message by Sigananda before. Previous to taking the message to Dinuzulu I heard that Cakitshana was in the forest, but I did not hear that he was there as a representative of Dinuzulu. I saw that Dinuzulu was angry with Mangati. I do not know whether Dinuzulu knew that Mangati was endeavouring to spread the rebellion. I did not mention that Cakitshana was in the bush because Dinuzulu was asking Mangati about the same matter. Dinuzulu was in a position to

have Mangati arrested and handed over to the authorities. The policeman arrived from Nongoma after Mangati had left, but Dinuzulu did not say anything about Mangati being there. I was there when the policeman arrived. I cannot understand why Dinuzulu did not inform the authorities that Mangati was at his kraal, because Dinuzulu said that these people were ruining the country.

Captain Clarkson: Did it appear to you that Dinuzulu was shielding this man Mangati and allowed him to escape?—How could he assist him, judging from the conversation he had with him? The error he made was in not handing Mangati over to the authorities.

By Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Dinuzulu said that Sigananda had no right to allow his young men to come out to fight. I told Sigananda that. This was after the fight of the Bobe Ridge and before the fight of the Mome Gorge.

Ngogo, duly sworn, stated: I belong to the chief Siswane. I heard that Bambata had crossed over into Zululand on the Sunday, the day after crossing the Tugela. I was not with my tribe at that time, but I heard they had been ordered to arm. I was then residing in Sigananda's ward, near Macal. I armed with Sigananda's people in compliance with orders. We searched for three days, and then Sigananda sent messengers in here to ask for provisions. A reply came that Sigananda was to provide the food-stuffs, and we were told we would be committing a crime if we returned to our homes for food. Shortly after that Bambata came out of the bush. I saw him myself. The Indunas then asked whether, now that Bambata had come out they should take him to the authorities, but Sigananda said no. He belonged to Dinuzulu. He said this in front of the impi. Mpikwa, Simoyi, Nangsana, and Polomba were there. Sigananda said this himself, and the impi did

not dispute his words, they thought he was speaking the truth. Sigananda's men were not only present, but Mbuzi, Mpumela, and Ndube's people were also there. When Sigananda announced what he intended to do, some of the men went away and others remained, and some of those who remained were killed. After the announcement to the impi they proceeded there, and then towards Cetshwayo's grave, and built their war huts, and after that day Bambata's men mixed freely with Sigananda's tribe. When Bambata was revealed, Sigananda sent round messages to other chiefs and headmen in the district. Some of them refused to come. Thereupon the impi went into the bush. People came into the bush from time to time after Bambata had come out. The impi were waiting for Dinuzulu, as Sigananda had said he would come with an impi. A relative of Mihlokazulu said that instructions had been received from Dinuzulu that the cattle would be seized and killed of any native who refused to join the rebels. Cakitshana did not take us into his confidence, but after we got into the bush he left Bambata and returned to Dinuzulu. On his return from Dinuzulu he formed the men into regiments according to the old Zulu custom. These regiments were in existence, but Cakitshana arranged them in their proper order. Cakitshana said he was Dinuzulu's messenger, and that he and Bambata had received instructions to commence the fight over in Natal. About this time a man named Mangati arrived with an impi of his own, and when they heard that Sigananda had thrown in his lot with Bambata, he remained there. When I heard that Makulumana had arrived I was at home, which was not far off, but I then heard what he had to say. I went down to Babaza's kraal to see Makulumana. Makulumana is a relative of mine, and

I went to see him at night, on the hills, to hear about this matter. I came down the hill and entered the church. Makulumana asked why Bambata did not come, and he was told that a message had arrived from Dinuzulu that Bambata and Sigananda were not to see him, as he had been sent by the white authorities. Makulumana said he would have liked to have asked Bambata why he was spreading about that Dinuzulu was responsible for this affair, and why he should say that his wives and children were at Dinuzulu's kraal. Nkangangwane, Bambata's Induna, and Moses, a preacher, said that it was the Natal people who said Bambata's wives and children were at Dinuzulu's kraal. Makulumana asked us not to spread about that he had interviewed Bambata's men. Makulumana then said, "I am returning to-morrow, and I want to see Ndabeningi about the reply I am to take back". We then separated. I heard afterwards, when it was common talk, that Dinuzulu would come and pretend to assist in the search for Bambata, and while in the bush would turn on the white men. All the impi expected to see Dinuzulu come down. Cakitshana was present at this meeting with Makulumana, and was recognised as Dinuzulu's representative. All he did was to find fault with Bambata for not coming to see Makulumana. I was at home at the Bobe Ridge fight, but I could see it. After the fight Sigananda sent messengers to Dinuzulu to report it. Sondhlovu and Siyelande were the messengers. I heard that Dinuzulu found fault with Bambata for taking the impi in the open and not remaining in the bush. Sondhlovu and Siyelande returned in company with two messengers of Dinuzulu, whose names I do not know. There was dissatisfaction expressed by the impi that Dinuzulu had not come as promised. I remember the burning of

Cetshwayo's grave. Sigananda sent Njinjini, Sangani, Magandeyana, and Tshingwayo to report the matter to Dinuzulu. I did not see Bambata after the Bohe Ridge fight, but I heard he had gone to Macala. I also heard that he came back into the bush again. I know of my own knowledge that Bambata and Mangati disappeared when the troops reached Nkunzane, and I have not seen them since. Sigananda's people would never have gone into revolt had they not been sure of the support of Dinuzulu. I went into the bush because I was frightened I would be killed and my cattle taken. There would have been no difficulty about Makulumana seeing Sigananda and Bambata had it not been for the message that came from Dinuzulu. My opinion of Makulumana was that he was deceiving the Government and was in reality siding with the rebels. I inferred that from his attitude and conversation, for why should he reside with an evil-doer? The commoners were searching in earnest for Bambata before Makulumana arrived, but I cannot say that of Sigananda, because he already knew where Bambata was. I say that because Bambata was not caught by the impi, but came out himself to Sigananda, and then Sigananda introduced him. Bambata was seen by a number of people the day he arrived. Sigananda's impi had not been called out at that time. Other tribes had received instructions to catch Bambata, but Sigananda had not. On the Sunday Bambata arrived we were proceeding to have Ndabeningi appointed successor to the Chief, as Sigananda was too old. Sigananda complained of his burden owing to his great age. If Sigananda had issued instructions even after Makulumana's arrival he could have prevented his people from going into rebellion. The only instructions I ever heard Sigananda issue in connection with this affair was

that we were not to draw blood first. He said, "I am afraid of the white men. I am only hiding Dinuzulu's man." Bambata was a mere nothing, and if Sigananda had issued instructions his men would have fought him. The people were not afraid of Bambata and his men, because they had been specially doctored. Although Sigananda's son was going to take his place, the people still looked upon Sigananda as the Chief. Makulumana was not angry with Bambata and Oakitshana for saying they had Dinuzulu's authority for going on with an impi. I do not know if Makulumana was pleased with Oakitshana, but I was surprised to see him accompanied by this evil-doer—I mean Oakitshana. I looked upon Oakitshana as being a representative of Dinuzulu, because he was in Makulumana's company. I did not hear him say in Makulumana's presence that he was Dinuzulu's representative. When Bambata came out of the bush Sigananda introduced him to the impi and told them that he would not hand Bambata over to the Magistrate, because he was Dinuzulu's man. By that he meant that Dinuzulu's word was greater than the great White Chief's. Sigananda did not tell them to fight against the white people, but he told them to help Bambata. If the white people came and fought they were to retaliate, so that Bambata should not be caught. Sigananda said that himself.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Are Sigananda's people quite satisfied with the result of the fight, or do they want some more? —Sigananda's tribe's backbone was broken at the Bobe Ridge fight. After that they were fighting like women. The people would have surrendered after that but they thought there could be no pardon for the evil they had done.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: What have you done with all the women?—I do not know where they have gone.

Major Molyneux: You say Moses, the preacher, was at the meeting at the church. Did he conduct the service in the Christian rites?—He did not conduct a service on that occasion, but he conducts Christian services with the impi.

By Lieut.-Col. Wylie: All Sigananda's people had the opportunity of asking Makulumana whether Cakitshana was Dinuzulu's representative, but I do not know if any of them asked the question. I did not think of asking, and I would be afraid to ask such a question.

Mpikwa called, duly sworn, stated: I am an Induna of the Chief Sigananda, and I surrendered here to the Government before the war commenced. The first I heard of this disturbance was when Nongama, a member of Mpumela's tribe, told me to arm. I asked him what authority had he for ordering us to arm. I sent to Sigananda and Sigananda sent word that we must come. We went to Enhlweni kraal, and slept there twice. On the third day Bambata was produced from out of the bush. When I taxed Sigananda with denying that he knew where Bambata was, he replied that Bambata was a man of Dinuzulu's. He admitted that he had known Bambata was there. This was after the messengers of the Court had been to Sigananda. I saw Bambata, but I was not close to him. When Bambata appeared, I said: "Send him to the Government," but Sigananda replied, "I cannot give him up. He belongs to Dinuzulu, and he has been given to me." I asked him who came from Dinuzulu, and he answered, Cakitshana had come. I said, "To whom does Cakitshana belong?" and he said, "He is a son of Gezindaba". Bambata was not given up, and he stayed with Sigananda's brother, Lunyana. Bambata then built some war huts near Cetshwayo's grave. I then ran away and cut myself off from the tribe of Sigananda.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant Walton : I was appointed an Induna by Sigananda's father. We were not collected together before Bambata's arrival in Zululand. I know that Sigananda turned out his men to look for Bambata, and up to that time I thought Sigananda was loyal. Lunyana is the man we have most respect for in Sigananda's tribe. I heard that Lunyana came to this Magistracy some time ago and asked to have Ndabeningi registered as Sigananda's successor. I did not come to the Government and report when Sigananda produced Bambata, but went back to my kraal, as I was afraid. I thought it best to wait until the Government was fully up, as I heard an army was coming. I knew I was doing wrong, but how could I get out without them stabbing me? Judging from what he said, Sigananda was afraid of Dinuzulu. The impi did not search whilst I was at the Enhlweni kraal, or else it searched in my absence. This was before the Bobe fight, and the burning of Cetshwayo's grave took place after I departed. I heard that Bambata was brought to Enhlweni kraal by Cakitshana, who had returned to Dinuzulu to report to him that Bambata was there. Amongst the headmen of Sigananda's tribe who were present at this meeting at Enhlweni kraal were Lunyana, Mangwane, Simoyi, and Muntomini. These men were sent here to report that Bambata could not be found. We do not know if Sigananda was responsible for bringing Bambata into his district; we leave that to him. When Sigananda said this person (Bambata) had been given to him by Dinuzulu, I said, "I do not believe it; these are lies that you are speaking".

Prisoner stated: I deny the statement of the witness.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Sigananda was merely an Induna when I was appointed Induna. Sigananda ought to know

better than any one else that Dinuzulu had no authority but through the Governor. We had heard that Bambata had killed some policemen before coming here, but we did not hear the details. Bambata stated he had finished the police. When Sigananda made the statement that Bambata had been given to him by Dinuzulu he led us to believe that Dinuzulu's word was greater than the Governor's.

Msimoyi, called and sworn, stated: I am a kraal head in the tribe of Sigananda. I was never summoned to the councils of the tribe, as I lived far away. The Magistrate sent for me after Muntemuni had been in to report the arrival of Bambata, because it was stated that Bambata had passed me. I did not see him pass, as I was away to see my brother Sigananda. After Sigananda had sent word that this desperate character had arrived, an order was given that the person should be searched for. When I returned Bambata had appeared. I saw him in the midst of an impi in the presence of Sigananda in the open on a ridge near the Enhlweni kraal. I asked Sigananda how it was that when I went away Bambata was invisible and on my return he was there. Sigananda did not answer, but the other people asked me whether I was still harping on that. Sigananda was in the midst of the impi when it started on the day of the Bobe fight. I heard from my brother Mangwana that he and another brother of mine, Mbemi, had an interview with the Commander-in-Chief of the white forces after the troops came down to Cetshwayo's grave. Mangwana did not tell me that the Commander-in-Chief had stated that if we surrendered by a certain time our cases would be tried by the Court, and I did not know such a message had been sent. I know that Cakitshana claimed to have brought Bambata to this location.

I did not know that Maginga and Masele were sent by Sigananda to find out if this man was sent by Dinuzulu.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant Walton: I do not know whether Mangati ever brought any message to Sigananda from Dinuzulu about Makulumana. I do not know that Maginga did either.

By Lieut.-Col. Wylie: I heard in conversation only that if we took up arms against the white people Dinuzulu would come and help us. I did not think Dinuzulu had any authority. I look to the Government. I know that if we disobey the law we will have to suffer the punishment.

Lunyana, called and sworn, stated: I am caretaker of the King's grave. I am a son of Sigananda's father. Sigananda reported the presence of Bambata amongst his people. I did not see Bambata then. I know there was a search made for Bambata, but we did not find him. When the guns first opened fire a projectile fell near Bambata, and he then came out. That was the first time I saw him. He came to where Sigananda was at Enhlweni kraal. Sigananda did not hand Bambata over to the authorities for the reason that when he came out the troops were already moving about. From that day Bambata mixed freely with the tribe, and built his war huts near Cetshwayo's grave. Then it was that a son of Gesindaba's came and said Bambata must not be molested, as he belonged to Dinuzulu, and from that day we treated Bambata as a friend. Some of Sigananda's men then joined Bambata, and were living in the war huts. Sigananda knew this. He could see it himself. The impi started from where Sigananda was to go to the Bohe ridge fight. I did not take part in the fight, but I sat on a hill there. The message that was sent by the Commander of

the white forces was heard by us all. It was brought by a policeman who accompanied the white forces. I do not know his name. I heard that a message was sent to Sigananda that whoever wanted could have his case tried by the Court. It was arranged that the Chiefs should go, but on their way the guns began to fire, and a lot of our men were killed. I was also anxious to give myself up, but I was terrified. It was on account of the fighting that we were afraid to come up.

Cross-examined by Captain Clarkson: I was present at the interview with Makulumana. I cannot say whether his sympathies were with Bambata. He said he came from the Magistrate at Nongoma, but he was a fit and proper person to come from Dinuzulu. I heard of the message that Maginga and Masele took to Dinuzulu, but I did not hear the reply. Makulumana said he had not come to talk to the people, but he had a message for Sigananda. Cakitshana was not present at the meeting at Nfanamadhlozi's kraal, but I know Cakitshana met Makulumana. When Makulumana arrived Bambata had already appeared. We certainly expected support from Dinuzulu, because Dinuzulu said this man belonged to him.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: If Bambata was Dinuzulu's man, and you knew there was trouble for him, why did you not send him to Dinuzulu to be dealt with by him? That was where we made a mistake by not doing so.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: If it should be denied that Cakitshana was sent by Dinuzulu, what proof have you that he was?—We should not know what to do in that case.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: And Makulumana did not deny that Cakitshana had been to Dinuzulu?—He did not deny it.

Charles McKenzie, called and duly sworn, stated: I

am Acting Magistrate at Nkandhla. I was appointed Assistant Magistrate here on the 16th April, 1906. Makulumana arrived here on the 23rd April, and left on the same day for the purpose of interviewing Sigananda. He returned on Friday, the 27th April, and then went back to Dinuzulu. Bambata arrived in this district on the night of the 7th April. It was reported here on Sunday, the 8th April, in the morning. A troop of the Z.M.R. were the first to arrive here on Monday morning, the 9th April. During that day the whole of the Z.M.R. and Krantskop Reserves arrived. The Natal police arrived two or three days later. The Krantskop Reserves left on the 10th. Up to the time of Makulumana's visit the only troops here consisted of the Z.M.R. and the police. They had no big guns. It would be very difficult for me to say whether any shots had been fired up to the time of Makulumana's visit. At this time Sigananda was certainly not regarded as being loyal. Sigananda was being pressed to bring Bambata in. The last messengers to go out to Sigananda were Umbili and Sikota, and they went before Makulumana. Sigananda had been warned of the consequences by failing to do his duty. Big guns first arrived here on the 25th, with Colonel Mackay's column. I distinctly remember seeing the guns arrive on that day. These guns were first used on the 30th April, near the Ufeni. This was some days after Makulumana's return. According to the office diary (produced in Court), information was received here of the Bobe fight on the 6th May. The Manzipambana fight took place on the 3rd June. (Extracts from office diary read):—

"4th June.—Colonel McKensie reports that yesterday he held extensive operations in Nkandhla Forest, with the result that he killed over 100 rebels. Our casualties, 5

of Royston's Horse killed and 6 wounded. The 5 men who were killed were brought in and buried at Nkandhla."

"10th June.—Reports have come in confirming movements of rebels from Qudeni to Nkandhla Forest (4 p.m.). Telegram from O.C. Z.F.F., reports big fight with rebels. 200 killed, including Mihlokazulu. Fighting still proceeding. Our casualties, 1 killed, 9 wounded."

"11th June.—Further reports go to show that about 350 rebels were killed in yesterday's fight. Bambata said to be wounded, and still in Nkandhla Forest. Chief Mavukutu also reported killed; also Mangati, but no confirmation of this. Lieutenant Marsden died of wounds (this subsequently turned out to be incorrect, but Lieutenant Marsden succumbed a week later)."

Terms were offered to Sigananda's people by Colonel McKenzie on the 19th May. (Extract from office diary read):—

"19th May.—Started at 9 A.M. for combined attack on Mome stronghold. Just before doing so Ndasana, a loyalist, came with white flag, stating Sigananda wished to surrender. Operations were stayed, and Sigananda given till 9 A.M. to-morrow to surrender. His Indunas were Mbeni and Mangwana."

"20th May.—Sigananda's Indunas, Mbeni, Lubiyele, Noginya ka Nongiya, came with white flag and asked for extension of time to surrender, saying that Ndabeningi could not find his father, and was searching for him. Sigananda was given till Tuesday, 9 A.M., to surrender."

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Can you give the date of the arrival of Colonel McKenzie's column?—Colonel McKenzie arrived on Tuesday, the 8th May.

Major Vanderplank here closed the case for the prosecution.

THE DEFENCE.

Lieutenant Walton, for the defence, called—

Ndabeningi, who, duly sworn, stated: I am son and heir to Sigananda. Although my father is of a great age he still has control over the tribe. We did not see Bambata enter this country, but when we heard of his arrival my father sent word to the Court here that it was supposed he had come. We turned out the people to catch Bambata as instructed by the Magistrate, but he made it impossible for us to get him. My father sent word by Maginga to Dinuzulu that Bambata was in his ward. I was present when Maginga was sent. Sigananda sent a message to ascertain who this person was who had arrived in the bush, and whom Sigananda did not know. Dinuzulu sent word back that he did not know him. Polomba was present when that reply was received. I was present at the meeting with Makulumana. I asked Makulumana about this scoundrel—referring to Bambata. Makulumana said that Bambata had been up to the Child—that is Dinuzulu. I have no hesitation in saying that Makulumana told me Bambata had been on a visit to Dinuzulu. I asked Makulumana why was he treating us in this manner. I said: You are breaking up my father's house. Makulumana spoke in reference to the army. He asked where the companies were. He referred to all the districts, saying: "The army for the poll-tax war". I am perfectly certain he said that. Up to that time our tribe had not in any way befriended Bambata. Sigananda was not present at the interview with Makulumana. When Makulumana arrived he asked to see Bambata and my father. He did not see my father on account of a word which was brought by Maginga. What I thought of this was that as Makulumana came from the white people there is some word it is

not wished should come to my father. I wondered myself that he and Dinuzulu should be at cross purposes. I did not think at the time that Makulumana was acting against the Government, but it caused me surprise that word should come he was not to see my father. About this time I met a man named Cakitshana. He is the man who came with Bambata. I saw them together at Nkandhla. I do not know if Cakitshana brought any word about Bambata; he never spoke to me. At this time all the impi of Sigananda were raised for the purpose of searching for Bambata. Nobody from outside the tribe ever came and attempted to raise a force to assist Bambata. Cakitshana raised the impi himself on account of the impi (troops) which came down the Bobe. While we were searching for Bambata word came down that we knew where Bambata was and that we were now rebels. We had not seen Bambata then. I was searching in the bush, and when I came out I found that my father had sent a messenger in here, and that he had returned and was with my father. I said to them, the Indunas and the Chief, I have failed in my search for Bambata. No order was ever given that we were to take up arms against the English, but what caused the disturbance was that some of the searchers were shot. They were shot before the Bobe fight. I was not at the Bobe fight. I was sitting at home: my stomach was very heavy. My father never received any instructions from Dinuzulu to supply cattle and food to Bambata. At the time of the Bobe fight we did supply Bambata with cattle. My father was against it. The army then looted cattle.

Cross-examined by Major Vanderplank: The army looted cattle—some from the Sputini store. These were then taken into Sigananda's location and killed. It was

before Makulumana came that some of the searchers were fired upon. Nobody was hurt. White people fired upon them. It was when some white people were past Sibungo's kraal. The boys ran away, and were then fired upon.

Major Vanderplank: That is a fabrication?—It is the truth. Sondhlovu and Siyelandi were sent to report the dead bodies to the Chief Dinuzulu after the Bobe ridge fight. We sent word to Dinuzulu to say we had been killed on account of the man who had come into the forest. We asked why had this outsider been sent. In Dinuzulu's reply he referred to Bambata as a madman, meaning that his tactics were bad. Dinuzulu said: "Why did you not run away into the bush, and why did you not wait until you were attacked?" My father sent messengers to Dinuzulu to report the burning of Cetshwayo's grave. My father also sent messengers to Dinuzulu to report the Bobe fight. Cakitshana was wounded at Macala the day the troops came down to the grave. Mangati, a nephew of Mpumela, arrived with other people of his tribe. Mangati has no special reputation as a warrior, but he has a reputation because he has a kraal of his own. Mangati took supreme command of the impis at the Mome fight, because the army had collected at his kraal. Mangati was appointed to the supreme command by his tribe. Dinuzulu certainly knows Mangati, and knows he led an impi before. Dinuzulu may have appointed him on account of his reputation, and Bambata agreed to this. I heard from Njinjini that he had met Mangati at Dinuzulu's kraal, but I did not know that he had gone there. Mangati never told me that he had been to visit Dinuzulu. Bambata never told me that he, Bambata, had been to see Dinuzulu. I did not see Bambata. He was away at

the Macala. Bambata went to the Macala after the fight of the Bobe Ridge. Makulumana told me that Mangati had been to Dinuzulu, but I do not know if any plan of campaign was arranged then. I knew a man named Nyamayengwe. He came across whilst we were still searching for Bambata.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Who is your supreme chief—Dinuzulu or the Governor?—I look up to the Government, who has brought me up.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Why did you fight then? Because Dinuzulu had told you to do so?—I was speaking of the tribe. I did not fight the British, but they came down and fought us.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Did you arm?—I did arm, but it was at the order of the Government.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Did the Government order you to fight the white people?—No; but the white people came because Bambata was there.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: How many men had Bambata when he came into the bush?—His army consisted of two full companies and a third small company.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: How many men are there in a company?—Sometimes there are 100.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: How many people were there in these particular companies?—The two companies which came with Bambata were very big.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: How many fighting men were there with Sigananda's tribe?—There were five companies.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Had Sigananda as many men as Bambata?—The army that came across with Bambata was less than Sigananda's.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: You say you were afraid of Bambata, because he had his impi with him. Why were you afraid,

if you had more men?—He was carrying a gun. Had we guns?

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Why did you not send word to the Magistrate here that you were frightened because you had no guns and Bambata had?—It was on account of this. We had not seen him. Word would have been sent if we had seen him.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: How were you afraid of him if you had not seen him?—We were afraid of this wolf.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Where is Bambata?—He is no longer here.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Where is he?—Bambata died at the Mome.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Did you see him when he was dead?—I did not see him there, but I saw him here, at the Court.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: What message did Makulumana bring from the Nongoma Court?—He did not speak it, because he did not see my father. He merely said what I have already told you.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Who told you Dinuzulu had appointed Mangati to supreme command?—I heard it from Njinjini.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: I believe that you are one of the biggest liars that have entered that box?—I am not telling lies. Dinuzulu found fault with me. He said I was too old. He thought a young man should lead the impi.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Why did not Njinjini tell us anything about Mangati being given supreme command?—I do not know why he did not tell the Court. He brought a message from Dinuzulu to say I should not lead the fight at the Bobe ridge.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Were you in command at Bobe ridge?—I was in command of the fight at Bobe ridge.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: But you told us previously that you were not at the fight of the Bobe ridge?—I am only saying what they said.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Who led the fight, then?—Bambata and Cakitahana.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Did Bambata go and see Dinuzulu before or after the Bobe ridge fight?—After that fight.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: How do you know that Bambata went to Dinuzulu after that fight?—I know, because he went with Mangati; Njinjini saw him there.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: How many times has Bambata been to Dinuzulu to your knowledge?—This was the first time to my knowledge.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Makulumana told you, before the Bobe fight, that Bambata had been to see Dinuzulu?—That is what I have said. I heard that from Makulumana, and afterwards I heard from Njinjini that he had been there from Macala.

Captain Ente: Do you remember the taking of the dry canteen wagon in the bush?—Yes, I know of that.

Captain Ente: Were they Sigananda's men who took it?—Yes.

Captain Ente: Sigananda had a good deal of that whisky?—I do not even know of the existence of that whisky.

Captain Ente: Did you have anything from the wagon?—No.

Captain Ente: Where is Mangati?—I do not know.

Captain Ente: Where is Cakitahana?—I do not know.

Captain Ente: Are they both still alive?—I do not know.

Captain Ente: Have you seen them since the Mome fight?—No, I have not seen them since the Mome fight. If I had seen them I would have told you.

Maginga, called and sworn, stated: I am a commoner, and belong to the tribe of Sigananda. Sigananda sent Masele and myself to Dinuzulu to report the arrival of Bambata. Our message was to ask who this man was who had been put in the bush. Masele delivered the message to Dinuzulu in my presence. After hearing the message Dinuzulu said: "I shall not speak much, because you will mention me to the white people. Sigananda will receive support from different tribes, which I will give him. Word has come here that Makulumana is being sent by the Magistrate at Nongoma." The Zulu king also said Makulumana was not to see Sigananda, and that we were to go first and tell Sigananda this before Makulumana came. We were to hide Sigananda, so that Makulumana should not see him. Bambata was on no account to appear. The third word was: "I shall send my own man with you with my message to Sigananda". Dinuzulu referred to Sigananda as his grandfather. Dinuzulu said: "Tell my grandfather Sigananda that he is to receive my man Bambata into his bosom, and take care of him". The last word was: "I have no further power. You will go and report me to the white people and say this is my impi." We delivered the message to Sigananda. The day after our return we saw Makulumana approaching, and we said to Sigananda: "Chief, instructions have been received you are not to see Makulumana. Hide." We then hid him. While Makulumana was with us he slept at Nfanamadhlozi's kraal. It would have been very easy for Sigananda to see Makulumana had it not been for the word that came from Dinuzulu. Sigananda himself was very anxious to see Makulumana, but he was overruled by his people. I was present when the man Dinuzulu sent back delivered his message to Sigananda. The

message was: "When Makulumana comes you must hide". The second word was that Dinuzulu was afraid they would report him to Mr. Saunders.

By Lieut.-Col. Wylie: The message was delivered to Masele, his own man, and myself, by Dinuzulu. Masele was wounded in the thigh in the Bobe fight, and died in consequence. When I left Dinuzulu I believed that he was at the bottom of the disturbance, and intended to assist in the rebellion. Sigananda would never have taken up the attitude that he did take up if he had not expected support from Dinuzulu, because Sigananda has no war power. Cakitshana came to see Makulumana at Nfanamadhlozi's kraal. Cakitshana was looked upon as Dinuzulu's representative by all the people. Makulumana and Cakitshana were seen talking together. The people looked upon Mangati as appointed in supreme command by Dinuzulu. It was on that account that Bambata, Mihlokazulu and other leaders allowed Mangati to assume that position. He told Ndabeningi that he was not so big as he, Mangati.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: You say that you got a message from Dinuzulu to give to Sigananda, that Sigananda would receive support from different tribes, which Dinuzulu would give. Do you remember saying that?—I told Sigananda that.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: Did Dinuzulu's own messenger tell Sigananda that?—Yes; this man told Sigananda that in my presence, and also in the presence of Polombo.

Captain Clarkson intimated that prisoner wished to make a statement.

Sigananda states: I have nothing to say. The Court already has the words I should have said. The only statement I would care to make is a statement to them.

I should have spoken to those people who drew this man along here. The men I refer to are Dinuzulu and Makulumana. I have nothing further to say. I simply wish the Court to speak according to the laws under which the Court is constituted.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: I want the names of the people who brought you into trouble?—I say their names; they are Dinuzulu and Makulumana.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie: How did Dinuzulu and Makulumana get you into trouble?—I do not know, sir; because this man Bambata came from their country. I simply say let the Court administer its law, seeing they are not here. I have not a lot of words to say. I simply wish the Court to deal with me according to the law.

Case closed for defence.

Major Vanderplank, prosecutor, informed the Court that he did not wish to address.

Captain Clarkson, for the defence, addressed the Court.

Mr. President and Gentlemen: It has been necessary in order to ascertain the cause of the present rebellion to go outside the charge brought against Sigananda. There is no question that under the indictment he is liable to be punished, as the prisoner is unable to produce evidence to prove his innocence of the charges alleged against him, but the old man in his statement says it is not his trouble, but was due to outside influence.

We have endeavoured in the course of this trial to find out what was the cause of the trouble. All the witnesses agree upon one point, that they expected support from Dinuzulu, and it was owing to that they went into revolt. Up to the time of Makulumana's visit a diligent search was being made for Bambata—all the witnesses state this; they had positive proof of that—and then this search

ceased. Why? Because of the outside influence. They also had positive proof that Cakitshana was acting for Dinuzulu, because he said so, and by Makulumana interviewing him and not remonstrating with him, or correctly informing the tribe of his position so far as Dinuzulu is concerned. We have evidence here from a man named Njinjini that when on a visit to Dinuzulu to report the burning of Cetshwayo's grave a man named Mangati was there. You have sufficient proof of this man's position with the rebels. Witness certainly said Dinuzulu was annoyed with this man Mangati, because he was mixing Dinuzulu's name with the rebellion. Dinuzulu, however, did nothing to him and allowed him to leave his kraal although he must have known the position he occupied with the rebels. This man commanded the forces at the Mome fight, superseding Bambata, Mihlokazulu and other leaders. You have evidence that they all thought it was Dinuzulu's wish that this should be so, and they accepted it as such. The witness Njinjini was present when this man arrived, but no word was said about him on the visit of the policemen to Dinuzulu. In fact, Dinuzulu was harbouring a rebel of great importance, as after events proved.

Previous to the disturbance in Natal, we have evidence to prove that Bambata and another went to the royal kraal and interviewed Dinuzulu. The old man, in his statement, corroborates this, and said that this man Bambata had gone to Dinuzulu and returned to Natal and started the trouble there. It is stated that Cakitshana, after Bambata's arrival, went to visit Dinuzulu. We do not know if he got there, but we do know that it was believed by prisoner and his people that this man was nominated by Dinuzulu, and in consequence of this belief,

they allowed him to do as he pleased. But prisoner, Sigananda, fearing the consequences of assisting this man, sent two messengers, Maginga and Masele, to report the arrival of this man at the bush, and you have in evidence the reply that was sent to Sigananda by Dinuzulu, with Maginga. You have the evidence for defence of this man Maginga, that he reported the arrival of Bambata, and the prosecution did not think it advisable to cross-examine this man on the question, therefore admitting it was true. Dinuzulu said that Sigananda was to look after this man. He told Maginga to hurry back before Makulumana could see Sigananda or Bambata, and say that it was his—Dinuzulu's—express wish that Sigananda should not see Makulumana. This message was carried out to the letter, with the result that the allegiance of the tribe was turned to Dinuzulu from the Supreme Chief.

We have the arrival of Bambata by various witnesses, some slightly contradictory, but in connection with this arrival this fact stands out prominently: that up to the time the tribe heard that he was Dinuzulu's man, they searched diligently for Bambata. After that, Cakitshana, who was Dinuzulu's representative, took over control of the tribe, and this, unfortunately, was acquiesced in by prisoner, because he did not object. When Makulumana arrived the tribe firmly believed that they were obeying the orders of Dinuzulu in not allowing Sigananda to meet him. At Nfanamadhlozi's kraal Makulumana gave them distinctly to understand that this affair was being arranged by Bambata, himself and Dinuzulu. He was there as the bearer of a message from the Magistrate, but that his sympathies were with the rebels. On being asked by one of the men present to take charge then, he said he had to return and bring back a message. At the church where

Moses, Bambata's preacher, was, you have the statement then made by Makulumana showing that his sympathies were with the people who were in open rebellion, and he never remonstrated with them except in this sense, that he would have to report that he had been received unkindly, and they had threatened to kill him. You have also on record that this man Cakitshana, who was sent by Dinuzulu, was seen in company with Makulumana, and Makulumana must have known the various officials taking part in this rebellion, and that the tribe looked upon Cakitshana as Dinuzulu's representative.

We have a total change in the attitude of Sigananda's people after Makulumana's visit. They firmly believed support would come, and more so than ever after Makulumana's visit. Although what has been said does not make the crime of Sigananda any the less, it is essential that this should be brought before the Court, to show that had it not been for this outside influence, this man would never have resisted the authorities, and would have brought Bambata to justice. Sigananda, up to a certain time after the arrival of Bambata, was loyal, and from the evidence I think it is clear he did his best to capture him ; but when he was satisfied that he was Dinuzulu's representative, or tool, he relinquished the search, and openly brought Bambata before the tribe.

The President of the Court questioned several of the witnesses, asking them whether they owed obedience to the Governor at Pietermaritzburg, or Dinuzulu. They naturally said, the Governor, but Dinuzulu's influence was so great, and the ties of blood so strong, that they looked to him and paid more attention to his orders than the Governor's. This shows clearly that Dinuzulu's presence in Zululand cannot help but be against peace and

good order. These people naturally (I cannot say whether it is on account of their thirst for blood or not) plunged themselves into the thick of it, firmly believing that their cause would prosper, because they had Dinuzulu's moral support, and expected his active support.

The whole of the evidence in this case has gone to show they expected this support. It is unnecessary to refer to the evidence in detail, but a reference will not be out of place. When Sigananda was remonstrating with the men previous to the Bobe fight, Cakitshana told them there: "I am Dinuzulu's representative, and it is no business of yours". The old man, personally, has not taken any part in the actual fighting, and was never present at any fight; and his extreme age should be sufficient alone to prove that. He, unfortunately, never remonstrated, or gave a direct order not to take up arms against the white people, and, therefore, as Chief of his tribe, he has transgressed the laws. He requested the Magistrate here last year to be relieved of his responsibility. It shows he has been feeling the burden of his extreme age. As he was not relieved, he is still responsible to the Government, and he is responsible for the tribe going into open revolt; but, as I have said before, to an old man of Sigananda's age, there must be a certain amount of mercy for his actions. When a man occupying Dinuzulu's position is found to be the instigator of this disturbance, and to have used his influence over Sigananda for evil, in mitigation of his sentence this should be taken into account.

The evidence that has been given in this case all goes to show that Dinuzulu is at the bottom of everything, and, as I have said before, had it not been for this, Bambata would have been handed over to the authorities. Sigananda has had the advantage of his case being


thoroughly gone into, and all the evidence he required has been called; and, as he says, he would like to meet the people responsible for this trouble—Dinuzulu and Makulumana.

Gentlemen, I ask, although the crime with which the prisoner is charged is the most serious any one can be charged with, owing to peculiar circumstances, and what the evidence has revealed, that any sentence that will be passed will be such that Sigananda will still have the opportunity of proving further allegiance to the Supreme Chief in Maritzburg. I would like to add, in conclusion, that Dinuzulu's influence in Zululand is, apparently, so great, that although he may be wrongly judged by me as to his loyalty, I am certain of one thing, and it stands out prominently, that all the natives look to him, and he is, in their minds, superior to the Governor; and so long as he remains in Zululand, and occupies this position, he will be a lasting menace to good order and peace.

THE VERDICT.

Lieut.-Col. Wylie, President: The Court have unanimously found you guilty of the crimes you are charged with—rebellion, high treason and public violence. The sentence which has been passed cannot now be communicated to you, as it has to be confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief. The authority and power of the Supreme Chief in Maritzburg has to be maintained; no matter what the cost in money, and blood it will be enforced in Zululand and throughout Natal. If the natives in Zululand and Natal do not obey the laws nothing will stop the white men until they have punished every man. Your fate is only the fate of every Zulu who disobeys the laws. You, by your wrong actions, have caused the death of a very large

number of your own tribe. Every Chief in Zululand or Natal who arms his men against the white men will have to suffer penalties, and be punished. The Supreme Chief has enough soldiers in the field to sweep Zululand from the north to the south of every black man in it. If they do not obey the laws, the same thing will happen to them as happened to the men who are lying dead in the Mome Gorge. There is no force under the control of the black man that will stop the white men. When the Commander-in-Chief has confirmed the sentence it will be communicated to you.



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B.D. JAN 1 1 1913

